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The second half of the 1990s saw an extended run of strength in 
the U.S. economy.  Both the highs and lows were notable: the govern-
ment budget was in surplus, the national unemployment rate was at a
historical low, the share of the population employed was high, inflation
was low, and the stock market was high.  These strong U.S. economic
indicators stood out against more sobering statistics for virtually all
U.S. trading partners.  Economic downturns plagued Europe and Latin
America, and financial crises rocked Asia.
In the midst of these differing states of economic health, Americans
became more aware of the growing relationship between the U.S. econ-
omy and the rest of the world.  It is now a familiar refrain to claim that
the U.S. economy is opening up to the world.  For American con-
sumers, there are more imported goods and services to buy.  Between
1965 and 1999, imports as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)
rose from 5 percent to 13.1 percent.  For American workers, a larger
share of what is produced in U.S. factories and offices is exported now
than 35 years ago.  Between the mid 1960s and 1999, the share of ex-
ports in GDP rose from 5 percent to 10.3 percent.  If we limit our view
to merchandise trade (as we will throughout this volume), we can con-
clude that U.S. manufacturing is more integrated now than at any time
in the past century.1 The integration of the U.S. economy can also be
viewed from the perspective of outsourcing, an activity whereby as-
pects of the production process are accomplished abroad and then com-
bined with domestic production activity.  This disintegration of the
formerly domestically centered production process has increased con-
siderably in the United States.2
The impact of free trade, now and historically, is a ready source of
public debate.3 The terms of that debate differ enormously between
participants at the national level (professional economists and politi-
cians) and participants at the local level.  Professional economists high-
light the net benefits of free trade: gains to consumers from lower
prices, gains to the overall economy in efficiency, and higher aggregate
welfare.  As a group, economists are in broad agreement on the net ben-
1
efits of trade to national economies.  Similarly, economists agree that
liberalized trade reduces incomes to some producers and workers—in
other words, the distribution of the benefits from free trade, across in-
dustries, occupations, regions, and ultimately individuals, is uneven.
Industries such as automobiles, steel, textiles, footwear, and consumer
electronics have experienced employment declines as imported goods
increasingly compete with domestically produced goods.  Growth of
foreign markets through exports has conveyed benefits on other indus-
tries, including aircraft, computers, entertainment, and finance.
Economists generally are in agreement with these descriptions and
other broad-brush statements.  For example, most economists acknowl-
edge the existence of costs associated with moving workers and capital
from import-competing sectors to other parts of the economy.  After all,
open trade is about shifting resources toward their most productive
uses, and these shifts can be costly.  Yet, individual standards of living
and people’s lives are in the details, and it is in the details where econ-
omists find less agreement and even outright division.  Some econo-
mists, by focusing on the national level, find the costs of reallocating
workers and capital across sectors and regions to be small.  With large
aggregate benefits and small aggregate losses, this side of the debate is
“pro–free trade.”
Individuals, unions, small firms, and state and local governments
make up the other side of the debate.  Where the pro–free trade side em-
phasizes the benefits, this group highlights the costs of free trade.  This
side was once less visible at the national level (with election years rais-
ing its visibility through the campaigns of political office seekers such
as Ross Perot and Patrick Buchanan).  As the 1990s ended, the “global-
ization backlash,” first seen on a visible scale during the street demon-
strations in Seattle during the November 1999 World Trade Organiza-
tion Ministerial meetings, was widely recognized and a potent political
force.  The strength, and ultimately political clout, of this group is that
the workers and communities who experience the costly dislocations
from freer trade are on this side.
Scores of articles have appeared on the two sides of the debate, in
the popular and academic arenas, and each side makes legitimate points.
Trade of goods and services across borders is beneficial for individuals
and firms that obtain what they want at lower prices and/or reach new
markets.  Such trade is not beneficial for those whose firms lose market
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share and cease production (or continue only at lower pay and profits),
despite the overall gains to the economy.  Ross Perot provided the de-
bate’s most visible and memorable phrase when he claimed that ratifica-
tion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would cre-
ate “a giant sucking sound” with high-paying jobs leaving the United
States for Mexico.
The ground appears to be shifting under the two sides.  After much
progress in unilateral and multilateral trade and investment policy lib-
eralization, there is currently a policy stalemate on questions of further
trade liberalization.  One causal interpretation of the stalemate is the as-
cendancy of the forces highlighting the domestic labor market costs of
freer trade.  Even with a policy stalemate, however, the process of
global economic integration will continue.  Yet, it seems most impor-
tant to remember that free trade is about net benefits; some will win and
others will lose.  In that light, understanding some of the magnitudes of
costs and benefits may contribute to more educated public discourse.
This book attempts to do that.  Several questions frame the analysis.  Is
there any validity to the claim that increasing trade is associated with
American job loss?  What are the theoretical underpinnings of such a
claim?  What do the data show?  Are parts of the claim consistent with
the facts and other parts inconsistent? 
With my training as an economist, I understand the net benefits of
liberalized trade.  As a scholar of labor markets and specifically job dis-
placement, however, I also understand the costly dislocations that occur
as economies change in response to freer trade.  In this book, I try to
bring a better understanding of the labor market costs of freer trade into
the national policy-making debate.  Only by understanding the costs
can the nation equitably move forward on the path of international eco-
nomic integration to enjoy the benefits.  Balanced advocacy of free
trade by economists requires full recognition that economy-wide posi-
tive net benefits do not preclude localized negative net benefits.  Eco-
nomic theory suggests that not everyone benefits from free trade; posi-
tive economy-wide benefits result from the gains of the winners
exceeding the losses of the losers.  Economy-wide, freer trade is only
welfare-enhancing if the winners compensate the losers through a
transfer of resources by policy.  This book aims to measure some of the
losses in the hope that future policy making will address them and the
people who bear the burden.
OUTLINE, OBJECTIVES, AND FINDINGS
A number of recent studies of the impact of international trade on
the domestic labor market have revealed potentially important links be-
tween increased foreign competition and reductions in employment and
relative earnings, particularly for less-skilled manufacturing workers.
This book seeks to add to that research and contribute to future policy
debate by providing a detailed examination of the relationship between
changes in international trade, employment, and job displacement for a
sample of  U.S. manufacturing industries.  The link between interna-
tional trade and domestic jobs is explored through studies of both net
and gross employment change.  Bringing together a variety of mea-
sures of employment change may offer a more complete understanding
of the impact of trade on domestic employment than any one approach
alone.  I proceed as follows.
Economists bring to the question of the impact of trade on domes-
tic employment an extensive and informative set of insights known as
international trade theory.  Some of the basics of trade theory form a
useful foundation of this study’s empirical focus, and this is the subject
of Chapter 2.  Different models of international trade point to different
indicators of international linkages.  In this chapter, I also discuss em-
pirical measures of the intensity of foreign competition.
This study of trade and the domestic labor market builds on a sub-
stantial body of earlier research.  In Chapter 3, I review the relevant lit-
erature in the areas of trade, employment, wages, and job loss.  The re-
view is not comprehensive; instead, it establishes basic methodologies
and reviews findings.  Taken as a group, these studies point to interna-
tionalization, particularly expansions of international trade, as a source
of declining manufacturing employment and increasing wage inequali-
ty but not the most important source.
The real empirical work begins in Chapter 4, where the data on
manufacturing employment and job loss are first introduced.  The ob-
jective of the chapter is to lay out the basic trends in manufacturing em-
ployment, job loss, trade, and domestic demand over the period of
1979–1994.  This time period is dictated by data availability: the job
loss data begin in 1979, and 1994 represents a significant break point in
the industry definitions for the trade flows data.  With these trends, we
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can consider several questions.  Has increased import competition been
an important factor behind declining employment?  Are changes in ex-
ports associated with changes in employment?  Do these relationships
hold for many industries or for a subset of industries?  From the per-
spective of manufacturing employment, the 15-year period from the
late 1970s to the mid 1990s was a difficult one.  The sector as a whole
was rocked by two recessions, a deep one in the early 1980s and anoth-
er, not so deep, in the early 1990s.  Productivity growth was sluggish,
and U.S. consumer demand continued to shift away from manufactured
goods and toward services.  There was also a seeming continued rise of
foreign competition.  Manufacturing employment has remained fairly
constant over the past 25 years, yet the composition of employment
within the sector has changed rather dramatically across industries and
over time.  Employment declined (sharply in many cases) in many
manufacturing industries, particularly during the late 1970s and early
1980s.  Over time, import share has risen within manufacturing, from
imports accounting for an average of 0.066 of domestic supply in 1975
to an average share of 0.171 in 1994 (an increase of 159 percent).  In
1994, U.S. firms exported about 12.5 percent of manufacturing ship-
ments to foreign markets, averaged across the industries in the sample.
This level represents a 50 percent increase from 1975.  Export intensity
grew slowly over the late 1970s and fell a bit from 1980 to 1985 with
the sharp dollar appreciation of the early 1980s.  From 1985 to 1994,
export intensity rose 68 percent from 7.2 percent of shipments to 12.5
percent.
Bringing together, descriptively, the data on employment and trade
reveals that sharply declining exports are strongly associated with em-
ployment decline, particularly in the industries accounting for the bulk
of the employment loss.  Rising imports are also strongly associated
with employment decline but more so in the smaller traditionally im-
port-competing industries (watches and clocks, footwear, and leather
products).  Apparel, a traditionally import-competing industry, was the
biggest employer in the set of top 10 industries for import share gain
and export decline.  The iron and steel industries appear hard hit by the
combination of rising import share and declining exports, as well as
large employment losses. 
How much employment decline was associated with the rise in im-
port share and/or the decline in exports?  Due mostly to employment
size, industries with the largest increases in import share accounted for
a noticeably small share of total sectoral employment decline.  Of the
top import share gainers (and export losers, with solid domestic de-
mand), apparel accounted for the largest share of employment declines,
at 7 percent.  With apparel at number 8 in rising import share, the top 10
import share gainers accounted for 21 percent of employment decline,
and they started with 12 percent of 1979 employment.  Four of the in-
dustries in this group had considerable export decline.  The top 10 in
export decline accounted for about 25 percent of employment loss,
starting from a 12 percent 1979 employment share. 
Industry net employment change is a result of changes in the gross
flows of new hires, recalls, quits, displacements, temporary layoffs, and
retirements.  Following the descriptive analysis of industry net employ-
ment change, I turn to one of the gross flows, job displacement, in an
analysis that is more novel.4 As commonly understood, job displace-
ment is an involuntary (from the worker’s perspective) termination of
employment based on the employer’s operating decisions—not on a
worker’s individual performance.  The focus on job displacement is
motivated by the perspective that the amount of social and private ad-
justment to freer trade depends importantly on gross employment
changes, and it is the job loss component of employment change that
most concerns workers, the general public, and policymakers.  Interna-
tional trade theory, together with previous empirical work, provides a
starting point: trade liberalization will lead to labor reallocation, with
jobs moving away from import-competing industries and toward export
industries.  From that starting point, several questions are posed.  De-
scriptively, how does the survey evidence on job displacement accord
with standard measures of increasing foreign competition? Is displace-
ment associated with employment losses?  Is the incidence of job dis-
placement across and within industries causally related to changes in
foreign competition?
The descriptive analysis reported in Chapter 4 reveals that, with a
few exceptions, all industries with above-average rates of job loss have
above-average employment declines in employment.  Industries with
employment growth tend to have lower job loss rates.  The large em-
ployment industries, all with sizeable increases in import share, all had
fairly large employment declines and job loss rates at or higher than the
sectoral average.  Interestingly, the strongest relationship between em-
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ployment change and the risk of job displacement is found amongst the
set of small (in employment) traditionally import-competing industries,
such as leather tanning and finishing (with a 29 percent employment
decline and a 0.073 job loss rate), watches and clocks (a 69 percent em-
ployment decline and a 0.091 job loss rate), and leather products (a 78
percent employment decline and a 0.142 job loss rate).
For the most part, these high job loss rate industries had both a high
import share and experienced a large (positive) change in import share
(increasing import competition).  In other words, the combination of
“trade with job loss” appears to arise from continued, sustained import
competition. Industries with lower import share yet large positive
change in import share have lower rates of job loss (metalworking ma-
chinery, aircraft, and knitting mills), while industries with high import
share and average or smaller changes in import share also have average
or lower rates of job loss (motor vehicles, and engines and turbines).
The discernible patterns found in the descriptive analysis, while in-
teresting and informative, require more detailed examination in an
econometric model.  Chapter 5 describes a straightforward empirical
model relating changes in foreign trade and foreign competition and
changes in industry employment and job displacement, and it is the ba-
sis for the econometric analyses that follow in Chapters 6 and 7.
Changes in industry employment are the focus of Chapter 6.  Over-
all, the results are consistent with arguments that increasing imports re-
duce employment and that increasing exports (and domestic demand)
enhance employment.  Within an industry on a year-to-year basis, ris-
ing exports are more strongly associated with employment growth than
are increases in domestic demand.  A 10 percent increase in sales due to
exports leads to a 7 percent increase in employment, whereas a 10 per-
cent increase in domestic demand leads to a 3.5 percent increase in em-
ployment.  A 10 percent increase in import share leads to a 4 percent
reduction in employment.  The employment-enhancing effect of ex-
panding exports is significantly greater than the employment-reducing
effect of expanding imports.  Across industries, the effect of rising im-
port share on employment is larger, where a 10 percent increase in im-
ports is associated with an employment decline of approximately 5 per-
cent.  This is consistent with the more descriptive analysis of Chapter 4,
which revealed a relatively strong relationship between rising import
share in the traditionally import-competing industries and a much less
systematic relationship in other industries.  Within the “typical” manu-
facturing industry, developed country imports and developing country
imports have equally sized effects on domestic employment. 
The analysis discussed in Chapter 6 measures increasing foreign
competition as changes in import price and suggests that a 10 percent
increase in import price is associated with an approximately 3 percent
decline in employment.  A one standard deviation change in import
price, 6.6 percent, implies a 1.98 percent decline in employment. 
At the end of Chapter 6, the within-industry estimates of the rela-
tionship between changes in trade flows and employment are used to
generate counterfactual simulations of the path of employment change,
had imports and exports been “frozen” at their 1979 levels.  In most in-
dustries, there would have been more employment with neutral imports
and less employment with neutral exports.  If import share had been
frozen at its 1979 level, average industry employment would have de-
clined by 8.8 percent.  For an average industry, this 4.6 percent differ-
ence, due to the increase in imports, represents 11,693 jobs.  On the
other hand, if exports had been frozen at their 1979 level, employment
would have fallen by 19 percent, 5.6 percent more than observed.
Thus, the growth in exports “saved” an average of 14,235 jobs in man-
ufacturing.  Together, if both imports and exports had been frozen at
1979 levels, employment would have declined by 16.4 percent, or 3
percent more than observed (7,626 jobs).
The empirical focus narrows to job displacement in Chapter 7.  A
10 percent increase in sales is associated with a 1-percentage-point de-
crease in the job loss rate.  The most striking result is the large respon-
siveness of job loss rates to changes in exports.  A 10 percent rise in
exports lowers the industry displacement rate by 2.2 percent.  A 10 per-
cent rise in domestic demand lowers the industry job loss rate by 0.9
percent.  The sensitivity of job loss to changes in exports has been over-
looked, but it may not be surprising.  The rise in exports can be inter-
preted as a shift in labor demand, leading to an increase in the desired
level of employment.  At a given level of hiring (accessions) and
nondisplacement separations, employment will rise with a fall in per-
manent job loss. 
Most notably, rising import share is associated with a higher dis-
placement rate, but the coefficient is small and the estimate is impre-
cise.  At standard levels of statistical significance, it cannot be rejected
8 Introduction
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that the “true” effect of changes in import share on the job loss rate is
zero.  The within-industry effect of rising import share is notably
smaller than the cross-industry effect, suggesting that the relationship
between rising import share and job loss holds (perhaps strongly) for a
subset of industries, but it is considerably weaker systematically or for
all manufacturing industries.  In other words, specific high import share
industries account for the rising import share–job loss relationship, and
once those industry effects are accounted for, the correlation between
rising import share and job loss is much weaker.  This difference is con-
sistent with the descriptive findings (noted in Chapter 4) that high rates
of job loss are found in the set of industries facing sustained import
competition where large positive changes in import share occur from a
starting point of a high level of import share.  Differentiating imports
by country of origin makes no difference in understanding changes in
the rate of job loss.
Chapter 8 concludes and discusses policy implications.  For policy,
the inclusion of exports into the story requires a reorientation of think-
ing.  “Trade” is not just imports.  A usual starting point is that if imports
are a culprit in the loss of jobs, then import restrictions can be used to
protect jobs.  The relatively small elasticities found here show that re-
ducing import share will not boost employment or reduce job displace-
ment by much, and consumers will bear the cost through higher prices.
There are industries, however, where the link between job loss and in-
creasing imports is strong.  For workers displaced from these indus-
tries, losing a job can be a costly experience, with two-thirds of work-
ers earning less on the new job than they did on the old job (see Kletzer
2001).  Protecting workers can be accomplished more directly through
domestic adjustment assistance policy.  This approach has long had
considerable support in the domestic politics of freer trade.
This study broadens our understanding of the benefits of export ac-
tivity.  If exports enhance employment growth and reduce job loss, then
acquiring or extending access to foreign markets can be a focus of pol-
icy.  Increasing foreign demand, all else the same, has a sizeable impact
on employment growth and it reduces job loss.  Particularly for U.S.
manufacturing, foreign markets provide a way to maintain demand and
employment as American consumers continue, with rising incomes, to
shift from goods-oriented consumption to services-oriented consump-
tion.
Notes
1. Feenstra (1998, p. 35) reported merchandise trade relative to merchandise value-
added and found the ratio 150 percent higher in 1990 than in 1890 and 273 percent
higher than in 1960.
2. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) estimated that imported inputs increased from 5.7 per-
cent of total U.S. manufactured imports in 1972 to 11.6 percent in 1990.  Out-
sourcing is concentrated in textiles, apparel, and footwear (see also Feenstra 1998).
3. Although Americans seem particularly taken by the growth of international trade,
it can be useful to remember that the share of trade in the U.S. economy in the mid
1990s was much smaller not only than the share of trade in most other industrial-
ized countries but also smaller than the share of trade in most other industrialized
countries 30 years ago.  In addition, while trade has grown in the United States, it
has grown even faster in some developing countries.




Understanding the Links between
Increasing Foreign Competition and
Domestic Employment and Job Loss
International trade theory provides a theoretical framework for
thinking about how changes in the global competitive environment af-
fect domestic labor.  In this chapter I review the basics of international
trade theory, focusing on theories relevant to how “trade” affects the
jobs of American workers.  With the theory in place, I then turn to a dis-
cussion of available empirical measures of the intensity of foreign com-
petition.
This study is predicated on the benefits of trade.  As noted in the in-
troduction, economists agree on the proposition that people, firms, and
countries should trade with each other to raise standards of living.
Trade has four main benefits: 1) it leads to efficiencies in production
through the principle of comparative advantage and, relatedly, special-
ization; 2) it leads to efficient consumption, through lower prices for
goods and services that result from the lower opportunity costs of pro-
ducing at comparative advantage; 3) it opens up a more competitive en-
vironment, with domestic producers competing with foreign producers,
leading to lower prices both statically and dynamically as competition
spurs innovation; and 4) it brings about an increased variety of avail-
able products. Readers interested in a more complete presentation are
directed to Burtless et al. (1998) for a particularly clear and concise dis-
cussion.
A BRIEF EXCURSION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL
TRADE THEORY: THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
Loosely speaking, two trends appear to line up, providing the link
between trade and a deteriorating labor market for manufacturing
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workers: 1) trade with the rest of the world has increased and 2) wages
and employment of production workers have fallen.  As consumers buy
more foreign-produced goods, they buy fewer domestically produced
goods, and American workers lose jobs and/or see their wages fall.
This section discusses the theoretical foundations of such claims.
Differences in prices across countries, reflecting differences in the
costs of production, are the most basic cause of trade.  With these dif-
ferences in prices, trade serves to minimize the resource costs of
(worldwide) production.  By minimizing the resource costs of produc-
tion, trade maximizes the real value of production from world re-
sources.  This happens because, with trade, producers in each country
can specialize in those economic activities that make the best use of
their country’s resources. 
Restated, these international differences in the relative costs of pro-
duction constitute the notion of comparative advantage, the mainstay of
international trade theory (the analysis of why nations trade).  Compar-
ative advantage was introduced by David Ricardo in his Principles of
Political Economy and extended and refined by Eli Heckscher and
Bertil Ohlin.1 At its simplest, a nation’s comparative advantage in
some goods and comparative disadvantage in others is a result of that
nation’s endowment of natural resources, weather, technology, and la-
bor force productivity.  The basic prediction of the model of interna-
tional trade with comparative advantage is that countries will tend to
export those goods where their endowment of land, labor, capital, and
technology allows expansion of output with the smallest sacrifice of
other domestic goods.  Conversely, countries will import goods whose
production is relatively more costly in terms of alternative domestic
output.  Ricardo used differences in technology to create opportunities
for trade.  The Heckscher–Ohlin theory is based on country differences
in factor endowments.  Countries will tend to export goods whose pro-
duction is intensive in factors with which they are abundantly endowed
and will tend to import goods whose production is intensive in factors
with which they are scarcely endowed.  This result, and its implications
for wages and employment, can be illustrated quite clearly in the con-
text of the two-factor, two-good Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model,
the standard or “textbook” model.
Each of the two countries in this basic setup is able to produce two
goods, the production of which requires the use of two factors of pro-
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duction.  These two inputs, capital and labor, are available in fixed sup-
ply in both countries.  Both economies share the same technology.  One
of the two goods requires a higher ratio of capital to labor than does the
other and is hence capital intensive.  The other is labor intensive.
Each economy will tend to be relatively efficient at producing the
good that is intensive in the factor with which it is relatively well en-
dowed.  The country/producer with the smaller opportunity cost of pro-
ducing a good has comparative advantage in the production of that
good.  In this framework, comparative advantage is based on the inter-
action between the resources a country possesses and the existing tech-
nology of production.  When trade opens up between these two coun-
tries, each one will tend to specialize in and export the good for which
it has comparative advantage, the good whose production is intensive
in the factor with which it is abundantly endowed.  The capital-rich
country will tend to specialize in and export the capital intensive good
and import the labor-intensive good and vice-versa for the labor abun-
dant country.2
International trade in this model will cause the export sector to ex-
pand production and the import sector to contract production as each
country focuses their production on the good in which they have com-
parative advantage.  With trade, as the two countries specialize accord-
ing to their respective comparative advantages, both benefit in that their
total consumption will be greater with trade than in the absence of
trade.  Free trade benefits both countries because it allows all resources
to be used most productively.
With an assumption of full employment, the capital and labor that
is “released” from the import sector is “absorbed” instantaneously by
the export sector.  The production of both goods is assumed to be char-
acterized by perfect competition, in both the output market and the fac-
tor market.  Therefore, the price of each good is exactly equal to the
cost of producing it and prices automatically adjust so that supply
equals demand.  This assumption rules out market imperfections, such
as monopoly pricing, long-term trade imbalances, and chronic unem-
ployment.  With the assumption of flexible prices and wages and full
employment, all the effects of trade on the demand for labor are reflect-
ed in wage changes.  As long as both goods are produced, there is a di-
rect relationship between global goods prices and domestic factor
prices.  In other words, when world goods prices change, so do home
factor prices.  So, in order to find out how international trade affects
wages in this model, we need to examine what happens to the relative
prices of the goods.
Given that there are no barriers to trade, international trade in this
model leads to a global convergence in the relative prices of the two
goods.  Without trade, the relative price of the capital intensive good is
lower in the capital abundant country because it is produced relatively
more efficiently.  The relative price of the labor intensive good is lower
in the labor abundant country because it is produced relatively more ef-
ficiently there.  The new relative price of the capital intensive good will
settle somewhere between the autarky (no-trade) levels of the relative
prices in both countries.  Thus, with trade, the relative price of the labor
intensive good increases in the labor abundant country and falls in the
capital abundant country.  Given that the relative price of the goods has
changed in each country, so will the relative factor prices.  The Stolper–
Samuelson theorem discusses how relative factor prices change in re-
sponse to a change in the relative price of goods.
Stolper–Samuelson theorem
The analysis of the effect of changes in relative goods prices on
factor prices, in the context of the two-factor, two-good Heckscher–
Ohlin framework, first appeared in Stolper and Samuelson (1941).
Generalized beyond the 2 × 2 case, this analysis now stands as the ori-
gin of the “Stolper–Samuelson effect,” and it is the foundation for most
studies of the effect of “trade” on wages.  Stolper and Samuelson
showed that there is a magnified effect of goods prices on factor prices.
When, as a result of trade liberalization, the relative price of the capital
intensive good increases in the capital abundant country, it will cause
an increase in the rental price of capital and a fall in the wage rate (the
return to labor).  Since the wage rate falls, the increase in the rental
price of capital must be proportionately higher than the increase in the
price of the capital intensive good.  In the labor abundant country, the
relative price of the labor intensive good has risen which causes an in-
crease in the wage rate and a fall in the rental price of capital.  Thus, the
Stolper–Samuelson effect predicts that trade liberalization will cause
the wage rate to fall in the capital abundant country and to increase in
the labor abundant country.3 Note that these factor price changes are
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real; the real wage will fall in the capital abundant country and rise in
the labor abundant country.
This analysis reveals that the benefits from trade liberalization are
uneven.  To fix ideas, we will focus on the U.S. perspective, where we
can consider capital to be abundant and labor scarce.  This is certainly
true for the United States relative to other countries.  The owners of the
two factors of production, capital and labor, will be affected differently
(in opposite directions).  In the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model,
the owners of the relatively scarce factor will be made worse off by
freer trade, and the owners of the abundant factor will be made better
off.  The way this works is that the scarce factor becomes less scarce in
an open economy, so its price (the wage rate) falls.  Then, workers will
be made worse off by falling wages with freer trade, and capital owners
will be made better off.  The loss to labor is more than offset by the
gains to capital, leading to the net national gains from trade.4
In the face of these distributional questions, it is often claimed that
income can be redistributed after a trade liberalization so that every in-
dividual is better off under free trade.  Such a redistribution is theoreti-
cally possible, taking from the gainers to compensate the losers.  If
gross gains exceeds the gross losses, the redistribution will yield net
benefits.  A problem for the theory is that such a redistribution is not a
required, or automatic, part of trade liberalization.  At a minimum,
some political will is required to create legislation that compels the
winners, through government transfer and assistance programs, to com-
pensate the losers.
If we expand the basic model, the two factors of production can be
seen as skilled and unskilled labor, as in Wood (1994).  Alternatively,
the model can work with three factors of production, capital, skilled la-
bor, and unskilled labor, as in Leamer (1993).  Then, the model predicts
increased wage inequality with liberalized trade, as the wages of high
skilled labor (the abundant factor in the United States) rise, and the
wages of low skilled labor (the scarce factor) fall.
Factor price equalization (FPE)
A second theorem relates to the distributional impact of free trade.
In the context of the simple Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model, per-
fectly free trade will cause the factor prices in the two countries to
equalize.  Without trade, different relative goods prices and corre-
spondingly, different relative factor prices, will prevail in the labor
abundant and capital abundant countries.  With free trade, the two
countries will face the same relative prices for goods, and with that, the
relative factor prices they face must also be the same.  This implies, for
example, that wages in the United States and Mexico (and/or China)
would be equalized if trade barriers were completely removed.
The conditions under which the FPE theorem holds are stringent.
Both countries must produce all goods, both countries must employ
identical technology, and there must be constant returns to scale (no
economies or diseconomies of large-scale production).  Factors must be
able to move freely between sectors within each country, there can be
no transport costs or other barriers to trade, and the quality of the fac-
tors of production must be identical in the two countries.5 Given these
stringent conditions, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence
shows that not all factor prices are equalized internationally.  
This basic model and its assumptions should not be accepted liter-
ally.  Most of the model assumptions are violated, at least most of the
time: there is not always full employment nor balanced trade; there are
often economies of scale; technologies differ across countries; endow-
ments of factors are not fixed; countries do specialize completely (e.g.,
the United States produces no bananas); and institutional and market
factors do influence prices, wages, supply, and demand.
With the assumption of fully flexible, market-clearing wages and
full employment, the standard model points to wage changes as the key
outcome for influence by free trade.  In a standard Heckscher–Ohlin–
Samuelson model, if the price of an imported (substitutable) good falls,
labor’s marginal revenue product falls.  This drop in the derived de-
mand for labor reduces employment (on an upward sloping labor sup-
ply curve).  Flexible wages dampen the fall in employment.  If wages
adjust fully to equate labor demand and labor supply (a competitive la-
bor market), employment falls to desired levels through (employee-ini-
tiated) quits.  How much wages and employment change will depend
on supply and demand elasticities.  With market-clearing wages, labor
leaving the import sector will be reallocated to the export sector, and
full employment will be sustained.
With the full employment assumption, conventional trade models
focus their predictive power on changes in goods and factor prices.
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(These prices must be flexible to ensure full employment.)  The data
(and reality) often reveal price and wage inflexibility and unemploy-
ment.  Where wages differ from market-clearing, the likely conse-
quences of increasing import competition differ from the conventional
models.  If wages are inflexible downward, the reduction in labor de-
mand will produce a fall in employment and no wage change.  Thus,
the impact of trade will be felt (much) more on employment and
(much) less so on wages.  The distribution of employment change may
also be affected.  For example, in unionized labor markets where wages
are set by collective bargaining, senior union members may prefer to
maintain wages (and their jobs), with layoffs reducing the employment
of junior workers.6 In a limited number of cases, unions may even push
for higher wages as labor demand falls, with an “endgame” bargaining
strategy that tries to get as much for the union as possible before the in-
dustry disappears.  Wage inflexibility does not require collective bar-
gaining.  If wages diverge from market-clearing for efficiency wage
reasons, firms may be reluctant to impose wage reductions if they an-
ticipate negative productivity consequences.
As we will see in the next chapter, the conventional model assump-
tion of flexible wages and full employment is often not borne out in the
data.  Empirical studies find more evidence of negative employment ef-
fects of trade than of negative wage effects.  These findings motivate
the further analysis of trade-induced employment changes and job loss.
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE AND “NEW” TRADE THEORY
The discussion above focused on so-called “conventional” or “tra-
ditional” trade theory, where industries are characterized by constant
returns to scale and perfect competition.  While no longer literally new,
“new” trade theory addresses the role of increasing returns to scale and
imperfect competition in the world economy.7 New trade theory offers
explanations for empirical observations that cannot be adequately ex-
plained through conventional trade theory.  Two empirical observations
stand out: the first is the volume of trade between countries.  The
Heckscher–Ohlin model explains trade entirely by differences across
countries in factor endowments.  These differences suggest that the vol-
ume of trade between countries will be inversely related to their simi-
larity in relative factor endowments.  The data reveal, however, that
most of the world’s trade occurs between industrialized countries that
are very similar in technology and factor proportions (e.g., trade be-
tween the United States and Canada or trade within the European
Union).  Second, differences between countries’ relative factor endow-
ments should generate a pattern of trade in which countries export
goods whose production is intensive in their abundant factor (e.g, the
United States exports cars and imports apparel).  This is the case, but
only for countries’ net exports (exports minus imports).  Again, the data
reveal clear patterns of substantial two-way trade in goods of similar
factor intensity (e.g., the United States exports and imports cars).  This
type of two-way trade within an industry is called intra-industry trade.
This second empirical observation is most relevant to this study, where
many industries can be characterized as both importers and exporters.
In new trade theory, trade between similar countries is explained by
product differentiation and country-specific economies of scale, in par-
ticular increasing returns to scale.  Increasing returns to scale refers to a
production situation where output of a differentiated good grows pro-
portionately more than the increase in inputs (factors of production).
With increasing returns to scale, unit production costs of a particular
variety of a good fall as the firm’s output expands.  Increasing returns to
scale may develop as a firm grows because a larger scale of operation
allows a greater division of labor and more specialization.  More spe-
cialized and efficient machinery might be introduced, or there might be
a fuller use of capacity or a more detailed division of worker tasks, all
of which could increase worker productivity.  In addition, fixed over-
head costs will make a smaller contribution to average costs as they
will be spread out over a larger volume of output.8 Trade allows simi-
larly endowed countries to specialize in the production of different va-
rieties of a good or even different goods.  They realize the lower unit
costs of increasing returns to scale and trade for other goods.  The pro-
duction efficiencies yield a higher global level of output.
Scale economies can explain trade between countries in goods that
are produced using identical proportions, which the Heckscher–Ohlin
theory cannot.  For example, a great deal of international trade involves
imports and exports of similar, but differentiated, products (such as
Chevrolet, Volvo, Toyota, and Volkswagen cars, or Californian, Chil-
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ean, French, or Italian wine).  This type of trade is called intra-industry
trade.  Producer goods can be differentiated also, including capital
goods (e.g., machine tools, photocopiers, and computers) and interme-
diate inputs (e.g., steel and microprocessors).
The logic of the model is straightforward.  Consider an industry
where the product is differentiated, and let each variety of the good be
produced with increasing returns to scale.  Allow these economies of
scale to occur at a relatively low levels of output so that, under free en-
try, the industry can accommodate many producers in a monopolistical-
ly competitive equilibrium.  Each firm will produce a different variety
of the good, under increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm.
Each firm in an industry (where industry means “product”) chooses a
variety of the product and an output level to maximize profits.  We need
to assume that industry demand displays a demand for variety.  People
can either like variety in their consumption bundles or different people
can prefer different varieties of a product.  Then, for a pair of countries
that produce varieties of a product, the model predicts intra-industry
trade.  In this simplest form, both countries will produce different vari-
eties of a product under trade, and every variety will be demanded in
both countries.  Thus, the production of and demand for differentiated
products generates intra-industry trade.  
Differentiated products are the key point of contrast with conven-
tional trade theory, where products are assumed homogeneous.  In the
Heckscher–Ohlin two-country, two-good, two-factor model, a capital
abundant country will export the capital intensive good and import the
labor intensive good.  This type of trade is inter-industry and is driven
by comparative advantage.  If goods within an industry are differentiat-
ed (there are different varieties of both the capital intensive good and
the labor intensive good), then the capital abundant country will still be
a net exporter of the capital intensive good, but it will also import some
varieties of that good.  The capital abundant country will continue to be
a net importer of the labor intensive good, but it will export some vari-
eties of that good.  The two-way trade in capital and labor intensive
products is intra-industry trade.  Gross exports of capital intensive
goods will exceed net exports from that industry.
To sum up, when products are homogeneous, all trade is inter-in-
dustry.  When products are differentiated, both inter- and intra-industry
trade will occur.  With differentiated products and increasing returns to
scale, there are gains from trade beyond the gains from comparative ad-
vantage.  Product differentiation helps explain the large volume of
trade among developed countries, the relative importance of intra-in-
dustry trade over inter-industry trade within these countries, and the
relative importance of inter-industry trade between developed and de-
veloping countries.9 Product differentiation also suggests higher trade
volumes between advanced industrial countries than is suggested by a
model of factor endowments. 
Increasing returns may have different implications for the distribu-
tion of income than conventional (comparative advantage) trade mod-
els.  Because economies of scale offer potential gains from trade be-
yond the gains from comparative advantage, the traditional impact of
trade on factor returns, following Stolper and Samuelson (1941), may
be reversed.  As discussed above, in the conventional model with con-
stant returns to scale, the Stolper–Samuelson theorem implies that
owners of factors of production that are scarcer in a particular country
than they are in the world overall are likely to lose from free trade.  In
the context of the United States, if unskilled labor is the scarce factor,
the theorem implies that unskilled real wages will decrease, in terms of
all goods, as a result of trade.  In short, unskilled labor in the United
States will be worse off from trade.
Conclusions can be different with scale economies, because the in-
creasing returns provide additional benefits to trade.  Bypassing the
technical details (which are provided in Helpman and Krugman
[1985]), if countries are sufficiently similar in relative factor endow-
ments, so that the changes in relative factor rewards are not too big, and
if economies of scale are sufficiently important, then all factors of pro-
duction can gain from trade.  These universal gains depend upon the
degree to which different product varieties within an industry are sub-
stitutable for one another.  If varieties are highly substitutable and fac-
tor abundance ratios are not very similar between countries, the
Stolper–Samuelson effect can dominate, implying losses from trade for
owners of the scarce factor of production.
This discussion is meant to provide only the basics of international
trade theory.  A far more in-depth review of trade theory and the empir-
ical evidence is found in Leamer and Levinsohn (1995).  For a compre-
hensive discussion of the structure of international trade that integrates
conventional and new trade theory, see Helpman (1999).
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MEASURING INDUSTRY TRADE SENSITIVITY
What is the best indicator of how changes in international trade af-
fect domestic labor?  As we will see in the next chapter, the trade and
employment literature is divided on the answer to this question, with
some studies measuring trade changes and increasing foreign competi-
tion as changes in global prices and other studies using “quantities,”
such as changes in import share or net imports (imports less exports).
There is no unique “best” measure in the sense that the choice of a
proxy for an exogenous shock in the foreign sector is model-specific
(more on this point below).  Causality aside, there is also a question in
the literature about how to classify industries as “trade-sensitive” or
“trade-impacted.”  In this section I take a somewhat agnostic approach
and discuss the various measures available and how the measures may
(or may not) be related to changes in employment and job loss.
Import penetration ratios (or import shares) provide an intuitively
appealing way to categorize industries facing significant foreign com-
petition.  An import penetration ratio is calculated by dividing industry
imports by the sum of industry output plus imports (the denominator is
industry supply).  An export penetration ratio is calculated by dividing
industry exports by industry output.  More generally, industries with a
large (or rising) share of output (or supply) internationally traded are
often labeled “trade-sensitive” (or import/export-sensitive) on the basis
of calculated import (and export) penetration ratios.  If the flow of im-
ports reduces domestic employment, industries with high import pene-
tration ratios are where that result is most likely to be found.10
In some quarters, a quantity-based categorization of industries has
intuitive appeal.  Yet from a theoretical perspective, there is no simple
causal link between the volume of trade and employment changes be-
cause the rise in import share could indicate a number of foreign or do-
mestic developments.  One simple example may be illustrative of the
complexity.  Take the case of perfect competition, increasing but differ-
ent marginal costs of production for both domestic and foreign firms,
with substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.  Let foreign
supply expand, perhaps from technological diffusion (or an export pro-
motion scheme) that lowers foreign costs while domestic costs remain
unchanged.  This reduces the foreign good price and imports rise.  With
constant demand, the rise in imports reduces price, domestic output,
and domestic employment.  With declining domestic output, import
share also rises.  How much import share rises depends on the elastici-
ty of domestic supply.  As domestic supply becomes more elastic, a
given increase in imports produces a bigger reduction in domestic
quantity (and presumably employment) and import share rises.
When trade is measured as quantity flows, it is important also to
consider (or control for) demand.  In the perfectly competitive case, im-
ports may also rise if domestic demand increases.  Price moves accord-
ingly and, if foreign supply is more elastic than domestic supply, im-
port share will also rise because the increase in imports will exceed the
increase in domestic output.  Alternatively, if domestic supply is more
elastic than foreign supply, the rise in imports will be accompanied by
a decline in import share.  Here, the use of quantities reveals an ambi-
guity: rising imports and import share are associated with increased do-
mestic employment and presumably less displacement, and rising im-
ports may not be associated with rising import share.  These two cases
imply that, over time, industry import shares will differ as a result of
differences in supply elasticities as well as differences in the competi-
tiveness of domestic firms relative to foreign firms.
Reliance on changes in trade flows may understate the impact of
foreign competition on wages and employment if the mechanism is
slightly different than that described by conventional theoretical mod-
els.  If employers exercise a threat, either implicit or explicit, of relo-
cating production facilities or outsourcing some part of production,
workers may feel that wage reductions are necessary to save jobs or
that some thinning of payrolls is necessary to save most jobs.  This
threat effect will produce either wage or employment changes without
actual changes in observed trade flows.  Changes in industry import
price might be associated with the wage and/or employment changes,
but not necessarily, as it is the perception of future foreign competition
that may produce the employer threat.  This mechanism does assume
that wages are not set in competitive markets and that a process of la-
bor-management bargaining produces a wage agreement.  The threat of
production relocation and/or outsourcing changes reduce the relative
bargaining power of labor.
The most immediate appeal of a “price” measure is the standard
Heckscher–Ohlin model, where industries face increasing import price
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competition when import prices fall.  The link between import price
competition and industry employment is fairly straightforward.  If the
price of an imported (substitutable) good falls, labor’s marginal rev-
enue product falls.  This drop in the derived demand for labor reduces
employment (on an upward sloping labor supply curve).  Flexible
wages dampen the fall in employment.  If wages adjust fully to equate
labor demand and labor supply (a competitive labor market), employ-
ment falls to desired levels through (employee-initiated) quits.  How
much wages and employment change will depend on supply and de-
mand elasticities, but there will be no displacement.  Only if prices fall
enough that firms find it more profitable to shut down than to continue
to operate will displacements occur (through plant closings).
There are at least two reasons to think that price, conceivably the
preferred measure, is not completely informative about the effect of
changes in trade policy or foreign supply.  The first is that during the
late 1970s and early 1980s some industries had quota protection (ap-
parel, footwear, and radio and television).  Import price changes will
not necessarily reflect these quantity restraints.  More importantly,
these quota restraints imply that market share (import share) is likely to
be a determinant of foreign and domestic supply.
The second difficulty with price alone is more fundamental.  Using
a monopolistically competitive dominant/fringe model, Mann (1988)
showed how market share is likely to be a determinant of both foreign
and domestic supply.  First, quantity is a key variable in monopolistic
competition with heterogeneous outputs (see Spence 1976). Second,
she noted that in a three-factor Cobb–Douglas production function,
with no restrictions on returns to scale and with capital fixed in the
short run, increasing returns to scale are an important determinant of
price.  In her empirical analysis, Mann found that foreign competition,
measured as both import prices and import share, plays a small role in
determining employment relative to the role played by domestic de-
mand and prices.
This discussion of the basics of international trade theory and mea-
sures of foreign competition will serve as a foundation for the detailed
empirical examination that follows.  These basics will also be useful in
our next step, when we turn to the insights of earlier studies.  We can
take several themes from this chapter.  The first is that different models
of international trade point to different indicators of international link-
ages.  Economists differ in their views about which model and indicator
is most appropriate.  This diversity of opinion is reflected in existing
empirical work.  For that empirical work and my own analysis that fol-
lows, it is also important to be clear that both quantity and price mea-
sures are likely to be endogenous, at least in some degree, to the overall
process that produces changes in domestic employment and job loss.
Similarly, both indicators, or certainly their proxies, are subject to data
issues, such as measurement and aggregation concerns.
Notes
1. For a more in-depth discussion of international trade theory, the interested reader
can consult any college-level textbook on international economics.  Salvatore
(1998) provides an accessible presentation, with an emphasis on graphs rather
than formal mathematics.
2. Well beyond the scope of this study, we note that neither endowments nor com-
parative advantage are fixed over time.  Technology, productivity, and capital in-
vestments are not immutable, as they are functions of institutional factors.
3. Allowing for more than two factors weakens the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, al-
though it still implies a weak relationship between factor abundance and the ef-
fects of protection on factor prices.  See Deardorff (1993).
4. Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p. 1348) offer a “winners and losers corollary” in-
terpretation of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem: “When a relative price changes,
there is at least one winner and one loser.”  They consider this corollary to be the
main message of the Stolper–Samuelson paper: that free trade is not good for
everyone.
5. There is one additional technical assumption of a unique relation between com-
modity prices and techniques of production. This assumption rules out factor in-
tensity (of production) reversals.
6. Unionized firms most often operate with inverse seniority layoff rules.  These
rules are also common in the nonunion sector (see Abraham and Medoff 1984).
7. For an integrated and much-cited presentation of “new” trade theory, see Help-
man and Krugman (1985).  Krugman (1995) offers a condensed version of Help-
man and Krugman.
8. Increasing returns to scale need to be distinguished from external economies.  Ex-
ternal economies are the reduction in each firm’s unit production costs as the in-
dustry’s output expands.  External economies arise when a larger (and perhaps
more geographically concentrated) industry is likely to provide more specialized
labor and other factors, which leads to higher productivity and lower average
costs for all the firms in the industry.  The pattern of international trade and the
gains from trade are not as clear with external economies as they are for internal
economies.
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9. It is the existence of economies of scale that matters for intra-industry trade, not
their size (see Helpman 1999).
10. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) found high rates of job destruction for
plants in industries with very high import penetration ratios over the period of
1972–1988.  Plants in the top quintile of industries ranked by import penetration
ratios had average annual employment reductions of 2.8 percent.

3
Evidence from Earlier Studies 
How does increasing international economic integration affect the
domestic labor market?  Standard theories of international trade predict
that internationalization will widen the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers in the United States.  The presence of both growing
internationalization and declining relative wages of low skilled workers
continues to fuel an active and often heated debate over how much
“globalization” is to “blame” for U.S. labor market outcomes.  While
the “trade and wages” research debate has become well-known for 
its heat, it has also generated considerable light.  This chapter is de-
signed to serve as a starting point into this large and growing literature.
Interested readers will find useful reviews in Belman and Lee (1996),
Burtless (1995), Richardson (1995), Cline (1997), Blanchflower and
Slaughter (1999), and Blanchflower (2000).1
My primary goal for this chapter is to develop some perspective
from the “trades and wages” literature for the analysis that follows.  To
that end, I will review the basic methodologies and findings of key as-
pects of the literature and discuss implications for my own analysis.  I
will also note disagreements, weaknesses, and gaps.  My discussion of
this large literature is not comprehensive; I include only empirical stud-
ies, not theoretical.  I highlight those studies relevant either to under-
standing the general direction of the literature or to my interest in em-
ployment and wage change and job loss.
As in any academic research area, scholars participating in this lit-
erature have their disagreements.  Unsurprisingly, a literature that is
called “trade and wages” involves economists in the two fields of inter-
national trade and labor.  Their disagreements tend to be methodologi-
cal, although not uniformly so.  I will use a simple statement of the
methodological dispute as an organizational tool for reviewing the lit-
erature.  That is, I will discuss the set of “product-price” studies, writ-
ten mostly from the perspective of international trade, followed by the
set of “factor-content” studies, written mostly from the perspective of
labor economics.  As Collins (1998) notes, this distinction is now a bit
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forced.  At this point in the development of the literature, field no
longer strongly determines approach, and the two approaches are seen
by many as being complementary rather than substitutes or opposites. 
This chapter is a way station, albeit an important one, in the pres-
entation of my analysis of changes in employment and job loss in U.S.
manufacturing.  My focus on changes in employment and job loss cre-
ates a particular lens through which I see the literature, and it represents
a different contribution in the sense that it focuses on an aspect of the
domestic labor market that is either secondary (changes in employ-
ment) or virtually overlooked (job loss) in the rest of the literature.  The
vast majority of studies examine the empirical relationship between
changes in “trade,” variously measured, and changes in wages, thus the
topic title “trade and wages.”  Studies of “trade and employment” or
“trade and job loss” constitute a much smaller share of the literature.
The focus on wages, either relative or in levels, as the primary domes-
tic labor market outcome can be explained as a derivative of the
Stolper–Samuelson theorem: in a two-factor, two-good model, trade
liberalization changes the relative price of goods, leading to an increase
in the real return to the factor used intensively in the production of that
good and a decrease in the real return to the other factor.  As such, this
focus can be seen as derivative of an international trade economist’s
perspective.  But, in all fairness, it is also a focus motivated by the ob-
servation of declining real and relative wages of lesser skilled workers
and rising skill-based earnings inequality, and it is thus a focus shared
by both trade and labor economists.
There is one last, largely uncontested, overview point.  Internation-
al trade does not affect the level of employment in the U.S. economy,
rather its distribution across sectors.  The level of employment in the
economy is determined more by macroeconomic events and policy
than by changes in global prices and trade flows.  These events can
change the allocation of resources (employment) and their pecuniary
returns (pay).  The trade and wages debate reviewed here (and my
analysis more generally) addresses this type of  distributional question.
The largely misguided debate over the number of jobs created and de-
stroyed by increased economic integration has created an incorrect as-
sociation in the public mind: that “trade” determines the total level of
jobs in the economy.2
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THE METHODOLOGICAL DISAGREEMENT, 
IN A NUTSHELL
In a dynamic and open economy, resource allocations between in-
dustries and sectors can have a number of structural causes, among
them differences in the income elasticities of demand across goods, dif-
ferences in rates of technological advance across sectors, differences in
rates of accumulation of alternative factors of production, and shifts of
comparative advantage (“trade”).  Macroeconomic events may also
play a role.
The key (but perhaps not sole) methodological dispute is over how
to measure “trade.”  One perspective, typically but not uniformly that of
international trade economists, starts with the Heckscher–Ohlin model
and in particular the Stolper–Samuelson theorem.  From the Stolper–
Samuelson theorem, a liberalization of trade (also known as a trade
“shock”) is communicated to the domestic labor market through a
change in relative goods prices.  Thus, this theorem offers a theoretical
link between “trade” and the domestic labor market: a relative goods
price change leads to a relative factor price (wage) response.3 This view
offers researchers (at least) one clear place to look for “trade” to have an
effect on the domestic labor market: product prices should change.  For
this reason, these studies can be called “product-price” studies.  The ap-
peal of this perspective is its grounding in the standard model of interna-
tional trade.  Its key drawback is the treatment of changes in the prices of
goods (for goods traded by the United States) as exogenous measures of
foreign competition.  As we will see, not all studies share this weakness,
but addressing the weakness introduces other complications. 
Although not solely the domain of labor economists, the alterna-
tive perspective involves measuring  the impact of “trade” as changes
in the effective supply and demand of domestic factors of production
resulting from changes in imports and/or exports.  More specifically, in
the “factor content of trade” approach, imports raise the effective sup-
ply of domestic labor while exports raise the effective demand for do-
mestic labor.  This approach also considers changes in trade flows or
volumes directly (and occasionally the trade deficit).  It is based on a
simple model of labor demand and labor supply and thus seems quite
intuitive and appealing.  Its key drawback is the treatment of changes
in trade flows as exogenous.  Trade flows change for some reasons;
changes in tastes, trade liberalization that changes the prices of traded
goods (as in product price studies), and technological change are three
key reasons.
PRODUCT-PRICE STUDIES
Papers in the product-price category vary, somewhat narrowly,
around the theme of whether changes in wages (sometimes employ-
ment) across industries are consistent with changes in industry prices
and/or changes in industry productivity.  Changes in prices are seen as
due to international forces, and changes in productivity are seen as due
to (sector-specific) technological change.  In this context, the question
about changes in the relative wages of American workers is taken as a
question of whether wage changes are due to “trade” or “technology.” 
There are a vast number of papers in this category.  Many of the
key papers address the question of rising U.S. wage inequality.  I will
briefly discuss a few of these papers from the set using disaggregated
industry data.  For readers interested in more detail, Slaughter (2000)
provides a comprehensive review of empirical product-price studies.
Richardson (1995) and Blanchflower (2000) provide assessments of the
state of knowledge in the area of trade, globalization, and inequality,
and Cline (1997) offers a detailed and comprehensive survey of papers
on the specific question of rising wage inequality in the United States.
To investigate the role of international trade in rising wage inequal-
ity, (early) researchers turned to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem and
Heckscher–Ohlin model.  One can draw the implication from the Stol-
per–Samuelson theorem that a decrease in the relative price of a good
(say an unskilled labor intensive good) will decrease the real wage of
the (unskilled) labor used intensively in producing such goods and will
increase the real wage of the scarce factor (here skilled labor).  In the
end, many papers end up investigating whether factors employed inten-
sively in industries with falling goods prices experience relative wage
declines.  The goods price declines are treated as though they are inter-
nationally induced (that is, due to foreign competition).
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From this framework, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) found no
clear evidence of lower relative prices for unskilled labor intensive
goods for the 1980s.  They interpreted this result as evidence against
the hypothesis that international trade contributed to rising wage in-
equality by lowering the price of unskilled labor intensive goods.
Sachs and Shatz (1994) treated the computer industry as a special case
(arguing the extraordinary productivity increases make output price
calculations very difficult) and concluded that, for a non-computer
sample in the 1980s, there were relative price declines in unskilled la-
bor intensive industries.4 The Sachs and Shatz results can be interpret-
ed as leaning toward a “trade” explanation of rising wage inequality.
Yet Leamer (1998) found relative goods price declines in unskilled la-
bor intensive sectors in the 1970s, but not for the 1960s or 1980s, and it
was the 1980s that saw a rise in U.S. wage inequality.  Krueger (1997)
reported similar evidence on relative price declines in unskilled labor
intensive industries for the first half of the 1990s. 
From this product-price sketch, what should we conclude? A safe
conclusion would be that the forces of international trade have played a
small role in the rise of wage inequality in the United States and that
other factors, including technological change, are important.  Method-
ologically, we learn about the importance of using disaggregated indus-
try data and addressing the implicit and unrealistic assumption that the
United States does not affect world prices.  We also learn that results
may be sensitive to the time frame.  Another lesson is that analyzing
product prices is a difficult task due to the variations in products, prices,
and quality.  This complexity makes the necessary data aggregation dif-
ficult. 
These studies are useful for my analysis in their methodology and
findings.  Methodologically, they contribute ways to measure and spec-
ify the role of trade: that is, international forces influence domestic in-
dustry relative wages and employment through changes in global prod-
uct prices.  Conclusions vary, but overall trade has a role in rising U.S.
wage inequality, but that role is secondary to (skill-biased) technologi-
cal change.
Fully within the product-price categorization, but from a Ricardian
perspective (country differences in technology rather than the Heck-
scher–Ohlin country differences in factor endowments), Feenstra and
Hanson (1997, 1999) and Feenstra, Hanson, and Swenson (2000) con-
cluded more strongly in favor of a role for international trade in in-
creasing U.S. wage inequality.  The approach in these three papers is
particularly interesting, by itself and for my analysis, because they use
outsourcing as the vehicle for the influence of international trade.  The
model, as explained in Feenstra and Hanson, uses country differences
in technology and associated differences in products to create opportu-
nities for outsourcing, with an impact on the demands of skilled and un-
skilled labor in both origin and recipient countries.  Outsourcing raises
the skilled–unskilled wage gap in both countries.  For example, if the
United States outsources to Mexico, it will relocate those aspects of
production that are relatively unskilled, from a U.S. perspective.  This
reduction in the demand for U.S. unskilled labor reduces the relative
wage of unskilled workers.  Relative demand for unskilled labor is also
reduced in Mexico, as the relocated production stage uses relatively
more skilled labor, from the Mexican perspective.  That is, labor that is
unskilled in the United States is relatively skilled in Mexico.  The
skilled–unskilled wage gap will rise in Mexico.  Using data from the
Offshore Assembly Program (OAP), which allows direct observation
of foreign outsourcing, Feenstra, Hanson, and Swenson (2000) found
some evidence that the U.S. content of OAP imports (goods exported
abroad for further processing) is relatively intensive in the use of
skilled labor (measured as nonproduction labor) and that increases in
OAP imports shift demand away from unskilled (production) labor in
the United States.
One appeal of this approach is that it directly models one way for
trade and technological advance to influence product prices, the loca-
tion of production, and relative wages.  For a set of U.S. manufacturing
industries in the 1980s, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) concluded that for-
eign outsourcing accounted for 15 percent of the rise in the skilled–
unskilled wage gap and technological upgrading accounted for 35 per-
cent of the rise.
While not exactly product-price studies (defined as strictly deriva-
tive of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem), there are other “price” studies,
ones that directly use changes in industry relative import prices to ex-
plain changes in industry employment and wages.  These studies asked
a slightly modified question: what is the effect of import competition
on manufacturing employment and wages and what other factors play a
role? Many of these studies predate the product-price studies noted
above and, in popularity of approach, have, in fact, been displaced by
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them.  Similar in spirit to the product-price findings, papers in this part
of the literature found that import competition caused only a small frac-
tion of employment and wage changes and that other factors, in partic-
ular changes in domestic demand and technology, accounted for most
change.5
A few select industry and industry-level studies are notable and in-
dicative of general findings.  Grossman (1987) examined nine manufac-
turing industries over the 1969–1979 period and found a significant ef-
fect of declining import prices on employment in only one, the steel
industry.  In a separate study of the steel industry, Grossman (1986) con-
cluded that most of the employment reduction over the period of
1976–1983 was due to the appreciation of the dollar and not increasing
international competition.  For a small sample of manufacturing indus-
tries, Mann (1988) found  that foreign competition, measured as both
import prices and import share, played a small role in determining em-
ployment relative to the role played by domestic demand and prices.6
Revenga (1992) showed, for a sample of manufacturing industries over
the period of 1977–1987, changes in import prices had a sizeable effect
on employment and a smaller yet significant effect on wages.  Her esti-
mated employment elasticity is in the range of a 2.5–4 percent reduction
in industry employment with a 10 percent fall in the industry relative im-
port price.  The 10 percent reduction in industry import price is associat-
ed with a 0.5–1 percent fall in the wage.  She concluded that most of the
adjustment in an industry to an adverse trade shock occurs through em-
ployment.  With somewhat inflexible wages (consistent with her finding
that the elasticity of industry wages with respect to import prices is
smaller than the employment elasticity), these employment reductions
must be occurring through involuntary separations (unless industry
quits are high).  Revenga took these results to suggest that workers are
mobile across industries.  This mobility implies that the effects of trade
on the manufacturing sector are not limited to that sector, as workers
seek new jobs in nonmanufacturing (and nontraded) industries.
FACTOR CONTENT OF TRADE (AND OTHER 
TRADE FLOWS) STUDIES
The essence of the factor-content approach is an implicit compari-
son of (often low skill) employment and wages in import-intensive in-
dustries to what employment and wages would be if imports were pro-
duced domestically (in autarky, a closed and isolated economy).  At
given wages, one can estimate the domestic and foreign labor inputs
used to produce a bundle of goods.  The United States tends to import
goods that are low skill labor intensive, and its exports are goods that
are high skill labor intensive.  Therefore, trade (particularly imports
from less developed countries) increases the relative supply of low-
skilled labor in the United States.  With estimates of the labor skills
used in various sectors, it is possible to estimate how changes in im-
ports and exports change the balance of demand and supply for high
skill and low skill labor, again at given wages and prices.  With esti-
mates of labor supply and demand elasticities, these changes in labor
supply and demand can be associated with estimated wage changes
and, thus, estimates of changes in wage inequality.  Freeman (1995, p.
23) offers a simple example:
For example, if the United States imported 10 additional chil-
dren’s toys, which could be produced by five American workers,
the effective supply of unskilled workers would increase by five
(or alternatively, domestic demand for such workers would fall by
five), compared with the alternative in which those 10 toys were
produced domestically.  This five-worker shift in the supply–de-
mand balance would put pressure on unskilled wages to fall, caus-
ing those wages to fall in accord with the relevant elasticity.  Any
trade-balancing flow of exports would, contrarily, reduce the ef-
fective endowment of skilled workers (raise their demand) and
thus increase their pay.
There are a few illustrative studies.7 In a detailed study of employ-
ment changes over the period 1964–1987 using the March income sup-
plements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), Murphy and Welch
(1991) calculated the effect of trade on product demand in four broad
sectors (traded durable goods, traded nondurable goods, traded ser-
vices, and nontraded goods) and then calculated the labor content of the
product demand shifts.8 They found that the increase in trade (more
specifically, the increase in the trade deficit) between 1979 and 1986
caused employment in durable goods to decline by 14.7 percent and
employment in nondurable goods to decline by 1.8 percent.  Trade in-
creased employment in traded services by 1.4 percent and in nontraded
goods by 4.1 percent.  The concentration of the trade-induced employ-
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ment reductions in manufacturing produced large effects on less-edu-
cated male workers.  They calculated that trade reduced employment of
men with less than a high school diploma by 2 to 3.5 percent.  For male
high school graduates, employment fell by 1.25 to 2.3 percent.  Trade
was associated with an increase in employment between 0.66 and 1.5
percent for college-educated men.  For women, only those with less
than a high school diploma experienced a reduction in labor demand
(on the order of 0.6 to 2.2 percent).  Demand for college-educated wo-
men increased by 3.3 to 4.3 percent due to trade.  Although Murphy and
Welch did not explicitly link these trade-induced labor demand changes
to wage changes, they noted that groups facing declining demand also
had declining wages, while groups in increasing demand experienced
rising real wages.
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992) found that trade increased the na-
tion’s effective labor supply of male high school dropouts by 5 to 9 per-
cent in 1985–1986; for female high school dropouts, the increase in ef-
fective labor supply was from 9 to 14 percent.  The increase in effective
labor supply of high school graduates was smaller, around 2 percent.
Trade had virtually no effect on the effective supply of college educated
workers.  Employing other researchers’ estimates of the wage elasticity
of labor supply, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz estimated that from 15 to 25
percent of the increase in the college graduate/high school graduate
wage premium over the period of 1980–1985 can be attributed to large
trade deficits (net imports).  The effects of trade through increases in ef-
fective labor supply were smaller in the late 1980s.
Sachs and Shatz (1994) estimated the impact of the change in trade
flows over the 1978–1990 period on the employment of high skilled
(nonproduction) and low skilled (production) workers.  For 51 manu-
facturing sectors, they calculated the effect of the increase or decrease
in net exports (exports minus imports) on the level of output, assuming
that both types of labor change in the same proportion as output.  Sum-
ming across manufacturing sectors, they found that trade from develop-
ing countries reduced employment, particularly of low skilled workers,
because the main output declines were in sectors where low skilled
workers dominated.  Compared to the counterfactual situation without
trade, Sachs and Shatz estimated that trade reduced the employment of
low skilled workers by 6.2 percent and the employment of higher
skilled workers by 4.3 percent.
In an update, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) focused on imports
from developing countries and considered immigration along with
trade as an aspect of globalization.  They reported that the growth of
U.S. imports of less developed (developing) country manufacturing
goods has increased the effective supply of less skilled labor, lowering
relative earnings of low wage workers.  They concluded, however, that
increased trade has a substantially smaller effect on relative wages than
increased immigration.
Wood (1994, 1995) reached the strongest conclusion, that trade ac-
counts for a major part of the rise in earnings inequality.  At the start of
his 1995 paper (p. 57) he wrote, “This paper will argue for what is still
a minority view among economists: that the main cause of the deterio-
rating situation of unskilled workers in developed countries has been
expansion of trade with developing countries.”  Wood’s criticism of
other factor-content studies centers on the choice of labor input coeffi-
cients.  Standard factor-content analyses use developed country labor
input coefficients: that is, the mix of labor (of various skills) used to
produce a good in developed countries.  That mix of labor is  very like-
ly different in the developing country, the source of the import.  For ex-
ample, it was once the case that the United States made high-end men’s
leather shoes while the Chinese made low-end synthetic shoes.  The
imports of Chinese shoes, unless treated at a quite disaggregated level,
would be treated as a “shoe” import and thus be multiplied by the mix
of skilled labor used in the U.S. production of “shoes,” that is, high-end
leather shoes.  If plastic shoes were made in the United States, they
would likely be made with more less skilled labor than observed in the
production of high-end shoes and thus the displacement of low skilled
labor would be greater than that estimated in the standard treatment.
Wood used an adjustment, based on labor input coefficients from de-
veloping countries at higher developed country wages.  With his adjust-
ments, Wood found a much larger impact of trade on the employment
of less skilled workers (about three times larger than the impact found
in Sachs and Shatz [1994]).
Trade between the United States and developing countries is the
most recent focus of research activity, in part due to 1980s trade liber-
alization in these countries.  To date, there is an emerging consensus,
both theoretical and empirical, that trade between the United States and
developing countries lowers the employment and wages of low skilled
workers in the United States.
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The decline in low skilled manufacturing employment was exam-
ined in some detail by Sachs and Shatz (1998).  Using trade data by in-
dustry and by trading partner country, they found that the increase in
net imports between 1978 and 1990 is associated with a 7.2 percent de-
cline in manufacturing production employment and a 2.1 percent de-
cline in nonproduction employment.  They reported reductions in pro-
duction worker employment across manufacturing, with the largest
declines in “low skill” sectors.  The intensity of “low skill” production
is measured by the ratio of production workers to total workers in each
manufacturing sector in 1978.  “High” skill–intensive industries in-
clude periodicals and office and computing machines.  “Low” skill–in-
tensive industries include girls’ and children’s outerwear and footwear.
Production employment fell by 4.1 percent in the highest skill intensive
sector and by 29.1 percent in the lowest skill–intensive sector.  Arguing
that production jobs are lower skilled overall than are nonproduction
jobs, they concluded that trade contributed to the observed rise in wage
inequality between unskilled and low and high skill workers.9 They
emphasized skill differences between the manufacturing and nontraded
sectors, noting that a reduction in manufacturing employment, particu-
larly import-competing manufacturing, will release relatively unskilled
workers into the nontraded (service) sector, leading to a fall in the rela-
tive wage of unskilled workers.
A number of criticisms can be directed toward factor-content stud-
ies.  The one most often voiced is that factor-content calculations take
the increase in imports as an exogenous event for the receiving country.
While trade economists, particularly those who study the pattern of
trade, found this assumption troublesome from the outset, it is not al-
ways unreasonable.  If imports to the United States rise because of
trade liberalization, or because skills improve in other countries or if
technological diffusion enhances the productivity and competitiveness
of production in other countries, then the link from these factors to
trade and on to domestic employment and wages is reasonably clear
and clean.  The change in trade will not be exogenous if domestic
events, such as wage increases, changes in innovation or technology,
the health of the macroeconomy, or tastes, produce the change in trade
and it will not be reasonable to infer that the link is from trade to do-
mestic wages and employment.
Factor-content calculations also consider changes in imports and
exports at existing wages.  If wages adjust, by falling, to an inflow of
imports, then the competitive advantage of foreign workers will fall
and this will put a brake on the flow of imports.  The observed rise in
imports will understate the pressures from foreign suppliers because it
misses the feedback mechanism from imports to domestic wages and
back to imports.  In the extreme, perhaps even the threat of imports re-
duces domestic wages, and those wage reductions feedback to reduce
import flows.  This means that observed imports will understate the ex-
tent of foreign competition, and thus factor-content studies will under-
state the effects of trade on domestic relative pay.  Freeman (1995) used
the comparison of U.S. to European studies to assess this possibility be-
cause low skill wages are more downwardly rigid in Europe than they
are in the United States due to different labor market institutions (cen-
tralized bargaining, minimum wages, and unionization).  With more
rigid wages, European factor-content studies should produce more ac-
curate estimates of trade-induced pay change than U.S. studies.  Euro-
pean trade displacement effects are not larger than those estimated for
the United States, and thus the U.S. studies seem not to be downwardly
biased (by the falling wages of less skilled U.S. workers). 
There is an interesting additional concern about labor input coeffi-
cients.  The use of skilled versus unskilled labor and the mix with capi-
tal is a choice, not a given.  These ratios are choice variables influenced
by a number of factors, including foreign competition and trade.  If the
relevant counterfactual question is, “What would labor demand look
like without expansions of trade?” then the correct labor/output ratios
for the calculations are the ones that existed before the trade expan-
sions, not the contemporary ratios.
MORE FACTOR-CONTENT STUDIES, BROADLY DEFINED
Other studies use measures of trade flows more directly to explain
changes in employment and wages, without the intermediate step of la-
bor input–output coefficients.  These studies share the weakness of tak-
ing trade flows as exogenous, but they avoid the pitfalls of choosing
labor-output coefficients.  Measuring disaggregated industry trade sen-
sitivity through import penetration ratios and export shares, Freeman
and Katz (1991) found that a 10 percent increase in imports reduces in-
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dustry wages by 0 to 0.64 percent and industry employment by 5 to 6
percent.  Exports raise industry wages and employment by slightly
smaller magnitudes than those found for imports.  The relationship be-
tween trade (imports) and wages changes over time.  Freeman and Katz
reported that increases in import share are negatively related to wage
changes between 1958 and 1970 and after 1980, but not between 1970
and 1980.
Using similar trade sensitivity measures, Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh (1996) found high rates of job destruction for plants in industries
with very high import penetration ratios over the period of 1972–1988.
Plants in the top quintile of industries ranked by import penetration ra-
tios had average annual employment reductions of 2.8 percent.  There
is little difference in job reallocation or net employment change when
industries are ranked by export share.10
OTHER LABOR DEMAND FACTORS
With respect to earnings inequality, technological change gets the
nod from many economists as the most important single cause.  Tech-
nological change helps explain changes that international trade cannot:
for example, the observed decline in the relative wage of low skilled la-
bor should have been associated with an increase in its usage, as firms
substituted away from the relatively higher priced skilled labor.  In-
stead, the relative employment of skilled labor has increased in virtual-
ly all industries, traded and nontraded, and in all countries.  Technical
change, biased toward higher skilled workers, can explain this trend.
While this can be a convincing piece of logic, there are still few studies
that directly show the role of technological change because of the diffi-
culty in measuring that change.  Technological change is often the
residual in the sense that if international trade measures cannot explain
rising inequality or changes in employment or wages, then it must be
what is not well-measured, technological change. 
There are a few papers with technological change proxies.  Ber-
man, Bound, and Griliches (1994) documented technological changes
in a few U.S. industries with shifts toward skilled workers, and
Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) considered a similar set of indus-
tries for a broader range of Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development countries.  Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1997) used
computer investment as a proxy for technical change and found a high
and positive correlation, across industries, between this measure and
the skilled labor share of the wage bill.11 Feenstra and Hanson (1999)
modeled how trade and technology upgrading affect product prices and
productivity and examined direct and indirect effects on wages.  They
concluded that, for U.S. manufacturing industries during the 1980s,
foreign outsourcing accounted for 15 percent of the observed rise in the
skilled/unskilled wage gap and that technological upgrading accounted
for 35 percent of the rise.
WHAT ABOUT EXPORTS?
From the perspective of employment and job loss, increasing for-
eign competition is always interpreted as increasing imports (or falling
import prices).  To a general audience, imports are a palpable threat—
they can be seen on store shelves (or car lots), and their mere presence
suggests an American good, and therefore worker, displaced.  Exports
are much less visible, except to the workers who produce them.  With
transport, these goods leave the country and are more elusive to the
general public.  Yet, without exports, the analysis of increasing eco-
nomic integration is incomplete.  Rising imports means rising exports,
and increasing foreign competition is more generally increasing global
participation, with U.S. firms entering foreign markets as foreign firms
enter U.S. markets.
As I noted previously, a number of studies have examined the role of
net imports or exports (that is, the difference between the two flows), so
that it is not the case that exports are overlooked in the research litera-
ture.  But, it can be useful to explicitly examine export activity.  How
should we think about exports and employment?  At the aggregate level,
the role of exports as an engine of growth is widely acclaimed.  Richard-
son (1993) reported that export growth created more than 40 percent of
overall U.S. output growth between 1985 and 1992.  Through this chan-
nel, the influence of exports in job creation is recognized.  In addition,
exports are the quid pro quo in the traditional accounting of the gains
from trade.  Exports are the means of obtaining imports.
40 Evidence from Earlier Studies
Imports, Exports, and Jobs 41
Until recently, little attention has been paid to the specifics of ex-
ports as an “engine of growth.” With the increasing availability of
plant- and firm-level data, the behavior of exporters is receiving long-
overdue attention.  Richardson and Rindal (1995, 1996) provided in-
sightful summary analyses of exports and exporting firms, based in
large part on the research of Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997).  Briefly,
good firms become exporters.  Firms that become exporters have faster
employment growth.  Productivity and wages are higher.  The line of
causality seems to run from being a good firm to becoming an exporter,
in the sense that successful firms (in a variety of dimensions) become
exporters, rather than exports causing firms to become successful.  Ex-
port activity does convey one note of success in that once firms become
exporters, they have lower failure rates than do nonexporters with sim-
ilar characteristics. 
At the same time, exporters face risks different from the risks faced
by domestic producers.  Exporting activities are volatile, with substan-
tial entry and exit of firms to and from exporting.  Bernard and Jensen
(1995, 1997) reported that 10 percent of manufacturing plants enter or
exit exporting each year.  Their study also revealed that those plants
that begin or continue exporting are also 10 percent less likely to go out
of business entirely.  While entry is associated with growth and im-
proved performance, exit from exporting is associated with poor firm
performance.12
More broadly, in a highly readable critical synthesis of recent re-
search based on longitudinal establishment as well as firm and worker
data, Lewis and Richardson (2001) emphasized the widespread benefits
to workers, firms, and communities of global engagement (which takes
the form of export and import activity, investment, outsourcing, and
technology licensing).  These benefits include higher wages, better job-
related benefits, more job security, more rapid sales growth, and faster
productivity growth.
SUMMARY
Taken as a group, these studies point to internationalization, partic-
ularly expansions of international trade, as a source of declining manu-
facturing employment and increasing wage inequality but not the most
important source.  This conclusion does not imply that increasing eco-
nomic integration across borders is the major explanation for declining
manufacturing employment and rising wage inequality.  The debate
over how large a role trade plays in changing employment patterns and
relative wages, and whether trade or technological change is more im-
portant, will continue.  At this point, technological change is seen as the
main culprit in the declining economic status of lower skilled workers,
although, as we will see, there are industries where trade plays a larger
role than it does in the aggregate. 
Notes
1. The edited conference volumes of Collins (1998) and Feenstra (2000) provide fo-
cused points of entry to the literature.
2. NAFTA, starting with its negotiations in the early 1990s and continuing through
its current outcomes, has been a prime source for the heated jobs debate.  For an
early view, see Hufbauer and Schott (1993). For a recent contribution, see Eco-
nomic Policy Institute (2001).
3. Some scholars contributing to this literature have expressed strong preferences
for the correct primary domestic labor market outcome and the correct measure of
trade. See Leamer and Levinsohn (1995).
4. The computer industry could complicate the investigation because the relative
prices of computers fell sharply over the 1980s, while productivity increased dra-
matically.  The industry is also skilled labor intensive.
5. See Dickens (1988) for a review of this earlier literature; also see Belman and Lee
(1996).
6. For footwear and radio and television, Mann did find that competition in both im-
port price and import share is important for employment determination.
7. For early factor-content studies, see Aho and Orr (1980) and U.S. International
Trade Commission (1986).
8. Their “industry” groupings were created to match trade data available in the 1988
Economic Report of the President.
9. The use of this limited skill classification by Sachs and Shatz (and, as noted
above, by authors of other studies) is data driven to some extent.  Readily avail-
able data sets with trade, employment, and wage information by industry are
based on the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), and the ASM occupations
are limited to production and nonproduction.
10. See also Schoepfle (1982) and Bednarzik (1993).  MacPherson and Stewart
(1990), using CPS data on male production workers in manufacturing for the pe-
riod 1975–1981, found that a 10 percent rise in industry import share lowered the
union wage differential by 2 percent, with no statistically significant effect on
nonunion wages.
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11. For other studies that address the role of  technological change, see Krugman and
Lawrence (1993), Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Leamer (1994), and Sachs and
Shatz (1994).
12. Bernard and Jensen found that employment in export “stoppers” falls relative to




Trends in International Trade, 
Employment and Job Loss
This study seeks to bring a broader understanding of the labor mar-
ket changes associated with increased trade into the national policy-
making debate.  One key aspect of this broader perspective is the focus
on job displacement.  Job loss is at the heart of the emotionally charged
assertion that, “trade costs jobs.”  The traditional approach, built on
studies of changes in net industry employment, can investigate the
“trade and jobs” link only indirectly.  With data on the incidence of job
displacement, I can more directly examine the association between
changes in trade flows and the widespread permanent job loss experi-
enced in manufacturing from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s.
With a theoretical framework and earlier studies as a foundation,
this chapter examines the descriptive evidence on changes in industry
employment and involuntary job loss and their possible link to the in-
creasing volume of trade and foreign competition.  The manufacturing
sector is diverse, with a wide range of activity that has changed over
time.  Some detail is required to do justice to the range of outcomes and
changes.  An up-front summary provides a roadmap to the detail that
follows.  The chapter begins with an overview of the manufacturing
sector, followed by a brief description of the data and its sources.  The
bulk of the chapter then establishes basic trends and shows simple cor-
relations.
MANUFACTURING: CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT
AND TRADE, IN BRIEF
This study examines changes in manufacturing that took place dur-
ing a 16-year period, 1979–1994, that was very difficult for the sector
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as a whole.  Employment declined steadily, by nearly 13 percent, and
manufacturing’s share of employment declined to 16 percent, a 31.2
percent decline from 1979.  There was widespread involuntary job loss,
with manufacturing accounting for 35.5 percent of total job loss (10.2
million workers).
Against this overall view of a shrinking manufacturing sector in
terms of output and employment share, trade flows increased consider-
ably.  Import share rose for the sector overall, from imports accounting
for an average of 6.6 percent of domestic supply in 1975 to an average
of 17.1 percent in 1994 (an increase of 159 percent).  Using a standard
definition of “high” import competition, we get a set of industries with
few surprises: apparel, footwear, leather products, toys and sporting
goods, electrical machinery, (parts of) steel, motor vehicles, and tex-
tiles.
By 1994, U.S. firms exported about 12.5 percent of manufacturing
shipments to foreign markets, averaged across the industries in the
sample.  This level represents a 50 percent increase from 1975.  While
sizeable, this increase, is smaller than the 159 percent increase in im-
port share over the same time period. 
Two-way, or intra-industry, trade is an important aspect of the in-
creased trade volumes noted here.  For a number of industries, the
flows of both exports and imports are considerable.  Almost all indus-
tries were more balanced in trade at the end of the period than they
were at the start.  Even where there was far more trade in one direction
than the other (unbalanced trade), the smaller of the flows increased
over the study period.
When the basic trends in employment, job loss, and trade flows are
brought together, some basic patterns emerge.  There is an association
between employment decline, import share gain, export loss, and weak
domestic demand for the handful of small, traditionally import-compet-
ing industries.  Sharply declining exports are strongly associated with
employment decline, particularly in the industries accounting for the
bulk of the employment loss.  Rising imports are also strongly associat-
ed with employment decline but more so in the smaller traditionally
import-competing industries.  Industries with high rates of job loss had
both a high import share and experienced a large (positive) change in
import share (increasing import competition).
We turn next to the details behind this summary.
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SOURCE: Data from Council of Economic Advisors (2001), Table B 46. 
Figure 4.1  Manufacturing Sector Employment and Manufacturing Em-
ployment as a Share of Total Employment, 1975–1995
THE STATE OF U.S. MANUFACTURING, 1975–1995
From the perspective of manufacturing employment, the 15-year
period from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s was a difficult one.  The
sector as a whole was rocked by two recessions, a deep one in the early
1980s and another, not so deep, in the early 1990s; sluggish productiv-
ity growth; continued shifts in U.S. consumer demand away from man-
ufactured goods and toward services; and the rise of foreign competi-
tion.
Manufacturing sector employment, from 1975 through 1995, is
shown in Figure 4.1. After climbing steadily through the recovery from
the 1974–1975 recession, manufacturing employment peaked, at 21
million, in 1979.  Employment declined through the trough of the
1981–1982 recession, rose during the recovery and growth years of the
late 1980s, declined again during the early 1990s recession, and grew
slowly in the “no jobs” recovery from 1992–1995.  It is clear that em-
ployment in this sector is highly pro-cyclical, and the level has declined
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SOURCE: Data from Council of Economic Advisors (2001), Table B 12. 
Figure 4.2  Manufacturing as a Share of GDP, 1975–1995
progressively since the late 1970s.  Overall, from 1979–1994, sectoral
employment fell by 12.9 percent.
While manufacturing employment declined, service-producing in-
dustries grew, both in output and employment.  Manufacturing’s share
of GDP is shown in Figure 4.2. America’s shift from manufacturing to
services has been ongoing for decades, as we can see through the slow
decline in share of GDP.  The progressive decline in output share has
been accompanied by a steeper decline in employment share.  Manu-
facturing’s share of employment fell by 31.2 percent over this period,
from 23.4 percent of total employment in 1979 to 16 percent in 1994
(see Figure 4.1). 
Against this overall view of a shrinking manufacturing sector in
terms of output and employment share, trade flows have increased con-
siderably.  Figure 4.3 shows the increased volume of goods trade from
1975–1995, in nominal dollars.  The greater dollar volume of imports
over exports can be seen more clearly in Table 4.1, where information
on U.S. international trade in goods and services is reported for the pe-
riod of 1975–1995.  In merchandise (goods) trade, 1975 was the last
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SOURCE: Data from Council of Economic Advisors (2001), Table 24. 
Figure 4.3  Exports and Imports of Goods, 1975–1995
year for which exports exceeded imports.  On the other hand, the posi-
tive trade balance in services grew steadily over the period, an accom-
paniment to the output and employment shift to services.
Our discussion of U.S. manufacturing over this time period would
be incomplete without a word about the exchange value of the dollar.  A
signal event for manufacturing was the appreciation of the exchange
value of the dollar, by about 50 percent against the currencies of major
U.S. trading partners, from 1981 to 1985.  High interest rates (from ex-
pansionary fiscal policy and tight monetary policy) and a robust U.S. re-
covery from the 1981–1982 recession encouraged international invest-
ment in U.S. and dollar-denominated assets, and the dollar strengthened
against other industrialized currencies.  The strong dollar made U.S. 
exports more expensive to buy and made imports cheaper.  Recovery
from the recession fueled U.S. demand for imports, while foreign de-
mand for U.S. exports remained sluggish due to the slower recovery of
our trading partners.  The exchange value of the dollar peaked in 1985,
with the September 1985 Plaza Accord that brought exchange market in-
tervention and modified interest rates.  Over 1986 to 1989, the dollar de-




Table 4.1  U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services (Balance of Payments Basis, Billions $), 1975–1995
Year Total Goods Services Total Goods Services Total Goods Services
1975 132.6 107.1 25.5 120.2 98.2 22.0 12.4 8.9 3.5
1976 142.7 114.7 28.0 148.8 124.2 24.6 –6.1 –9.5 3.4
1977 152.3 120.8 31.5 179.5 151.9 27.6 –27.2 –31.1 3.8
1978 178.4 142.1 36.4 208.2 176.0 32.2 –29.8 –33.9 4.2
1979 224.1 184.4 39.7 248.7 212.0 36.7 –24.6 –27.6 3.0
1980 271.8 224.3 47.6 291.2 249.8 41.5 –19.4 –25.5 6.1
1981 294.4 237.0 57.4 310.6 265.1 45.5 –16.2 –28.0 11.9
1982 275.2 211.2 64.1 299.4 247.6 51.7 –24.2 –36.5 12.3
1983 266.0 201.8 64.2 323.8 268.9 54.9 –57.8 –67.1 9.3
1984 290.9 219.9 71.0 400.1 332.4 67.7 –109.2 –112.5 3.3
1985 288.8 215.9 72.9 410.9 338.1 72.8 –122.1 –122.2 0.1
1986 309.7 223.3 86.4 450.3 368.4 81.8 –140.6 –145.1 4.5
1987 348.8 250.2 98.6 502.1 409.8 92.3 –153.3 –159.6 6.2
1988 431.3 320.2 111.1 547.2 447.2 100.0 –115.9 –127.0 11.1
1989 489.4 362.1 127.2 581.6 477.4 104.2 –92.2 –115.2 23.0
1990 537.2 389.3 147.9 618.4 498.3 120.0 –81.1 –109.0 27.9
1991 581.3 416.9 164.3 611.9 490.7 121.2 –30.7 –73.8 43.1
1992 617.3 440.4 176.9 652.9 536.5 116.5 –35.7 –96.1 60.4
1993 642.8 456.8 185.9 711.7 589.4 122.3 –68.9 –132.6 63.7





1994 703.4 502.4 201.0 800.5 668.6 131.9 –97.0 –166.2 69.2
1995 795.1 575.8 219.2 891.0 749.6 141.4 –95.9 –173.7 77.8
NOTE: Data compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Balance of payments
basis for goods reflects adjustments for timing, coverage, and valuation to the data compiled by the Census Bureau. The major adjust-
ments concern: military trade of U.S. defense agencies, additional nonmonetary gold transactions, and inland freight to Canada and
Mexico. Goods valuation are F.A.S. (free alongside ship) for exports and customs value for imports
SOURCE: International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights. Available at http://www.
ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H01t01.txt
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SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisors (2001), Tables B 12 and B 24.  
Figure 4.4  Exports and Imports of Goods as Percentage of GDP in the
Manufacturing Sector, 1975–1995
growth quickened.1 This turn in the exchange value of the dollar and the
corresponding changes in import and exports (relative to growth in U.S.
and world income) makes 1985 a important year.2 Where appropriate,
our time period will be divided into a pre-1985 period and a post-1985
period.
The growing importance of trade within manufacturing, and varia-
tions in trend growth (variations that we can understand now as influ-
enced by macroeconomic factors) can be seen in Figure 4.4. This chart
shows the time-series of export and import volumes, separately, as
shares of manufacturing GDP.  Both shares have grown since the late
1970s, imports more than exports.  The dampening of export demand
with the 1981–1982 recession, the relatively slow recovery of our trad-
ing partners from that recession, and the strong dollar of the early
1980s is clearly evident, as is the export surge that followed from 1986.
We can also see the relatively smooth rise in export and import shares
from 1985, as compared with the more variable path from 1975 to
1985.
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This brief survey of the state of U.S. manufacturing reveals two
trends that likely fuel American perceptions of trade: the declining lev-
el of employment in manufacturing and increased volumes of merchan-
dise trade.  Both of these trends are real, yet it is wrong to simply link
trade to the number of jobs.  In the standard models of international
trade reviewed in Chapter 3, trade reallocates jobs according to shifting
patterns of comparative advantage.  In other words, we can expect trade
to influence the distribution of jobs and employment.  This means that
we will look for employment to decline, and jobs to be lost, in some
sectors, while we look for employment expansion in other sectors.  Be-
cause we are concentrating on manufacturing, we will “miss” consider-
able employment growth in services, and some of that growth is due to
foreign demand for our services exports. 
We turn now to a more detailed analysis of the evidence on trade
flows, employment change, and job loss.  I first explain my definition of
an “industry,” a definition determined by data availability.  Details on
data sources and construction are provided in Appendix A.
DEFINING AN INDUSTRY
Data on employment levels and job loss were obtained from infor-
mation in the CPS.  The Displaced Worker Surveys (DWSs), biennial
supplements to the CPS, are the only large-scale, nationally represen-
tative source of information on the incidence of involuntary job loss.
Information on job displacement from this source is available for the
period of 1979–1999.  This data source dictated my definition of an
“industry,” because DWS-based information on job loss by industry
follows the definition and classification of industry used by the CPS, a
scheme called the Census of Population Industry Classification (CIC).
These coding schemes have changed over time, reflecting the changing
nature of the economy and improved data collection.  The 1990 CIC
codes are the most recent.  The most detailed level of industry classifi-
cation  offered in the DWS is the three-digit CIC.  Thus, my manufac-
turing industries are 1990 three-digit CIC industries.
Employment levels by (three-digit CIC) industry were constructed
from the March Annual Demographic File supplements to the CPS.
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Because I used CPS files dating back to the mid 1970s, I used concor-
dances between the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 three-digit CIC classi-
fication codes in order to have one uniform code, the 1990 code, for my
industries.
The required three-digit CIC definition of industry affected my us-
age of the available data on U.S. exports, imports, and shipments.
Those data are available at a more detailed level, a four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) category, from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) Trade Database for the period 1958–
1994.  The SIC-based industry trade and shipments data were aggregat-
ed up to the three-digit 1990 CIC classification code in order to com-
bine the trade information with CPS-based information on employment
and job displacement.  The last year for which the product-based trade
flows data could be converted to an SIC industry format was 1994.
Therefore, the availability of the trade flows data determined the end
point of the study period.
Lastly, import price indices data are available for many three- and
four-digit SIC manufacturing industries starting in 1982–1983, with the
SIC-based series currently ending with 1992.  For a smaller set of in-
dustries, the price series provides reasonable information from 1980
forward.  Similar to the trade and shipments data, the price data were
aggregated up to a three-digit CIC scheme.  The price measure itself  is
a fixed weight Laspeyres index with a 1985 base period.3 The weak-
nesses of the price data are several: import prices exist for relatively
few industries and cover only some goods in some industries.  In addi-
tion, changes in quality not captured in the price indices create mea-
surement error.
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT
As a companion to the discussion of overall manufacturing em-
ployment, it is useful to consider how the composition of employment
changed within manufacturing over the period of 1979–1994, across
industries and over time.  This 16-year time period is the longest and
most broadly available for the various data series.  Appendix Tables A1
(1979–1985) and A2 (1985–1994) provide a quick and brief overview
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of the manufacturing industries in the sample, focusing on their trade
and employment characteristics.4
Summarizing these tables briefly, employment fell 11.4 percent on
average from 1979 to 1985 for the industries in the analysis sample.
Employment declined sharply in a number of  industries, most notably
several large and visible industries, such as apparel, (non-electrical)
machinery and motor vehicles.  Employment losses in these industries
were on the order of 11–17 percent.  A number of smaller industries,
particularly in traditional heavy manufacturing, experienced large per-
centage declines in employment: blast furnaces, 63.4 percent; iron and
steel foundries, 53.2 percent; and farm machinery and equipment, 62.5
percent.5 Among industries recording a decline in employment, em-
ployment fell by nearly 22 percent.
Very few industries saw employment rise; for the most part, grow-
ing industries started small and were not a part of traditional heavy
manufacturing (printing and publishing, +18.6 percent; office and
accounting machines, +26 percent; and computers, +52 percent).
Amongst the employment gainers, the average increase was 20 percent.
Guided missiles and ordnance benefitted from increased defense spend-
ing during the first Reagan administration, and office and accounting
machines and computers were just beginning to expand.
Overall, conditions improved in manufacturing over the 1985–
1994 period.  Employment fell on average just 1.2 percent, with a num-
ber of industries expanding employment and just a few industries with
large declines, notably electrical machinery and apparel.  Over this pe-
riod, employment losses were, for the most part, in a distinctly different
set of industries than were losses in the earlier period.  Ordnance and
guided missiles saw a decline in government spending with the end of
the Cold War and a related decline in employment.  Employment con-
tinued to fall sharply in a number of smaller traditionally import-com-
peting industries, such as footwear, leather products, steel and metals
industries, radio and television, and toys and sporting goods.  For the
industries with employment declines, the average decline was 15.6 per-
cent.  With a healthier economy, more industries recorded employment
gains over the late 1980s and early 1990s than for the earlier period.  A
number of the gains were small, and the average gain was +10 percent.  
With this summarized view of manufacturing employment in
place, we turn next to trends in goods trade flows.  
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THE EXTENT OF IMPORT COMPETITION BY INDUSTRY
The ratio of imports to domestic supply is a widely used character-
istic for classifying industries as “import competing” or “high import.”
Consistent with the increasing trend shown in Figure 4.4, import share
has also risen for the manufacturing sector overall, from imports ac-
counting for an average of 6.6 percent of domestic supply in 1975 to an
average of 17.1 percent in 1994 (an increase of 159 percent).  With the
exception of the food and kindred products industries, most industries
experienced an increase in the share of domestically available supply
that was foreign produced over the 20-year period).6
In which industries are imports an important or high share of do-
mestic supply? Any discussion of high-import industries has a bit of ar-
bitrariness in the cutoff point for high. Using the top 25 percent (top
quartile) of industries ranked by mean import share, we can define the
high-import industries (industries with mean annual import share of 13
percent or higher) over the full 1975–1994 period (Table 4.2).7 The list
contains few surprises, and it is fully inclusive of the group of industries
traditionally considered import competing: apparel, footwear, leather
products, toys and sporting goods, electrical machinery, (parts of) steel,
motor vehicles, and textiles.  Table 4.2 also reports import shares over
time.  In some industries, increases in import share are quite large
(watches and clocks, footwear, leather products, and toys and sporting
goods), while in other industries, import share has changed very little
(textiles, and pulp and paper).  Appendix Table A3 reports the full rank-
ing of industries in the sample, from highest mean import share to low-
est for the period of 1975–1994.
The group with a high import share was fairly constant over time,
as industries with high import shares at a point in time retained their
rankings with above-average increases in import shares over time.8
Many of the high-import industries in 19759 remained the high-import
industries in 1994, and similarly for the low-import industries.  
The cross-time correlations of industry quartile rankings by import
share shown in Table 4.3 reveal that, at 5-year intervals, the ranking of
industries by import share is fairly stable.  At 10- to 15-year intervals,
there is considerable change in the relative sensitivity of industries to
import competition.  Thus, although we can consider a fairly constant
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Table 4.2  Import Shares of High-Import Industries, 1975–1994
Industry
1975–94
(Mean) 1994 1990 1985 1980 1975
Watches, clocks 0.405 0.800 0.571 0.613 0.436 0.265
Footwear, ex. rubber &
plastic
0.377 0.707 0.641 0.567 0.313 0.252
Leather products, ex.
footwear
0.320 0.660 0.505 0.464 0.283 0.165
Pottery & related products 0.316 0.445 0.421 0.418 0.329 0.247
Toys & sporting goods 0.265 0.507 0.472 0.377 0.236 0.134
Cycles & misc. transport.
equip.
0.264 0.227 0.234 0.268 0.328 0.278
Misc. manuf. industries 0.209 0.376 0.336 0.296 0.190 0.121
Motor vehicles 0.191 0.275 0.291 0.259 0.220 0.161
Electronic computing
equipment
0.188 0.487 0.377 0.189 0.101 0.110
Leather tanning &
finishing
0.172 0.277 0.303 0.233 0.128 0.089
Apparel & accessories 0.167 0.382 0.328 0.236 0.135 0.086
Radio, TV, &
communication 
0.158 0.298 0.217 0.197 0.143 0.121
Office & accounting
machines
0.157 0.451 0.335 0.162 0.074 0.075
Other primary metal
industries
0.156 0.191 0.176 0.211 0.244 0.106
Pulp, paper & paperboard
mills
0.153 0.168 0.175 0.159 0.153 0.145
Electrical machinery,
equip.
0.133 0.313 0.264 0.178 0.120 0.074
Blast furnaces, steelworks 0.130 0.190 0.154 0.193 0.125 0.117
Photographic equipment 0.129 0.260 0.214 0.172 0.116 0.075
Misc. textile mill products 0.128 0.133 0.131 0.133 0.131 0.124
Mean (column) 0.096 0.171 0.148 0.126 0.090 0.066
Std. deviation 0.086 0.164 0.136 0.122 0.088 0.063
NOTE: Import share = imports/(imports + domestic supply).
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from NBER Trade Database.
Import share
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Table 4.3  Cross-Time Correlation of Industry Quartile
Rankings, by Import Share
Quartile




1990 0.795* 0.838* 0.881*
1994 0.763* 0.795* 0.859* 0.935*
NOTE: * = statistical significance at the 0.05 level
set of industries as “high” import competing, we should also take note
of some fluidity in relative degree of import competition.
Although descriptive tradition uses import share as a measure of
foreign competition, clearly it is the change in import share that can
proxy, ex post, a change in an industry’s foreign competitive environ-
ment.  Several industries experienced notable increases in import share,
especially among the high import competing. The import share of com-
puters increased by 346 percent, apparel and accessories by 344 per-
cent, leather products by 300 percent, and toys and sporting goods by
278 percent.
As I noted above, the longest overlapping time period of the vari-
ous data series is 1980–1994.  Also, the dollar appreciation of the early
1980s, with a peak in 1985 and subsequent sharp depreciation, suggests
a division of the 1980–1994 period into two subperiods, 1980–1985
and 1985–1994.  Over the 1980–1985 period, average import share
rose from 0.089 to 0.126 (a 41.5 percent increase).  A number of indus-
tries experienced sharp increases in import share during the strong dol-
lar period: construction and material handling equipment (+147 per-
cent, from a 0.060 1980 share), knitting mills (+130 percent, from a
0.068 1980 share), primary aluminum (+129 percent, from a 0.040
1980 share), and office and accounting machines (+118 percent, from a
0.074 1980 share).  In 1985, the high-import industries (top 25 percent,
with import share of 0.167 or higher) included most of the industries
listed in Table 4.2, with a small number of additions: tires and inner
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tubes (import share of 0.167), other primary metal (0.211), farm ma-
chinery and equipment (0.195), and metalworking machinery (0.168).
The dollar peaked in 1985 and declined by 21 percent by 1986 and
39 percent by 1992.10 From 1985–1994, average industry import share
rose from 0.125 to 0.171 (an increase of 36.8 percent).  Import share
fell in 13 of the 75 industries in the full sample.  Most of the declines
were less than 1 percentage point and occurred from a small 1985 base
import share, with the exception of sugar and confectionary products
(–28.3 percent, from a 0.108 1985 import share) and cycles and misc.
transport equipment (–15.2 percent, from a 0.268 1985 import share).
Both of these industries had some protection from foreign competition
during this period.  Import share increased notably in a number of in-
dustries: other rubber products (+229 percent, from a 0.073 1985 im-
port share); office and accounting machines (+178 percent, from a
0.162 1985 share); and aircraft and parts (+123 percent, from a 0.078
1985 share).
By 1994, the last year for which trade volume data is currently
available at a CIC-conformable level, average industry import share
was 0.171, and the high-import industries (top 25 percent) had an im-
port share of 0.227 or higher.  There were 19 high-import industries: of
these 19 industries, 16 were in the top quartile by import share in 1985,
11 were in the 1980 top quartile, and 13 were in the top quartile for the
full period. 
This discussion of import share reveals industries where foreign-
produced goods account for a sizeable share of domestic supply.  In this
way, these industries are import competing.  It is important to under-
stand that the industries used here are highly aggregated across goods,
and import share can vary considerably across goods within an indus-
try.  Domestic firms within these industries face varying import compe-
tition depending on the goods they produce.  The footwear industry de-
fined here, CIC 221, represents (nearly) all shoes, from the detailed
industry “men’s dress shoes” to another detailed industry “ballet slip-
pers and athletic shoes.”  The level of foreign competition, measured as
import share, appears to differ between the two detailed industries.  The
four-digit SIC industry that includes men’s dress shoes, 3143 (men’s
footwear, except athletic), had an average import share of 0.326 for the
1979–1994 period.  SIC industry 3149 (footwear, except rubber, nec11),
with ballet slippers and athletic shoes, had an average import share of
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0.781 for the period.  Imports represent far more of the ballet and ath-
letic shoe market than they do for men’s shoes.  Over the period, how-
ever, the two four-digit industries faced similar increases in import
share, with an increase in import share of 76 percent for 3143 (men’s
footwear), from 0.203 in 1979 to 0.453 in 1994, as compared to an in-
crease of 56 percent for 3149 (ballet and athletic), from 0.571 in 1979
to 0.889 in 1994.  This example illustrates the heterogeneity within an
“industry.” Footwear is a broad category, one where ballet and athletic
shoes do not compete with men’s dress shoes.  On the other hand, some
industry aggregation is necessary, and this example also illustrates
some of the common characteristics within a broad industry. 
TRENDS IN IMPORT PRICES
As discussed in Chapter 3, changes in import prices are a more
commonly used measure of competitive pressure.  When import prices
fall (and all else stays the same), imported goods become relatively
cheaper and consumers may substitute imported goods for domestical-
ly produced goods, leading to a rise in import share.  Alternatively, if
domestic producers respond to changes in import prices with their own
price reductions, relative prices remain constant and presumably im-
port share remains constant.  This thinking reveals that changes in the
import share measure depend on the response of domestic producers to
changes in import price.  In this way, changes in import prices represent
an alternative measure of the competitive pressures faced by domestic
producers.  Unfortunately, the time-series and industry coverage of im-
port prices is more limited than it is for trade volumes.  In addition, the
price data involve considerable industry aggregation and measurement
concerns.  Appendix Table A4 lists industries, in order of mean import
share as in Appendix Table A3, with their changes in import prices for
the period of 1980–1992.  Import prices fell sharply during the strong
dollar period of 1980–1985, when import shares were also rising
sharply.  The price declines were considerable (in excess of 20 percent)
in a number of durable goods industries, the same industries discussed
above with large increases in import share.  As the dollar depreciated
from its 1985 level, many of these declines were reversed.  From 1985
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to 1992, import prices rose an average of 14 percent, having fallen
nearly 15 percent from 1980 to 1985.  On balance, import prices fell
slightly over the 1980–1992 period.12
To sum up, foreign-produced goods represent an important share of
domestically available output in a number of manufacturing industries.
The foreign share of domestically available goods has increased con-
siderably over the past 20 years.  For consumers, this has meant a wider
array of goods, often at lower prices.  To even out our understanding of
the extent of trade, we turn to exports, where foreigners are on the de-
mand side instead of the supply side.
INDUSTRY EXPORT ACTIVITY
Measured by dollar value, U.S. exports are concentrated in a small
number of industries, industries that are dominated by large firms for
the most part.  In 1994, the top export industries (and their shares of to-
tal manufacturing exports) were: electrical machinery and equipment
(0.114), motor vehicles (0.108), aircraft and parts (0.083), computers
(0.070), and non-electrical machinery (0.058).13 These “large” ex-
porters are also large in terms of shipments.  The computer industry
was the only newcomer to the list; computers accounted for a very
small share of manufacturing shipments and exports in 1980 (ranked 52
and 7, respectively), but the industry’s shipments share ranking was 11
and export share ranking was 3 by 1987.14
One measure of the foreign market orientation of an industry is its
“export intensity,” calculated as the ratio of exports to shipments.  Ex-
port intensity is a composition measure, in the sense that it yields the
share of an industry’s output that goes to foreign markets.  Foreign mar-
kets constitute an important part of output demand for industries with
high export intensity.  Thus, industry export intensity can also be inter-
preted as a measure of industry exposure to world markets. 
In 1994, U.S. firms exported about 12.5 percent of manufacturing
shipments to foreign markets, averaged across the industries in the
sample.  This level represents a 50 percent increase from 1975.  This
increase, while sizeable, is smaller than the 159 percent increase in im-
port share over the same time period.  Export intensity grew slowly
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over the late 1970s and fell a bit from 1980 to 1985.15 From 1985 to
1994, export intensity rose 68 percent from 7.2 percent of shipments to
12.5 percent.
Average export intensity masks wide variation across industries
and over time.  Table 4.4 lists the top 25 percent of manufacturing in-
dustries, ranked by mean export intensity, for the period 1975–1994,
with their mean export intensity and export intensities at five-year in-
tervals between 1975 and 1994.  These industries had a mean export in-
tensity of 0.13 or higher.  Appendix Table A6 reports the full set of in-
dustries.  Some industries stand out as considerable exporters; in 1994,
the top eight industries had export intensities exceeding 25 percent,
twice the cross-industry average.  The computer industry stands out for
its very high, but declining, export intensity over the time period.  Oth-
er industries have virtually no exports and are entirely domestically ori-
ented (e.g., newspaper publishing and printing, cement, concrete and
gypsum, and paperboard containers and boxes).  Durable goods indus-
tries are far more export-oriented than nondurable goods industries,
with export intensities in the range of 13–44 percent.  Most industries
saw an increase in export intensity. 
Similar to the discussion of imports, membership in the “high-ex-
port” group was fairly constant over time.  Many of the high export in-
dustries in 1994 were the high-export industries in 1975 and similarly
for low-export industries.  Compared to import share, there is more mo-
bility in the rankings of high export, in the sense that high export in an
earlier period is a weaker predictor of high export in a later period
(Table 4.5). The correlation is strong at a 10-year interval, and it is con-
siderably weaker at 15 years and beyond.
The early 1980s, from 1980–1985, were a very difficult time for
exporters, with weak global demand due to the 1981–1982 recession
and the dollar appreciation from 1981 to 1985.  Most industries saw a
reduction in exports and in export intensity.  Sample average export in-
tensity fell nearly 20 percent, from 0.092 to 0.074.  A number of indus-
tries experienced sharp decreases in export intensity from 1980 to
1985, with a mean change of –20.2 percent.  Twenty industries saw de-
creases in export intensity of 40 percent or more.  In 5 of the 14 indus-
tries where export intensity increased, it did so because exports fell by
a smaller percentage than did shipments.  By 1985, the top quartile of
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(1975–94) 1994 1990 1985 1980 1975
Electronic computing
equipment
0.615 0.167 0.271 0.319 0.811 0.842
Metal forgings 0.345 0.173 0.352 0.408 0.251 0.279
Aircraft & parts 0.304 0.449 0.379 0.263 0.246 0.282
Construction & material
handling machines
0.303 0.344 0.302 0.264 0.319 0.343
Engines & turbines 0.244 0.394 0.264 0.200 0.229 0.213
Scientific & controlling
instrmnts
0.233 0.295 0.273 0.199 0.213 0.226
Logging 0.210 0.266 0.278 0.140 0.199 0.205
Office & accounting
machines
0.192 0.249 0.232 0.123 0.190 0.207
Cycles & misc. transport.
equip.
0.183 0.265 0.189 0.186 0.149 0.140
Leather tanning &
finishing
0.176 0.246 0.343 0.143 0.126 0.085
Electrical machinery,
equip.
0.163 0.197 0.215 0.129 0.154 0.141
Industrial & misc.
chemicals
0.160 0.208 0.174 0.147 0.162 0.133
Machinery, exc. electrical 0.155 0.199 0.178 0.121 0.150 0.158
Other primary metal
industries
0.146 0.215 0.178 0.085 0.226 0.076
Ordnance 0.146 0.227 0.153 0.104 0.142 0.191
Plastics, synthetics &
resins
0.144 0.191 0.178 0.116 0.173 0.098
Farm machinery &
equipment
0.143 0.175 0.167 0.119 0.125 0.140
Photographic equipment 0.136 0.133 0.146 0.111 0.153 0.147
Mean (across industries) 0.096 0.125 0.112 0.074 0.093 0.084
Std. deviation 0.095 0.090 0.090 0.071 0.090 0.100
NOTE: Export Intensity = (Exports/Shipments). Across-industry mean and standard
deviation are weighted using industry share of total value of shipments.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from NBER Trade Database.
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Table 4.5  Cross-Time Correlation of Industry Quartile
Rankings, by Export Intensity
Quartile




1990 0.476** 0.709** 0.888**
1994 0.323** 0.577** 0.743** 0.902**
NOTE: ** = statistical significance at the 0.05 level
industry exporters had an average export intensity of 0.104, as com-
pared with 0.131 in 1980.
The period after the dollar peak in 1985 and continuing to 1994
was nearly a reversal of the early 1980s.  From 1985 to 1990, average
export intensity rose 51 percent, from 0.074 to 0.112.  In the two years
from 1992 to 1994, the share of shipments exported rose 11.1 percent to
0.125.  Just two industries had a decline in the value of exports (metal
forgings at –80.1 percent and misc. petroleum at –0.5 percent), and
three others experienced a fall in export intensity despite a rise in ex-
ports.16 Exports (and export intensity) grew tremendously in a number
of industries, particularly in those having a low starting export intensi-
ty (industries with little previous export activity): bakery products
(+572 percent, from a 0.0017 1985 share), apparel and accessories
(+562 percent, from a 0.012 1985 share), and footwear (+431 percent,
from a 0.024 1985 share).  Mean percentage change in export intensity
was 132 percent.
Export intensity, useful as a measure of the foreign outlook or ori-
entation of an industry, can change for a variety of reasons and those
changes must be interpreted with some caution.  For almost all indus-
tries, export volumes are much smaller than shipments, so an equal (by
dollar volume) increase in exports and shipments yields a larger per-
centage increase in exports than in shipments and therefore an increase
in export intensity.  Similarly, the growth of foreign demand can be ex-
pected to exceed the growth in domestic demand in percentage terms,
since the domestic market is much bigger than the foreign market for
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most industries.17 Differences in the size of the foreign and domestic
markets will be incorporated into the econometric analysis. 
As a composition measure, a change in export intensity is not nec-
essarily informative about changes in the level of demand for an indus-
try’s output.  Export intensity can increase if domestic demand is re-
placed by foreign demand, with overall shipments constant.  This route
to an increase in export intensity should yield no change in industry
employment.  Alternatively, if exports grow at the same rate as ship-
ments, export intensity will remain constant, while the industry, over-
all, has experienced an increase in demand for output and possibly an
increase in employment.
To summarize the separate trends in imports and exports, albeit
very briefly and simply, there is now vastly more trade in many, if not
most, manufacturing industries.  The greater flow of imports is widely
acknowledged; it is important to recognize that the flow of U.S. pro-
duced goods to foreign markets is also much greater.  In a considerable
number of industries, both goods flows have increased. 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
A simple view of trade is that the United States imports watches
and apparel and exports airplanes and bulldozers.  A more realistic view
is that the United States imports and exports all four of these goods, ei-
ther as intermediate goods or as final goods.  The simple characteriza-
tion of industries as either importers or exporters ignores the observa-
tion that there are significant trade flows within industries, across
national borders.  Intra-industry trade is a very general and rising trend.
Helpman (1999, p. 134) noted that, “. . . the industrialized countries
trade with each other much more than they trade with less developed
countries.”
Lovely and Richardson (2000) presented a useful characteriza-
tion of intra-industry trade.  Between industrialized countries (North–
North), trade flows within an industry are differentiated, skill-intensive
intermediate or final goods.  Between industrialized countries and new-
ly industrialized (North–South), the North exports skill-intensive inter-
mediates or final goods, and the South exports labor intensive interme-
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diates.  Southern production of labor intensive intermediates (or the la-
bor intensive assembly component of final goods), is also known as
Northern “outsourcing,” the import of intermediate inputs.
At the level of aggregation in this data set, it is not surprising that
industries are both importers and exporters.  In motor vehicles (CIC
351), for example, where finished cars are included with parts, firms lo-
cated in the United States import parts for production in the United
States (e.g. Honda, Toyota, and the NUMMI plant in Fremont, CA),
and parts are exported for Canadian production.  Of course, finished
cars are also imported and exported.
An industry’s import share and export intensity provide a rough un-
derstanding of intra-industry trade, in the sense that high import share
teamed with high export intensity suggests that the industry is actively
importing and exporting.  A more precise, and now established, method
for measuring intra-industry trade was offered by Grubel and Lloyd
(1975).  That measure is:
IIT = 1 – 
where X and M represent, respectively, the value of exports and imports
of an industry and the vertical bars in the numerator denote the absolute
value.  The value of IIT ranges from 0, when an industry exports or im-
ports (but not both), to 1, when an industry’s exports and imports are
equal.  Thus, the higher the value of IIT, the greater the degree of trade
overlap, or intra-industry trade.
This measure, and other similar measures, reveal significant trade
overlap within industries, especially for the industrialized countries.
Helpman (1999) reported that 65 percent of European Union trade was
within the Union in 1996.  Intra-industry trade can also be quite high in
particular sectors, such as pharmaceuticals and electrical machinery. 
Table 4.6, which reports the Grubel-Lloyd measure of trade over-
lap, along with import share and export intensity, provides a basic pic-
ture of the extent to which industries were both importers and exporters
in 1994. Industries are listed in rank order of trade overlap, from the
lowest degree of overlap (unbalanced, or little intra-industry, trade) to
the highest degree of trade overlap.  At low values of intra-industry
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Logging 0.113 0.020 0.266
Footwear, ex. rubber & plastic 0.118 0.707 0.127
Watches, clocks 0.149 0.800 0.237
Leather products, ex. footwear 0.182 0.660 0.152
Newspaper publishing & printing 0.246 0.000 0.001
Apparel & accessories 0.262 0.382 0.082
Tobacco manufactures 0.296 0.008 0.252
Structural clay products 0.322 0.179 0.039
Blast furnaces, steelworks 0.330 0.190 0.045
Knitting mills 0.337 0.219 0.052
Misc. manuf. industries 0.341 0.376 0.111
Pottery & related products 0.351 0.445 0.146
Grain mill products 0.362 0.018 0.080
Toys & sporting goods 0.396 0.507 0.195
Paints, varnishes 0.397 0.016 0.057
Aircraft & parts 0.429 0.176 0.449
Petroleum refining 0.462 0.085 0.039
Misc. fabricated textile products 0.473 0.148 0.048
Misc. petroleum & coal products 0.505 0.072 0.038
Furniture & fixtures 0.519 0.133 0.048
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 0.520 0.035 0.012
Other rubber products 0.526 0.243 0.101
Engines & turbines 0.535 0.189 0.394
Beverage industries 0.594 0.068 0.029
Fabricated structural metal 0.597 0.016 0.036
Tires & inner tubes 0.616 0.225 0.116
Misc. paper & pulp products 0.617 0.025 0.050
Iron & steel foundries 0.634 0.046 0.022
Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.637 0.012 0.005
Paperboard containers & boxes 0.641 0.013 0.025
Misc. wood products 0.645 0.101 0.045
Office & accounting machines 0.645 0.451 0.249
Ship & boat building & repair 0.651 0.040 0.076
Motor vehicles 0.653 0.275 0.146
Meat products 0.655 0.034 0.065
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Plastics, synthetics & resins 0.658 0.104 0.191
Soaps & cosmetics 0.660 0.039 0.072
Sawmills, planning mills 0.664 0.144 0.075
Photographic equipment 0.677 0.260 0.133
Metal forgings 0.679 0.042 0.173
Screw machine products 0.683 0.156 0.087
Printing, publishing 0.688 0.021 0.033
Misc. food preparations 0.696 0.066 0.114
Construction & material handling machines 0.725 0.237 0.344
Industrial & misc. chemicals 0.726 0.132 0.208
Radio, TV, & communication 0.744 0.298 0.193
Electronic computing equipment 0.763 0.487 0.167
Drugs 0.765 0.093 0.126
Ordnance 0.773 0.153 0.227
Yarn, thread & fabric mills 0.778 0.108 0.067
Primary aluminum industries 0.779 0.157 0.102
Railroad locomotives 0.783 0.141 0.096
Optical & health supplies 0.795 0.115 0.162
Household appliances 0.801 0.168 0.117
Cutlery, handtools 0.816 0.176 0.135
Scientific & controlling instrmnts 0.826 0.228 0.295
Metalworking machinery 0.839 0.236 0.176
Electrical machinery, equip. 0.863 0.313 0.197
Cycles & misc. transport. equip. 0.864 0.227 0.265
Glass & glass products 0.882 0.129 0.096
Pulp, paper & paperboard mills 0.883 0.168 0.126
Misc. plastics products 0.904 0.076 0.059
Floor coverings 0.911 0.070 0.056
Leather tanning & finishing 0.929 0.277 0.246
Misc. textile mill products 0.944 0.133 0.151
Farm machinery & equipment 0.944 0.158 0.175
Misc. nonmetallic mineral & stone products 0.944 0.112 0.100
Misc. fabricated metal products 0.960 0.085 0.076
Bakery products 0.962 0.014 0.012
Other primary metal industries 0.965 0.191 0.215
Machinery, ex. electrical 0.977 0.187 0.199
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Dairy products 0.981 0.017 0.017
Canned & preserved fruits 0.983 0.054 0.050
Sugar & confectionary products 0.988 0.078 0.074
Guided missiles, space vehicles 0.989 0.057 0.048
Mean (unweighted) 0.653 0.171 0.124
Std. deviation (unweighted) 0.237 0.164 0.093
NOTE: Import share is calculated as imports divided by the sum of imports and do-
mestic supply; export intensity is calculated as exports divided by shipments.  Trade
overlap (IIT) is defined in the text.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the NBER Trade Database.
competing industries have export activity, but it is swamped by im-
ports.  These industries include apparel, footwear, leather products,
structural clay products, and watches and clocks.  The unbalanced and
high export industries are logging, tobacco, and grain mill products.
Trade flows are more balanced in durable goods than in nondurable
goods.  There is considerable balanced trade in leather tanning and fin-
ishing, miscellaneous textile mill products, machinery, farm equip-
ment, and cycles and miscellaneous transport, where high import share
is combined with high export intensity.  A few industries are balanced
with very little trade (high domestic orientation), such as dairy prod-
ucts; bakery products; paperboard containers; printing and publishing;
cement, concrete, and gypsum; and fabricated structural metal. 
In sum, corresponding to the overall increase in trade flows noted
throughout this chapter, virtually all industries were more balanced in
trade at the end of the period than they were at the start.  Even where
there is far more trade in one direction than the other (unbalanced
trade), the smaller of the flows increased over the study period.  Ex-
ports represent a small, although far from trivial, share of domestic
shipments in traditionally import-competing industries, such as foot-
wear, watches and clocks, leather products, pottery, and toys and sport-
ing goods.  Other traditionally import-competing industries have more
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balanced trade, such as leather tanning and finishing and cycles and
miscellaneous transport.18
We now have in place basic trends in employment, trade flows, and
foreign competition.  Employment has declined, and in many cases
sharply, for most manufacturing industries.  Trade volumes have in-
creased.  To get at the questions raised in the introductory chapter, we
need to consider the variation across industries in changes in trade
flows, foreign competition, and employment.  Has increased import
competition been an important factor behind declining employment?
Are changes in exports associated with changes in employment?  Do
these relationships hold for many industries, or for a subset of indus-
tries?
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT: THE ROLE 
OF TRADE AND FOREIGN COMPETITION
As a first take on these ideas, Table 4.7 reports summary informa-
tion on changes in employment, trade flows, and domestic demand for
our subset of high-import industries for 1979–1985 and 1985–1994.
The full set of industries are reported in Appendix Tables A8 and A9 for
1979–1985 and 1985–1994, respectively.19 To establish the importance
of an industry to sector employment gains or losses, the table also re-
ports each industry’s share of total manufacturing employment loss, if
that industry lost employment, or the share of total manufacturing em-
ployment gain, if that industry gained employment over the period.
In the 1979–1985 period, apparel (representing 5 percent of manu-
facturing employment in 1979) accounted for 7 percent of employment
losses, while it was in the top 10 of industries in terms of import share
gain and export losses.  Non-electrical machinery, 5 percent of begin-
ning period employment and 4 percent of employment losses, saw a
more modest increase in import share and export decline.  Blast fur-
naces accounted for just under 3 percent of 1979 manufacturing em-
ployment but, with a 63 percent decline in employment, accounted for
almost 11 percent of manufacturing employment loss.  It saw a rise in
import share of 7 percentage points (61 percent) and a 106 percent de-
cline in exports.  Domestic demand was also very weak, falling 55 per-
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cent.  Construction and material moving machinery, accounting for just
under 2 percent of 1979 employment, produced 5 percent of manufac-
turing employment loss, associated with a 9-percentage-point increase
in import share (152 percent increase) together with a nearly 48 percent
decline in exports.  Domestic demand was also very weak, declining 33
percent.  
There is also an association between employment decline, import
share gain, export loss, and weak domestic demand for the handful of
small traditionally import-competing industries.  Watches and clocks,
with a 0.1 percent employment share and accounting for 0.6 percent of
employment losses (with a 81 percent employment decline), experi-
enced the largest percentage-point increase in import share (22.6 per-
centage points, a 58 percent increase) and an 84 percent decline in ex-
ports, along with a 41 percent decline in domestic demand.  Footwear,
with a 40 percent decline in employment, accounted for just under 2
percent of employment losses from a 0.7 percent employment share.
The rise in import share in that industry was 22 percentage points, a 63
percent increase.  Unlike other import-competing industries, exports
rose in footwear over the period.  Leather products saw a large rise in
import share and a sizeable decline in exports.  Toys and sporting goods
experienced similar changes.
Several general points can be made from this table (bringing in ob-
servations from Appendix Table A8 as well).  Sharply declining exports
are strongly associated with employment decline, particularly in the in-
dustries accounting for the bulk of the employment loss.  Rising im-
ports are also strongly associated with employment decline but more so
in smaller, traditionally import-competing industries (watches and
clocks, footwear, and leather products).  Apparel, a traditionally im-
port-competing industry, was the biggest employer in the top 10 set of
industries for import share gain and export decline.  The iron and steel
industries appear hard hit by the combination of rising import share and
declining exports, as well as by large employment losses.  Of the top
export losers, blast furnaces was the biggest employer, experiencing a
63 percent decline in employment.  Other primary metals also experi-
enced a large decline in exports, a modest rise in import share, and a 20
percent decline in employment.
How much employment decline was associated with the rise in im-






















Electrical machinery 0.062 –0.030 0.015 0.071 0.026 0.217
Apparel 0.054 –0.175 0.070 0.103 –0.621 0.060
Machinery, exc. electric 0.050 –0.113 0.043 0.052 –0.212 0.027
Motor vehicles 0.049 –0.115 0.043 0.086 –0.017 0.161
Blast furnaces 0.028 –0.634 0.107 0.074 –1.067 –0.553
Office & acct machines 0.019 0.260 0.141 0.083 –0.100 0.293
Construction machines 0.019 –0.414 0.052 0.091 –0.478 –0.334
Electronic computing eqp. 0.018 0.521 0.311 0.086 0.586 0.676
Misc. manuf industries 0.014 –0.145 0.015 0.110 –0.740 0.028
Pulp, paper 0.012 –0.057 0.005 0.004 –0.129 0.047
Footwear 0.007 –0.406 0.020 0.219 0.078 0.058
Photographic eqp. 0.007 –0.090 0.005 0.052 –0.350 0.096
Toys & sporting goods 0.006 –0.242 0.010 0.148 –0.476 0.064
Radio, TV 0.006 –0.315 0.012 0.046 0.107 0.445
Other primary metal 0.005 –0.204 0.008 0.022 –1.139 –0.248
Misc. textile 0.003 –0.237 0.006 0.014 –0.230 –0.157
Cycles & misc. transport eqp. 0.003 –0.065 0.001 –0.022 0.410 0.006
Leather products 0.003 –0.444 0.007 0.195 –0.555 –0.063





Watches, clocks 0.001 –0.812 0.006 0.226 –0.841 –0.415
1985–94
Electrical machinery 0.066 –0.072 0.054 0.135 1.146 0.456
Apparel 0.050 –0.222 0.118 0.146 1.965 0.223
Machinery, exc. electric 0.049 –0.000 0.000 0.050 0.757 0.302
Motor vehicles 0.048 0.029 0.032 0.016 0.800 0.323
Electronic computing eqp. 0.034 –0.285 0.099 0.298 0.595 0.475
Radio, TV 0.031 –0.297 0.094 0.101 1.205 0.014
Office & acct machines 0.027 –0.345 0.094 0.289 0.249 –0.331
Blast furnaces 0.016 –0.235 0.041 –0.003 1.084 0.187
Construction machines 0.014 –0.179 0.027 0.087 0.287 0.061
Misc. manuf industries 0.013 0.145 0.045 0.080 0.773 0.410
Pulp, paper 0.013 –0.057 0.008 0.010 0.772 0.207
Photographic eqp. 0.007 –0.329 0.022 0.088 0.378 0.174
Footwear 0.005 –0.544 0.027 0.140 1.297 0.028
Toys & sporting goods 0.005 0.194 0.025 0.130 1.495 0.512
Other primary metal 0.005 –0.119 0.006 –0.020 1.092 0.172
Misc. textile 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.000 1.017 0.308
Cycles & misc. transport 0.003 –0.006 0.000 –0.041 0.565 0.275
Pottery & related 0.002 0.043 0.002 0.027 0.693 0.317
Leather products 0.002 –0.336 0.006 0.196 1.328 0.208
Leather tanning & finish 0.001 –0.188 0.002 0.045 0.752 0.450
Watches, clocks 0.001 –0.381 0.003 0.187 0.793 0.215
NOTE: Changes are log changes. See Appendix Tables A8 and A9 for explanations.
a Employment share data refer to 1979 for the 1979–85 panel and 1985 for the 1985–94 panel.
Leather tanning & finish 0.001 –0.296 0.002 0.073 –0.192 –0.359
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size, industries with the largest increases in import share accounted for
a noticeably small share of total sectoral employment decline.  Of the
top import share gainers (and export losers, with solid domestic de-
mand), apparel accounted for the largest share of employment declines,
at 7 percent.  With apparel at number 8 in rising import share, the top 10
import share gainers accounted for 21 percent of employment decline,
and they started with 12 percent of 1979 employment.  Four of the in-
dustries in this group had considerable export decline.  The top 10 in
export decline accounted for about 25 percent of employment loss,
starting from a 12 percent 1979 employment share. 
On the employment gain side, advances were concentrated in com-
puters, office and accounting machines, and printing and publishing.
Computers saw an 8-percentage-point increase in import share, along
with a 58 percent increase in exports and strong domestic demand.  Of-
fice machines was similarly situated, although exports declined by
about 10 percent.  Printing and publishing has little exposure to imports
or exports, and domestic demand growth was strong.
For the 1985–1994 period, we have a different set of observations.
A number of the same industries appear in the top 10 of import share
gainers (leather products, watches and clocks, apparel, footwear, and
toys and sporting goods).  The computer industry moved to number 1
from 11, and office and accounting machines moved up also, from 13 to
2.  Rising imports were associated with employment decline in all these
industries.  The surge in exports, nearly across the board, produced
some (simple) surprises, in that many of the top import share gainers
had big increases in exports.  Apparel accounted for almost 12 percent
of employment losses, from a 5 percent 1985 employment share, while
import share increased, exports surged, and domestic demand was
moderately strong.  Import share rose 159 percent in computers (29
percentage points), exports increased 59 percent, and employment fell
28 percent, accounting for nearly 10 percent of total sectoral employ-
ment loss from a 3 percent employment share.  The story in office and
accounting machines was very similar.  Scientific and controlling in-
struments, small by employment, saw an increase in import share of 11
percentage points and a 58 percent increase in exports, with solid do-
mestic demand, but a 16 percent decline in employment that accounted
for 4 percent of employment losses.
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The top 10 import share gainers accounted for 46 percent of em-
ployment losses while representing 21 percent of 1985 employment.
The surge in exports appears more weakly related to employment
growth.  The top 10 export gainers accounted for just 5 percent of em-
ployment growth, from an 18 percent employment share.  Weak do-
mestic demand, through changed circumstances in international poli-
tics, played a larger role in this later period, particularly for aircraft and
guided missiles and ordnance.
With respect to the degree of intra-industry trade (and considering
data from Appendix Table A9), there is some evidence of greater em-
ployment loss in unbalanced trade industries (industries that are either
importers or exporters) than in balanced trade industries.  The average
weighted employment change in the most unbalanced trade industries
(with values of mean IIT less than 0.46) was –23 percent, and the aver-
age weighted employment change in the most balanced trade industries
(with values of mean IIT greater than 0.795) was –7 percent, a differ-
ence that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.20
Several conclusions emerge from these observations about changes
in industry employment and trade flows.  Rising import share is associ-
ated with declining employment, particularly for a few industries over
the full period.  Watches and clocks, footwear, leather products, appar-
el, and construction and material handling machines all had large to
very large increases in import share and very large declines in employ-
ment.  Computers and office and accounting machines saw large in-
creases in import share and expanding employment.  With respect to
simple correlations, exports are more complicated.  From 1979–1985,
when export demand was weak, employment declined in a number of
industries.  Yet, when exports surged, from 1985–1992, employment
continued to decline. 
WHAT ABOUT IMPORT PRICES?
At this very descriptive level, it is more difficult to draw conclu-
sions about the association between changes in employment and
changes in import prices.  The simple correlations between changes in
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log industry employment and changes in import share appear stronger
than the employment/import price associations.  This may be somewhat
a product of timing: once import share has risen, an industry is revealed
to be facing stronger import competition, whereas a decrease in import
price reveals potentially more import competition, and the effect on in-
dustry employment depends on the industry response to the import
price decline.  In other words, rising import share is an ex post measure
of increasing import competition, whereas declining import price is a
measure of potential competition.  We will return to this point in Chap-
ter 6.
Job loss, not net changes in industry employment, is at the heart of
the emotionally charged assertion that, “trade costs jobs.” Having built
a foundation from the traditional focus on net industry employment
change, we conclude this chapter with a discussion of the incidence of
job loss and how trends in job loss are associated with trends in trade
flows.
JOB LOSS AND TRADE, 1979–1994
The best available measure of permanent job loss is provided by
the DWSs, biennial supplements to the CPS.  As CPS data, the DWSs
offer the advantage of being drawn from a large-scale, nationally repre-
sentative sample.  In each survey, adults (aged 20 years and older) in
the regular monthly CPS were asked if they had lost a job in the pre-
ceding 5-year period due to “(1) a plant closing, (2) an employer going
out of business, (3) a layoff from which he/she was not recalled, or (4)
other similar reasons.”  If the answer was yes, a series of questions fol-
lowed concerning the old job and period of joblessness.  By drawing a
sample of workers who responded that their job loss was due to the first
three reasons, we obtain a reasonable and sound measure of involuntary
permanent job loss.  A key disadvantage of the DWSs is their retro-
spective nature—respondents are asked to recall events 3–5 years in the
past.  I discuss the DWS and its advantages and disadvantages in more
detail in Appendix A.
Based on calculations from a sample drawn from the DWSs, 32
million nonagricultural workers reported experiencing at least one per-
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manent job loss over the 1979–1994 period (Appendix A reports sam-
ple construction details).  Manufacturing accounted for 35.5 percent of
total job loss, with 10.2 million workers reporting a job loss from that
sector.  Manufacturing accounted for an average of 18–19 percent of to-
tal nonagricultural employment over the 16-year period, starting with
23.4 percent in 1979 and ending at 16.0 percent in 1994.
Figure 4.5 plots the total and manufacturing displacement rates
over the 1979–1994 period.  The rate of job loss from manufacturing is
considerably higher than the overall rate for all industries.  The manu-
facturing displacement rate rose to 8 percent in the early 1980s reces-
sion and then fell sharply until the late 1980s.  It rose steadily through
the prolonged early 1990s recession and then fell as the economy re-
covered from the recession.  By 1994, the rate of job loss was down
from its 1992 peak, but it remained high for a recovery phase.  The to-
tal displacement rate follows a similar, although dampened, pattern.
The overall rate of job loss was high in 1994, given the strength of the
SOURCE: Kletzer (2000, Figure 10.1). 
Figure 4.5  Manufacturing and Total Displacement Rates, by Year
(1979–94)
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economy (for more on the pattern of job loss over the 1980s and 1990s,
see Farber 1997).21
TRADE AND JOB LOSS BY INDUSTRY
The years 1979–1994 were characterized by widespread job loss in
manufacturing.  Table 4.8 presents the top job loss manufacturing in-
dustries.  In part, these industries accounted for much job loss because
they are large industries in terms of employment.  By adjusting for em-
ployment, the displacement rate offers a proxy for the “risk of job loss.”
All these industries were near or below the average job loss rate for
manufacturing industries.
Is displacement associated with employment losses? Appendix
Table A10 reports information at a more detailed level on employment
change, displacement, and changes in trade flows, ranking industries by
1979 employment levels.  With a few exceptions, all industries with
above-average rates of job loss have above-average declines in em-
ployment.  Industries with employment growth tend to have lower job
loss rates.  The large employment industries, all with sizeable increases








Electrical machinery 822.9 0.042
Apparel 748.3 0.052
Motor vehicles 675.5 0.051
Machinery, exc. electric 633.3 0.044
Printing & publishing 580.8 0.037
Electronic computing equipment 394.9 0.045
Fabricated structural metals 386.3 0.056
All manufacturing industries 11,380 0.051
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in import share, all had fairly large employment declines and job loss
rates at or higher than the sector average.  Notably, electrical machin-
ery, apparel, motor vehicles, and blast furnaces accounted for larger
shares of displacement than their corresponding employment share.  In-
terestingly, the strongest relationship between employment change and
the risk of job displacement is found amongst the set of small (in em-
ployment), traditionally import-competing industries, such as leather
tanning and finishing (with a 29 percent employment decline and a
0.073 job loss rate), watches and clocks (a 69 percent employment de-
cline and a 0.091 job loss rate), and leather products (a 78 percent em-
ployment decline and a 0.142 job loss rate).
For the most part, industries experiencing high job loss rates start-
ed with a high import share and experienced a large (positive) change
in import share (increasing import competition).  Industries with lower
import share yet large positive change in import share had lower rates
of job loss (metalworking machinery, aircraft, and knitting mills),
while industries with high import share and average or smaller changes
in import share also had average or lower rates of job loss (motor vehi-
cles, and engines and turbines).  Exports appear important: while four
of the top 10 job loss rate industries had large increases in import share,
five of the top 10 had small increases in exports or even a decline in ex-
ports.  At the same time, the top three job loss industries had large in-
creases in exports.  Over this long period, export change may be de-
ceiving.  Exports surged strongly after 1985, and it is likely that the
long-period change is driven by the 1985–1994 period.  The economet-
ric analysis of annual changes in the next chapter will provide a better
perspective on export change.
Table 4.9 reports additional summary univariate classifications of
trade volumes and job loss.  Panel I reports the mean annual displace-
ment rate for each quartile of the industry mean import share distribu-
tion.  The highest import share industries have, on average, the highest
job loss rate, but job loss rates are relatively uniform below the top
quartile.  Within each quartile, the distribution of job loss rates is fairly
similar.  Panel II reports mean job loss rates by the long-period change
in import share.  In this panel, job loss rates are higher for industries
with large positive changes in import share.  Panel III reports the mean
annual displacement rate for each quartile of the distribution of the




Table 4.9  Industry Displacement, Import Share, and Exports
Lowest quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Top quartile
I.
By mean import share <0.043 0.043–0.076 0.079–0.140 >0.140
Mean annual displacement rate 0.042 0.052 0.041 0.066
(min, max) (0.024, 0.080) (0.021, 0.126) (0.020, 0.083) (0.008, 0.142)
II.
By change in import share, 1979–94 <0.0131 0.0131–0.0614 0.0615–0.1170 >0.1172
Mean annual displacement rate 0.044 0.049 0.051 0.058
(min, max) (0.021, 0.098) (0.021, 0.126) (0.024, 0.108) (0.008, 0.142)
III.
By change in ln(exports), 1979–94 <0.149 0.149–0.709 0.709–1.043 >1.044
Mean annual displacement rate 0.059 0.042 0.053 0.047
(min, max) (0.008, 0.107) (0.023, 0.074) (0.026, 0.142) (0.020, 0.126)
IV.
By mean annual displacement rate <0.031 0.032–0.043 0.044–0.061 >0.065
Mean import share 0.077 0.074 0.096 0.184
(min, max) (0.002, 0.181) (0.009, 0.154) (0.006, 0.234) (0.023, 0.458)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the Displaced Worker Surveys and the NBER Trade Database.
Imports, Exports, and Jobs 81
loss with more growth of exports, so that from the bottom quartile to
the top, job loss rates would fall.  This is the overall pattern found in
Panel III, although the decline in job loss as exports rise is not smooth,
and the range of job loss rates within each quartile is fairly similar.
Lastly, Panel IV reports mean import share for the full job loss industry
distribution.  Similar to what can be seen in Appendix Table A10, im-
port share is highest among the high job loss rate industries, and the top
half of the job loss rate distribution has distinctly higher import share
than the lower half of the distribution.22
One suggestion from these univariate classifications is that the
combination of “trade with job loss” arises from continued, sustained
import competition.  That is, high rates of job loss are found for indus-
tries with high import share and large (positive) changes in import
share.  For the most part, increasing import competition (positive
changes in import share), from a lower level of import share, is associ-
ated with below-average job loss (photographic equipment, scientific
and controlling instruments, and pulp and paper).
A few general observations emerge from Appendix Table A10 and
Table 4.9.  There is a set of industries facing sustained import competi-
tion, those with both high levels of import share and positive changes in
import share where the rate of job loss is high.  At the same time, there
is a considerable amount of variation in job displacement across indus-
tries, and the risk of job loss can be high in the absence of changes in
foreign competition.  Thus “trade” itself can explain only a small share
of the variation in job displacement.
SUMMARY
When the basic trends in employment, job loss, and trade flows are
brought together, some basic patterns emerge.  There is an association
between employment decline, import share gain, export loss, and weak
domestic demand for the handful of small traditionally import-compet-
ing industries.  Sharply declining exports are strongly associated with
employment decline, particularly in the industries accounting for the
bulk of the employment loss.  Rising imports are also strongly associat-
ed with employment decline but more so in smaller, traditionally im-
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port-competing industries.  High job loss rate industries were both high
import share and experienced a large (positive) change in import share
(increasing import competition).
From this descriptive background, the next step is the estimation of
an econometric model that allows for the inclusion of other factors in
the determination of employment change and job loss. Chapter 5 pres-
ents such a model, with estimates following in Chapters 6 and 7.
Notes
1. This brief discussion owes its clarity to the more complete discussion in Mann
(1999).
2. This is not to say that trade flows are solely determined by exchange rates and
other macroeconomic factors such as differential country growth rates.  Chapter 2
discussed how trade flows are also a function of price competitiveness, from a
microeconomic perspective.  What we can see now is that microeconomic deci-
sions and broad macroeconomic factors affect global price competitiveness and
trade flows.
3. These indices are described in more detail in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(1992).  They are based on a survey of actual transactions prices, and to the de-
gree possible, they reflect c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) prices.  When aggrega-
tion was needed, the SIC indices were weighted by their relative shares in total
imports, using the NBER Trade Database.
4. Because attention is often, although not always, paid according to the size of an
industry, industries are listed in the two tables in descending order of beginning-
of-period employment.
5. In the case of farm machinery and equipment, and for all small employment in-
dustries, it is worth noting that arithmetically, when a given number is divided by
a small base, it yields a larger percentage change than the same number divided
by a larger base.
6. Import share fell in just four industries over the 1975–1994 period.  These indus-
tries are newspaper printing and publishing (import share fell by 82.5 percent),
sugar and confectionary products (a drop of 54.2 percent), cycles and miscella-
neous transport (–18.3 percent), and petroleum refining (–16.1 percent).  Note
that sugar and motorcycles had trade protection during some or all of the period.
7. Table 4.2 lists two additional industries, with import shares of 0.129, very close to
the 0.13 cutoff.
8. See Schoepfle (1982) for classifications over the period 1972–1979 and Bed-
narzik (1993) for the period 1982–1987.
9. Import share of 0.089 or higher.
10. As measured by the multilateral trade-weighted value of the dollar, in Council of
Economic Advisers (1999).
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11. Nec stands for “Not elsewhere classified.”
12. Import prices are not available for all industries.  Mean price changes are report-
ed in the last rows of the table.  These means are simple means, not weighted by
industry output, nor corrected for the use of two-digit import prices for a number
of three-digit industries.
13. These industries correspond to a lineup of the top exporting firms General Mo-
tors, Boeing, Ford Motor, General Electric, Chrysler, IBM, Motorola, and Hew-
lett-Packard (reported in Richardson and Rindal, 1995).
14. More detail on industry shipments shares and export shares is contained in Ap-
pendix Table A5.
15. As discussed below, the slight average decline in export intensity from 1980 to
1985 masks a wide variation, with exports falling dramatically in a number of in-
dustries.
16. The three (computers, railroad locomotives, and petroleum) all had shipments
growth exceeding export growth.
17. Computers are an exception here, as export intensity fell over the 1980–1994 pe-
riod (by –0.643), due to faster growth in shipments and domestic demand than in
exports (all three positive). The other industries where exports, shipments, and
domestic demand all grew, and export intensity fell due to the growth in ship-
ments (and domestic demand) exceeding the growth in exports are grain mill
products, misc. fabricated textile products, guided missiles, photographic equip-
ment, and misc. manufacturing industries.
18. Appendix Table A7 reports mean trade overlap, import share, and export intensi-
ty separately for 1980, 1987, and 1994.
19. Appendix Tables A8 and A9 list industries in descending order of beginning year
employment share (i.e., largest employment industries first) and reports changes
in employment, import share, exports, and domestic demand.  A ranking of indus-
tries is also provided for each of the four changes, where a ranking of “1” denotes
largest percentage employment loss, largest import share gain, largest export loss,
and largest domestic demand loss. The ranks provide some evidence of the rank-
order correlations between the changes. If an industry’s rank numbers are all
small, then that industry had large employment declines, large increases in import
share, large decreases in exports, and large reductions in domestic demand.
20. The weights are 1979 industry employment.
21. My estimates of the rate of job loss are lower than Farber’s due to differences in
sample construction. Farber corrects the DWS numbers for an undercount of job
loss that results from a change in the recall period. I do not follow his procedure
and therefore my count of manufacturing job loss should be considered a conser-
vative one.
22. In results not reported, there is little suggestion of a simple, univariate, relation-
ship between intra-industry trade and job loss rates.  More balanced trade indus-
tries have similar job loss rates as unbalanced trade industries.

5
Modeling Labor Market Responses
to Changes in Trade and 
Import Competition
In the previous chapter, I examined the descriptive evidence on
changes in industry employment and job loss and the possible link to
the increasing volume of trade and foreign competition.  I noted a num-
ber of discernible patterns.  I also noted a number of issues likely to af-
fect estimates of the relationship between foreign competition, trade,
and changes in employment.  In this chapter I discuss these issues more
formally and present an empirical strategy for estimating these relation-
ships.
The very basic question I seek to answer is, “How is trade associat-
ed with employment change and job loss?”  As such, my goal is not a
model of why industries trade or more generally a model of the deter-
minants of trade.  My question fits into an approach with a long tradi-
tion in labor economics: it is partial equilibrium, not general equilibri-
um, in that I examine employment changes and job loss in an industry
in relation to changes in trade flows and/or foreign competition in that
industry, with no explicit allowance for spillover effects.  This partial
equilibrium approach stands in contrast to the perspective of interna-
tional trade economists, who study the determinants of trade and trade
patterns in interrelated markets.  My partial equilibrium modeling is
not unique: often-cited examples include Grossman (1987), Freeman
and Katz (1991), and Revenga (1992).
Even as the analysis gains econometric structure and a bit of for-
malism, it remains descriptive, not causal.  By choice, I want to assess
how changes in employment and job loss have been associated with
changes in trade flows and prices, controlling for other factors that in-
fluence employment and job loss.  I acknowledge, although I do not ad-
dress in depth, the important (and correct) view that trade flows and
prices are jointly determined with other variables, including produc-
tion, domestic demand, and employment.  This joint determination
makes trade flows and prices endogenous to the process I am modeling.
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I do not attempt to uncover the underlying causes of changes in either
trade flows or prices.  Thus, my analysis is not truly causal; it is de-
scriptive and meant to reveal the associations between U.S. jobs and in-
creasing economic integration that concern policymakers, workers, the
general public, and academics. 
The basic empirical specification is presented in the following sec-
tion.  I also discuss some of the qualifications of the estimation, along
with econometric issues that arise.  For the reader less interested in the
technical details, the first section contains all the essential points.  A
more technically complete presentation of the model follows.  Reading
the more technical presentation is not essential for understanding the
discussion of econometric results presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
THE BASIC EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
I use a fairly simple empirical framework for examining the associ-
ations between changes in product demand, import (price) competition,
employment change, and job displacement.  The framework is devel-
oped from a straightforward industry model of employment determina-
tion.
The model begins with the labor market.  Using first differences,
the demand for labor in industry i in year t (Nit) can be written as:
(1) dlnNit = –kdlnWit + dlnZit,
where Wit is the industry wage, Zit is the shift in the derived labor de-
mand curve due to shifts in product demand, k is the wage elasticity of
labor demand, ln is the natural logarithm, and d is the difference opera-
tor.
Also in first differences, labor supply can be written as:
(2) dlnNit = edlnWit + dlnHit,
where e is the wage elasticity of labor supply, Hit is a vector of factors
that shift labor supply.  Labor market clearing, where wages in an in-
dustry adjust to equate labor supply and labor demand) implies:
86 Labor Market Responses to Changes in Trade and Import Competition
Imports, Exports, and Jobs 87
(3) dlnNit = (edlnXit – kdlnHit)/(k + e), and
(4) dlnWit = (dlnXit + dlnHit)/(k + e).
With respect of changes in product demand, the coefficient of interest is
e/(k + e), which we will call h.
This model highlights the relationship between changes in em-
ployment (and wages) and (exogenous) shifts in demand (and supply).
Taking this framework to the data requires empirical measures of these
shifts and, in particular, the relationship between changes in our mea-
sures of trade and changes in product demand.  It is precisely this
aspect where my approach is descriptive rather than causal because I
use measures of industry sales, decomposed into domestic market de-
mand, exports, and imports or industry (import) price as measures of
exogenous shifts in product demand.  Realistically, these measures are
not exogenous; they depend on industry supply as well as demand and
are further influenced by wages and employment and the factors that
determine them.  The more technical derivation in the section that
follows discusses this point in more detail.  That section shows 
how changes in sales can be used to proxy for changes in product de-
mand.
With these qualifications in mind, we can isolate the trade-related
components of product demand.  Data on industry shipments (sales) is
available from the NBER Productivity data set, and data on exports and
imports from the NBER Trade Database (the Trade Database contains
information on all three variables—shipments, exports, and imports).
Following Freeman and Katz (1991), we can decompose sales into its
component parts.  Define D (= domestic) as gross domestic market
sales, where D = sales – exports + imports (D = S – X + M).  A first-or-
der approximation gives:
(5) dlnS = w1 dlnD – w2 dMshare + w3 dlnX,
where Mshare is import share, defined as M/D.  The w’s are various
weights: w1 = [(S – X)/S], w2 = (X/S), and w3 = (D/S).  The weights ad-
just changes in the three components for the difference in the absolute
magnitude of sales generated by the domestic side as compared to ex-
ports and imports.
Allowing changes in sales to proxy changes in product demand
(explained more fully in the section that follows), we get a specification
relating changes in sales (decomposed) to changes in employment:
(6) dlnN = Bw1dlnD + Bw2dlnX – Bw3dMshare,
where B, a coefficient to be estimated, is a combination of various struc-
tural parameters explained more fully below in the following section.
Note that from Equation 4, labor supply factors (H) are being ignored
for now.  These factors reappear in a more complete specification below.
Note that this model makes an implicit assumption that changes in
industry employment due to (weighted) changes in trade-related sales
are similar to changes in industry employment due to changes in do-
mestic sales.  This assumption appears as the same “B” on the three dif-
ferent components of sales.  In the long run, there seems little reason to
expect industry labor markets to react differently to changes in sales
from different sources.  An export-related shift in demand is a shift in
demand.  In the short run, we may have less confidence about this as-
sumption.  If trade-generated shifts are perceived to be temporary, say
because of exchange rate volatility, then there may be different re-
sponses by industry labor markets to shifts in demand.
Note also that the underlying approach in Equation 6 is a consider-
ation of shifts in demand, shifts that allow us to consider whether do-
mestic employment is more or less sensitive to changes in imports or
exports than to changes in domestic demand.  As an economy becomes
more open (trade flows rising as a share of GDP), industry labor mar-
kets will be subject to shifts that are trade generated, along with the do-
mestic demand shifts that prevailed (alone) in a closed economy.  This
perspective allows us to ask how much of the observed changes in em-
ployment can be related to changes in trade flows. 
More technically, in the regression context, Equation 6 considers
the domestic employment change associated with a change in one of
the components of sales (S = D + X – M), holding the other two compo-
nents constant.  Each one of these demand shifts cannot be viewed in
isolation, due to the sales (or demand, D = S – X + M) identity that de-
fines them.  Take changes in import share, for example.  Let imports
rise, producing a rise in import share.  The rise in import share is corre-
spondingly a reduction in the domestically produced share of domestic
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demand, through a decline in shipments that will hold constant the lev-
el of domestic demand.  The decline in shipments will be one-for-one
with the increase in imports.  Thus, the rise in import share is a change
in the composition of total domestic demand, holding the level con-
stant.
In the case of a shift in export demand, exports can only rise if in-
dustry sales/shipments rise.  This again follows from the domestic de-
mand identity.  If exports rise and imports are held constant, a rise in
shipments is required to hold domestic demand constant.  Another way
of stating this is that an increase in weighted exports, where the weight
is the share of exports in sales, represents an increase in overall sales
due to exports, holding the other components constant. 
Domestic demand is the last, and biggest, component.  Averaged
over time and the industries in this sample, domestic demand repre-
sents 91 percent of sales.  Examining an increase in domestic demand,
holding import share and exports constant, is complicated a bit by the
fact that domestic demand is part of (the denominator of) import share.
This complication means that when domestic demand increases, im-
ports must also increase, to hold import share constant.  Thus, the rise
in shipments that spurs a domestic demand increase is accompanied by
an increase in imports.  For example, domestic demand for cars is satis-
fied by domestic producers and foreign producers.  When domestic de-
mand increases, with no change in the foreign share, there will be more
imports, to meet the increased (absolute) demand for foreign cars, and
more domestic car shipments, to meet the increased (absolute) demand
for domestically produced cars.  In an open economy, some of the in-
crease in domestic demand is satisfied by foreign producers.
These interactions highlight the partial equilibrium nature of my
approach.  The introduction of trade flows takes the level of domestic
demand as a given, without a feedback mechanism that would allow for
economic growth.  There is also no provision for spillover employment
effects from goods trade to other sectors of the economy. 
In this framework, these relationships imply that the correlation be-
tween import share increases and employment declines will be over-
stated, due to the effect of falling shipments.  The association between
export growth and employment growth will also be overstated, due to
the effect of rising shipments.  The (employment-stimulating) effect of
a rise in domestic demand will be understated due to the accompanying
rise in imports.  Given the size of the domestic market, we expect this
understatement to be small.  We will return to this point in Chapter 6.
Returning to our modeling strategy, an alternative specification re-
lates changes in industry employment and changes in industry relative
prices, using these price changes as a proxy for changes in sales:
(7) dlnNit = B[(1 – f 1)dln(Pi/Pa)t + f 2dln(Pm/Pa)t + dlnXit],
where Pi is the price of the domestically produced good; Pm is the dol-
lar price of the foreign good; Pa is the dollar price of all other goods; f 1
is the domestic price elasticity of demand; f 2 is the foreign price elas-
ticity of demand; and X is shifts in product demand.
Equations 6 and 7 will become estimable below with the addition
of error terms.  The error terms that will be added reflect measurement
issues and the stochastic nature of changes in employment.  There are,
however, other error terms relevant to these equations.  Turning first to
Equation 6, sales (decomposed) are being used as an estimate of prod-
uct demand.  The following section explains how this is done through
demand, price, and employment determination equations that link
product demand to shipments/sales.  These links mean that our measure
of sales (decomposed into trade flows) is determined, in part, by do-
mestic demand, production, and employment.  These interrelationships
mean that sales is not a variable exogenous to the determination of em-
ployment.  Technically speaking, this means that the error terms we add
to Equation 6 will very likely be correlated with (some of) the determi-
nants of sales.  If sales are correlated with any of the components of the
error term, ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates will be bi-
ased and inconsistent.
Similar issues arise for the treatment of industry prices in Equation
7.  As noted by Revenga (1992), several factors may induce correlation
between the import price measure and the stochastic errors in changes
in employment, such as unmeasured worldwide shocks to materials
costs or unobserved and unmeasured taste or demand shifts in the Unit-
ed States that influence import prices due to the size of the U.S. market.
In addition, as in the model in Mann (1988), import prices may be set
specifically for the U.S. market, and this price setting will produce a
correlation between import price and the disturbance terms.  The direc-
tion of the bias is ambiguous.  For example, a worldwide oil price
90 Labor Market Responses to Changes in Trade and Import Competition
Imports, Exports, and Jobs 91
shock will increase import prices and (separately) depress U.S. em-
ployment, inducing a negative correlation between import price and
employment change.  Alternatively, if foreign producers price to the
U.S. market, they may reduce prices when U.S. demand is slack, induc-
ing a positive correlation as import prices fall while domestic employ-
ment falls.  On balance, it is not clear whether the OLS estimates of the
employment change elasticities will be understated or overstated.
In principle, these endogeneity concerns are most properly ad-
dressed with a system of equations for domestic demand, exports, im-
ports, and industry prices, changes in employment and job loss.  In
practice, such a system presents a very difficult and complex estimation
task.  Since my goal is to inform the policy debate, I do not take that ap-
proach here.  In what follows, I do explore instrumental variables esti-
mation of industry import prices but with limited success.  Given that
limited success, I do not extend the instrumental variables analysis to
trade flows.  My method for instrumenting industry import prices is dis-
cussed in Appendix B.
Most importantly, the endogeneity of changes in trade flows and
changes in prices constrains our interpretation of the regression analy-
ses that follow.  The regressions are descriptive; they will enable us to
assess how changes in employment and job loss have been associated
with changes in trade flows and import prices.  I cannot conclude that
changes in “trade” cause changes in employment and job loss because
my chosen trade measures are themselves determined, at least in part,
by some of the factors that influence changes in employment.
With these caveats stated clearly, we can return to Equations 6 and
7 as the basis for our econometric specifications for changes in industry
employment.  These specifications, however, make provisions only for
trade-related factors and not the other factors that were noted in previ-
ous chapters and are likely to influence resource allocations (e.g., tech-
nological change, other factor prices and factor usage, supply, and
macroeconomic influences).  In what follows, these other factors will
enter as the vector X2it.
The nature of the questions asked (within an industry, how are
changes in trade flows and import competition associated with employ-
ment change and job loss) and the available panel structure of the data
(observations on a cross section of industries over several time periods)
suggest the following error term structure:
(8) dlnNit = Bw1dlnDit + Bw2dlnXit – Bw3dMshareit + G1X2it + u1it, and
(9) dlnNit = B [(1 – f 1)dln(Pi/Pa)t + f 2dln(Pm/Pa)t + dlnXit] + G2X2it + u2it,
where B (1 – f 1), Bf 2, G1, and G2 are coefficients to be estimated and
u1it and u2it are error terms.  We will utilize a two-way error component
model, with
(10) u jit = µi + λt + v jit, j = 1,2,
where µi denotes an unobservable industry-specific effect, λt denotes an
unobservable time effect that is industry invariant, and vit is the sto-
chastic disturbance.  We note that µi is time-invariant and accounts for
any industry-specific effect that is not included in the regression.  The
term λt is industry-invariant and accounts for any time-specific effect
that is not included in the regression.  For example, it can account for
macroeconomic influences that are not otherwise captured by the econ-
omy-wide proxies.  The remainder disturbance, vit, varies with indus-
tries and time and should be considered as the usual disturbance term in
the regression.  
With this type of error structure, a “fixed effects” model is the ap-
propriate specification, as we are focusing on a specific set of manu-
facturing industries, and our statistical inference will be limited to the
behavior of these industries.  It is important to recognize that the indus-
tries in the data set are not a random sampling of the population of in-
dustries.1 In the fixed effects model, the µi and λt are assumed to be
fixed parameters to be estimated.  With industries differing in size and
scale, the stochastic remainder disturbances (vit) are assumed to be zero
mean with nonconstant, heteroscedastic variances.2
Estimation will first proceed assuming that the explanatory vari-
ables are independent of the disturbance terms, for all industries and
time periods.  Given this assumption, and the above assumptions about
the disturbance terms, feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) is a
standard estimation technique.  With more cross-section variation
(number of industries) than time variation (number of time periods),
however, FGLS variance-covariance estimates are anti-conservative
(unduly optimistic in the simple sense of being too small).  An alterna-
tive is OLS, with an adjustment for autocorrelation and panel-corrected
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standard errors (PCSE).3 Most of the panel estimates that follow will
be from OLS/PCSE estimation.
Job loss is the last component of the basic empirical framework.
Starting from changes in net industry employment, a simple model of
turnover can be used to modify and narrow the focus to just one of the
gross flows, job displacement.4 Firms implement net employment re-
ductions through the use of displacements and unreplaced attritions.
Attritions are separations due to quits, discharges (for cause), retire-
ments, and deaths.  Attritions that are not replaced by employers are
called unreplaced attritions.  For an industry, net employment change in
year t can be written as:
(11) DIS + UA = –∆N,
where DIS is displacements, and UA is unreplaced attritions (other
nondisplacement separations minus accessions).5 This net change in
employment can be expressed as a proportion of total employment:
(12) DIS/Nt–1 = Displacement rate = –(Nt – Nt–1)/Nt–1 – UA/Nt–1.
Relying on the approximation of the rate of change of employment, (Nt
– Nt–1)/Nt–1, to the change in log employment, (lnNt – lnNt–1), for small
changes, Equation 9 is approximately equal to:
(13) Displacement ratet = –dlnNt – UA rate,
where UA rate = UA/Nt–1.  Rearranging yields:
(14) –(Displacement Ratet + UA rate) = dlnNt.
Equations 8 and 14, and separately Equations 9 and 14, can be
combined to yield reduced-form equations for industry i displacement:
(15) Displacement rateit = B2w1dlnDit + B2w2dlnXit – B2w3dMshareit
+ G3X2it + u3it, and
(16) Displacement rateit = B2[(1 – f 1)dln(Pi/Pa)t + f 2dln(Pm/Pa)t + dlnXit] 
+ G4X2it + u4it,
where B2, G3, and G4 are coefficients to be estimated and u3it and u4it
are error terms.  We will continue to utilize a two-way error component
model, with fixed effects as discussed above.
The specifications in Equations 15 and 16 acknowledge that the
dependent variable will be measured with error because information is
not available on industry UA rates.  Appropriate for dependent variable
measurement error, the omission is subsumed in the error terms, u3 and
u4.6 Even with information on UA rates, moving that variable to the
right-hand side of Equations 15 or 16 is inappropriate because that
would treat quits, discharges, and accessions (the components of the
UA rate) as independent variables in a displacement relationship.
Quits are very likely to be influenced by conditions within the indus-
try.7 Firms and industries are likely to differ in their use of the various
components of turnover to implement desired changes in employment.
Other factors: technological change
The vector X2 provides room in the empirical model for other fac-
tors influencing changes in industry employment.  Technological
change is the most prominent factor revealed in the “trade and wages”
literature, and that literature points clearly in the direction of techno-
logical change as a key explanation to declining unskilled employment
in manufacturing and increasing wage inequality (see the references in
Chapter 3).  The challenges of proxying technological change are clear,
and there is the additional issue of potential endogeneity in this case.
Industries facing increasing foreign competition may be driven toward
technological change as a response (see Lawrence 2000).  That is, tech-
nological change can be seen as both a driving force in increasing eco-
nomic integration, as well as a force driven by increasing economic in-
tegration.  This interaction is complicated, and any separation of trade
and technology is beyond the scope of this study.  In what follows, I use
two measures of technological change: changes in the output intensity
of research and development spending and changes in total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP).  Following a number of studies (Bartel and Lichten-
berg 1987; Mincer 1991), research and development intensity is mea-
sured as the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales.
Research and development expenditures are available at the two- and
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three-digit SIC industry level from the National Science Foundation
(1981, 1989, 1999).  The use of TFP, my second measure, as a proxy for
technological change has a considerable history in economics, dating
back to Robert Solow’s work in the 1950s.  Total factor productivity is
the portion of output growth unexplained by labor, capital, or energy
input growth.  It is a residual, a combination of all the unmeasured fac-
tors contributing to output growth. 
Briefly, other variables are included to control for effects known to
influence employment change.  These variables are important to in-
clude but of less interest to the main discussion.  The change in the in-
dex of manufacturing industrial production is included to capture cycli-
cal fluctuations in labor demand.  Average hourly earnings in services is
included as a measure of an alternative wage.  Production function
characteristics are proxied by the capital intensity of shipments (the
natural logarithm of the ratio of the capital stock to shipments).
Readers most interested in the empirical results can now proceed
directly to Chapter 6, where estimates of the employment change spec-
ifications, Equations 8 and 9, are reported.  Chapter 7 reports estimates
of the displacement specifications, Equations 15 and 16.  Readers inter-
ested in the more technical issues involved in deriving the basic frame-
work should continue through to the end of this chapter.
THE BASIC EMPIRICAL MODEL, IN MORE DETAIL
Even in full detail, the empirical framework for examining the rela-
tionship between changes in product demand, import (price) competi-
tion, employment change, and job displacement is fairly simple and
straightforward.  I specify a simple structural model and estimate the
reduced-form equations that result from solving out for employment
(and the other dependent variables) in terms of the exogenous vari-
ables.  The basic setup borrows from models of import competition and
employment change developed in Mann (1988), Freeman and Katz
(1991), and Revenga (1992).
The description of the labor market remains as previously stated,
and I repeat Equations 1–4, renumbered for this section as Equations
17–20.  Using first differences, the demand for labor in industry i in
year t (Nit) can be written as:
(17) dlnNit = –kdlnWit + dlnZit,
where Wit is the industry wage, Zit is the shift in the derived labor de-
mand curve due to shifts in product demand (discussed in more detail
below), k is the wage elasticity of labor demand, ln is the natural loga-
rithm, and d is the difference operator.
Also in first differences, labor supply can be written as:
(18) dlnNit = edlnWit + dlnHit,
where e is the wage elasticity of labor supply, Hit is a vector of factors
that shift labor supply.  Labor market clearing, where wages in an in-
dustry adjust to equate labor supply and labor demand) implies:
(19) dlnNit = (edlnZit – kdlnHit)/(k + e), and
(20) dlnWit = (dlnZit + dlnHit)/(k + e).
With respect of changes in product demand, the coefficient of interest is
e/(k + e).
In the data, industry product demand is represented by 1) industry
shipments, decomposed into domestic market demand, exports, and
imports (more on this below), or 2) industry price.  Both shipments and
prices depend on industry supply as well as demand; therefore, replac-
ing Z with shipments in Equations 19 and 20 fails to recognize the si-
multaneity that arises from the effect of wages/employment on industry
price and shipments.
Product demand can be represented as:
(21) dlnQ = –fdlnP + dlnZ,
where Q is industry output; P is industry price, f is the price elasticity of
product demand, and Z is shifts in product demand.  The industry (i)
and time (t) subscripts have been omitted.  Following Freeman and
Katz (1991), assume that industry i’s price at time t depends only on
production costs.  Industry price is determined by wages,
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(22) dlnP = gdlnW,
where g is labor’s share of total cost.
Wage and employment determination (ignoring H for now):
(23) dlnW = qdlnZ,
where q = 1/(k + e).
(24) dlnN = hdlnZ,
where h = e/(k + e).  Both wages and employment depend on exoge-
nous shifts in product demand.
Substituting Equation 22 into 21 yields
(25) dlnQ = –fgdlnW + dlnZ
Using the identity dlnS (Sales) = dlnP + dlnQ and substituting,
(26) dlnS = –fgdlnW + dlnP + dlnZ
Substituting Equation 22 into 26
(27) dlnS = (1 – f )gdlnW + dlnZ
Solve for dlnZ,
(28) dlnZ = dlnS – (1 – f )gdlnW
Use Equation 23 to substitute for dlnW
(29) dlnZ = {1/[1 + g (1 – f )q]}dlnS
To write an equation between changes in employment and changes in
sales (shipments), use Equation 24 for employment determination and
substitute Equation 29 for dlnZ:
(30) dlnN = {h/[1 + g (1 – f )q]}dlnS = (h/C)dlnS = BdlnS,
where C ={1/[1 + g (1 – f )q]}.  With the addition of an error term,
Equation 30 can be estimated using OLS, producing an estimate of B.
The coefficient of interest, however, is h, not B, where h is the response
of industry employment to changes in product demand.  With an esti-
mate of B, h can be determined from Equation 14, rearranging terms,
h = B (1 – g (1 – f )q),
where f is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of product demand,
g is labor’s share of total cost, and q is the wage elasticity of product
demand.
The difference between B and h depends on the term {g (1 – f )q}.
B equals h only if: 1) f = 1 (unitary price elasticity), g = 0 (labor share
equals zero), or q equals 0.  At plausible values of g and q, if f < 1, B
will overstate h; if f > 1, B will understate h.  The bias is small; for ex-
ample, using an estimate for q of 0.04 (a quick consensus across the es-
timates in Freeman and Katz [1991]), and g of 0.25 (from the NBER
Productivity file), if goods are elastically demanded ( f in the range of
1.2 to 2.5), h will differ from B by at most 1.5 percent.  If goods are in-
elastically demanded ( f ranges from 0 to 1), h differs from B by less
than 1 percent.8 Even at “large” price elasticities, for example if f
equals 5, h will differ from B by about 4 percent.
As I discussed above, there are error terms in Equations 22 and 24
that get carried into Equation 30, because we are using shipments as an
estimate of product demand and a price determination and employment
determination equation to link product demand to shipments.  This
leaves dlnS in Equation 30 correlated with the error terms.  As a result,
dlnS should be instrumented to obtain consistent estimates of B.
Changes in trade flows
To isolate the trade-related components of sales, we return to the
information on exports, imports, and shipments from the NBER Trade
Database.  Following Freeman and Katz (1991), define D (= domestic)
as gross domestic market sales, where D = sales – exports + imports (D
= S – X + M).
Define import share as Mshare, or M/D (imports as a share of do-
mestically available product).  Then 
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(S – X)/D = 1 – Mshare
Substituting,
S = (1 – Mshare)D + X
(31) dS = d [(1 – Mshare)D] + dX,
where d is the difference operator.  Time subscripts help clarify the der-
ivation,
dSt = (1 – Msharet)Dt – (1 – Msharet–1)Dt–1 + dXt,
= (1 – Msharet)dDt + (1 – Msharet)Dt–1 – (1 – Msharet–1)Dt–1 + dXt,
= (1 – Msharet)dDt – DtdMsharet + DtdMsharet – dMsharetDt–1 + dXt,
(32) = (1 – Msharet)dDt – DtdMsharet + dDtdMsharet + dXt.
If the interaction term, dDtdMsharet, is ignored,9
(33) dS/S = [(S – X)/S]dD/D – (D/S)dMshare + (X/S)dX/X.
Using ln changes as approximate percentage changes yields:
(34) dlnS = [(S – X)/S]dlnD – (D/S)dMshare + (X/S)dlnX. 
Substituting this last equation in Equation 30 yields:
(35) dlnN = Bw1dlnD + Bw2dlnX – Bw3dMshare.10
The w’s are the various weights: w1 = [(S – X)/S], w2 = (X/S), and w3 =
(D/S).  Given the derivation above, we note that the weights are more
accurate for small changes than for large changes. 
Note that this model assumes, implicitly, that changes in employ-
ment respond similarly to weighted changes in sales, whether those
(weighted) changes are due to exports, import share, or domestic de-
mand.  The assumption can best be seen as a statistical hypothesis, one
derived from the derivation of the empirical specification.  It is not an
assumption imposed by economic theory.  It does seem plausible in the
long run, in that we might expect industry employment to respond to a
given change in demand, regardless of the source.  In the short run,
Freeman and Katz (1991) noted that industries may differentially as-
sess the persistence of trade-related changes in demand, given the role
of exchange rates.  Alternatively, across industries, this assumption
may not hold if industries differ in their export or import orientation.  In
their analysis, based on four-digit SIC industry data from 1958–1984,
Freeman and Katz (1991) found roughly comparable effects of the
three components of sales on both changes in industry wages and em-
ployment.
Changes in import competition
As discussed in Chapter 4, another strand of the literature looks at
import competition, highlighting the influence of changes in industry
import prices.  The model of Equations 17–24 can be altered to separate
industry domestic price from industry import price.  Equation 21 for
product demand becomes:
(36) dlnQi = –f 1dlnPi + f 2dlnPim + dlnZi,
where Pi is the price of the domestically produced good; Pm is the dol-
lar price of the foreign good; f 1 is the domestic price elasticity of de-
mand ( f in Equation 21); f 2 is the foreign price elasticity of demand,
and Z is shifts in product demand.  This specification allows the domes-
tic and foreign goods to be imperfect substitutes, with differing elastic-
ities.11
Adding dlnP to dlnQ yields a different definition of dlnS (Sales):
(37) dlnS = (1 – f 1)dlnPi + f 2dlnPm + dlnZ.
Substituting for dlnS into Equation 30,
(38) dlnN = BdlnS = B[(1 – f 1)dlnPi + f 2dlnPm + dlnZ].
In this form, the coefficient of interest is Bf 2, the import price elasticity
of industry employment.  
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The discussion of the labor turnover model in the previous section
was complete, and there are no additional details to be noted here.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, I developed a straightforward empirical model for
estimating relationships between changes in industry employment and
job loss and measures of trade flows and import competition.  With es-
timates of the model’s parameters, we can understand how changes in
trade are associated with domestic labor market changes, controlling
for (some of) the other factors influencing these important outcomes.
The framework has a number of practical and policy benefits.  Its tech-
nical simplicity eases interpretation, as will be seen in Chapters 6 and
7.  The addition of job displacement to the literature’s traditional focus
on net employment changes allows a focus on “real” job loss, the type
of event that happens to “real” workers, rather than the “summing-up”
of employment gains and losses that lies behind industry net employ-
ment change.  This addition has clear policy implications, as it will
yield an understanding of the association between industry job loss and
changes in trade and foreign competition.  Chapter 6 is devoted to the
employment change specifications, Equations 8 and 9.  Chapter 7 re-
ports estimates of the displacement specifications, Equations 15 and 16.
Notes
1. In this case, a random-effects model would be more appropriate.
2. The econometric estimation will also allow for the disturbances to be serially cor-
related within industries and contemporaneously correlated across industries.
3. The Prais–Winsten approach is used to account for serially correlated errors with-
in industries.
4. Kletzer (1998b, 2000) contains a similar discussion in the context of an empirical
model relating changes in foreign competition to job displacement.
5. Accessions are new hires and rehires.  The term unreplaced attritions appears in
Brechling (1978).
6. The industry fixed effects may also capture some cross-industry differences in
quit rates.
7. Brechling (1978) presents a model of turnover with endogenous quits.  In that
model, quits rise and fall with industry employment growth and the state of the
overall economy.  In depressed industries, workers are much less likely to quit;
therefore, “normal” attrition cannot be counted on to reduce employment.
8. Most estimates of price elasticities of demand are at the final goods level, not the
industry level.  For a number of goods where aggregation to the industry level is
straightforward, demand appears to be price inelastic.  See Field and Pagoulatos
(1997) and Koutsoyiannis (1984).  Estimates in Comanor and Wilson (1974) are
more price elastic.
9. This is done for simplicity. Checks reveal that the interaction term is empirically
very small (near zero) in the data.
10. This equation is the same as Equation 6.
11. This equation is in the spirit of the discussion in Mann (1988).
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Measuring the Link between
Changes in Industry Employment
and Changes in Trade Flows
Chapter 4 discussed basic trends in industry employment, trade
flows, and foreign competition as well as associations between the
trends.  A number of other factors, some related to foreign competition
and others not (e.g., the overall health of the economy, wages, and tech-
nological change), are also likely related to industry employment
change.  Chapter 5 presented an empirical model for estimating the in-
fluences of changes in trade flows and increasing import competition
on industry employment.  Implementing the econometric model, I here
report estimates of employment changes associated with changes in
trade flows and increasing foreign competition, controlling for these
other factors.
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND TRADE FLOWS
To fix ideas, we start with the within-industry, or industry fixed ef-
fects, estimates (Equation 8 from Chapter 5).  With data that are pooled
across industries and time, the error term in Equation 8 will include
time-related and cross-section disturbances along with possible omitted
explanatory variables.  Industry fixed effects allow the intercepts to
vary over cross-section units, in this case industry.1 In large part, these
are the preferred estimates, as they address directly the question of
whether increasing trade and/or import competition, within an industry
over time, is associated with declining employment.  This approach ful-
ly recognizes that industries differ, in both observable and unobserv-
able ways, in the responsiveness of employment to changes in technol-
ogy, wages, foreign competition, and the overall health of the economy.
This approach is also the proper way to frame the question from a poli-
cy perspective, in that a revealed link between increased trade flows
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and declining employment may signal some harm to workers that could
be mitigated by assistance programs.  Again, the empirical analysis
should not be taken as causal in the sense of concluding that employ-
ment changes would have been different if trade flows had been differ-
ent.  Without a model of the dependence of trade flows on wages, em-
ployment, and production, the estimates must be viewed as broadly
descriptive.
Table 6.1 reports the first fixed-effects estimates, on a sample peri-
od 1979–1994.2 The table reports coefficient estimates from regres-
sions using the change in log industry employment as the dependent
variable (see Equation 8 in Chapter 5).  The various explanatory vari-
ables are listed in the first column of the table.  In the main body of the
table, each number represents the change in log industry employment
(approximately the percent change in industry employment) associated
with a one-unit change in an explanatory variable.  Each column of the
table represents a separate and distinct regression specification.  Speci-
fications differ either by their explanatory variables or by the time peri-
od of the estimation.
From the estimates presented in Table 6.1, one can see a number of
clear observations.3 Rising sales, domestic demand, and exports are all
strongly associated with rising employment.  Using the column 1 esti-
mate for changes in sales, a 10 percent increase in sales is associated
with a 3.9 percent increase in employment, all else the same.4 Given
the size of the domestic market for most U.S. manufacturing industries,
it is not surprising that the estimated coefficient on (weighted) changes
in domestic demand in columns 2–4 closely approximates the estimat-
ed coefficient on changes in sales reported in column 1.  The direction
of this estimated association is reassuring—that employment moves
positively with demand changes.  At the same time, the estimated mag-
nitudes reveal that domestic demand alone cannot explain changes in
industry employment.  With this point estimate, the average annual
cross-industry weighted change in domestic demand, +5.35 percent,
yields a predicted change in industry employment of +2.0 percent.  The
mean observed annual change in employment for this period was ap-
proximately –0.2 percent.
Foreign demand is equally important, as seen in results across the
columns for changes in sales due to exports.  From the estimate in col-
umn 2, a 10 percent increase in overall sales due to exports is associat-
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ed with a 7.9 percent increase in employment.  The average weighted
annual change in sales due to exports was 0.82 percent; with this esti-
mated elasticity, the change in exports would be associated with a 0.65
percent increase in employment, whereas the mean annual change in
employment was a decline of 0.9 percent.
Note here that the point estimates for weighted changes in sales due
to exports are a bit larger than the point estimates for changes in do-
mestic demand, and the differences are statistically significant at stan-
dard levels.  Our discussion in Chapter 5 anticipated an overstatement
of the export–employment association and an understatement of the do-
mestic demand–employment association.  The results are consistent
with that discussion.  The rise in export demand is met by an increase in
shipments to meet the increased foreign demand, allowing domestic
demand to remain constant.  On the other hand, the overall increase in
domestic demand is met, in part, by an increase in imports that holds
the import share of domestically available output constant.  Thus, in an
open economy, not all of the increase in domestic demand is met by do-
mestic shipments (production).  Given the size of the domestic market
relative to imports, and the much smaller share of exports in sales, we
expect the understating of the domestic demand association to be
smaller in effect than the overstating of the export association.
These measurement concerns may explain why the estimated B’s
(coefficient of changes in sales), within each specification, are differ-
ent, when the statistical maintained assumption from Chapter 5 is that
changes in employment respond similarly to changes in sales, whether
those (weighted) changes in sales result from domestic demand, ex-
ports, or imports.  At a basic level, the statistical assumption makes
sense, at least in the long run, in that there seems to be no reason to an-
ticipate that industries would respond differently to variation in de-
mand coming from the domestic market as compared to the foreign
market. 
Turning to import share, we find that employment declines are as-
sociated with a rise in import share.  Holding domestic demand con-
stant, a 10 percent rise in the import share of domestic sales is associat-
ed with a 4 percent decline in employment.  The mean weighted annual
change in import share was about +1 percent, associated with a 0.4 per-
cent annual decline in employment.  Again, the observed mean annual











Table 6.1  Changes in Industry Employment, Sales, Domestic Demand, Exports, and Imports:
Within-Industry Estimates, 1979–1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in ln(sales) 0.3920***
(0.0353)
Weighted change domestic demand 0.3745*** 0.3744*** 0.3266***
(0.0385)# (0.0385)# (0.0393)#
Weighted change exports 0.7957*** 0.7977*** 0.7214***
(0.1324) (0.1328) (0.1286)
Weighted change import share –0.4004*** –0.1981**
(0.0811)# (0.0803)#
Weighted change DC import share –0.4865***
(0.1092)#
Weighted change LDC import share –0.2992***
(0.1038)#
Change index of industrial production 0.0068*** 0.0031** 0.0031** 0.0031**
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Change R&D intensity 0.0912*** 0.0988*** 0.1007***
(0.0207) (0.0234) (0.0235)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0183 –0.0180 –0.0174 –0.0204
(0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0152)
Change ln(alternative wage) –0.0055 –0.0173 –0.0171 –0.0094







Constant –0.0178 –0.0460 –0.0449 –0.0488
(0.0273) (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0263)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1198 1198 1198 1166
Number of industries 75 75 75 73
R2 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38
NOTE: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%; # = sig-
nificantly different from export coefficient (in absolute value) at 5% level.
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import share association would be overstated due to the accompanying
decline in shipments.  The overstatement may explain how the estimat-
ed import share association, at the mean weighted annual change in im-
port share, more than accounts for the observed annual change in em-
ployment.
Note also that the responsiveness of employment to a change in im-
port share is smaller than the responsiveness of employment to a
change in exports, and the difference in the point estimates is statisti-
cally significant at standard levels. 
What share of industry employment change is accounted for by
changes in trade flows and domestic demand?  For a representative in-
dustry experiencing sample mean (weighted) annual changes in domes-
tic demand, exports, and import share, these three estimated employ-
ment elasticities yield a predicted change in employment of +1.98
percent.  The mean annual change in industry employment observed in
the data over the 1979–1994 percent was –1.03 percent.  Thus, al-
though the separate trade flows and domestic demand are each signifi-
cantly associated with employment changes as predicted, they clearly
cannot, alone, explain the average industry employment change.  Trade
has an effect, but the effect is small and it cannot explain the overall
pattern of employment change in manufacturing.
These findings on the components of demand basically hold across
the four specifications reported in Table 6.1.  The specifications them-
selves differ in a number of ways.  The first difference is the proxy for
technological change.  Changes in research and development (R&D)
intensity are the main measure of technological change (R&D intensity
is measured as the ratio of R&D spending to the value of shipments).
Increases in the intensity of R&D are positively associated with em-
ployment change.  This is consistent with the Rybczynski theorem,
where factors, including employment, flow into sectors experiencing
technological change.  A similar positive relationship is found for
changes in TFP in column 4, although the estimated coefficient is not
statistically significant.
Imports from developing countries have received considerable re-
cent attention.  Industry import data is available by country of origin
from the NBER Trade Database, allowing the disaggregation of import
share into two parts: developing country (LDC) import share and de-
veloped country (DC) import share.  Following Borjas, Freeman, and
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Katz (1997), I classify western European countries (except Greece and
Portugal), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada as developed
countries and include all imports into the United States from all other
countries as LDC imports.  Including these two import share measures
separately allows for differences in their correlations with employment
change.  Averaged across industries, about 40 percent of import share
originated in developing countries over the 1979–1994 period.  Consis-
tent with the rise in attention to imports from developing countries, the
average percentage increase in LDC import share was 5.4 percent, ap-
proximately double the percentage increase in DC import share.
Column 3 of Table 6.1 reports results for the separate import share
measures.  Within industries, rising import share is associated with em-
ployment decline regardless of country of origin.  The larger of the
point estimates indicates that, for changes in DC import share, a 10 per-
cent increase in DC import share is associated with a 4.8 percent de-
cline in industry employment.  The difference in the estimated magni-
tudes for DC and LDC import share may be informative about the
overstatement of the import share association.  If DC imports are clos-
er substitutes than LDC imports to domestically produced output, then
the shipments response to a change in DC import share will be larger
than the shipments response to LDC imports.  This differential ship-
ments response will produce a larger estimated DC import share associ-
ation than a LDC import share association.  The average increase in DC
import share was 0.2 percent, and the average increase in LDC import
share was 0.3 percent.
The remaining variables in the specifications indicate that more
capital intensive industries had smaller employment growth, and as
predicted, employment growth is negatively correlated with wage
growth.  Overall, the fit of the model to the data is modest; around one-
third of the variation in industry employment growth is explained by
the included explanatory variables.  It is clear that the sales and trade
variables alone have limited explanatory power.5
The relationship between import share and employment change is
stronger for the 1979–1985 time period than for 1985–1994 (see
columns 1–3 of Table 6.2 for 1979–1985 and columns 4–6 for 1985–
1994 and columns 2–4 of Table 6.1 for 1979–1994), and it remains
smaller than the responsiveness of employment to changes in exports.











Table 6.2  Changes in Industry Employment, Sales, Domestic Demand, Exports, and Imports: Within-Industry
Estimates, 1979–1985 and 1985–1994
1979–1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in ln(sales) 0.4458*** 0.1812***
(0.0417) (0.0557)
Weighted change domestic demand 0.4629*** 0.4654*** 0.1604*** 0.1605***
(0.0458) (0.0469) (0.0611)# (0.0611)#
Weighted change exports 0.7259*** 0.7247*** 0.7186*** 0.7225***
(0.2058) (0.2064) (0.1851) (0.1855)
Weighted change import share –0.5438*** –0.2026**
(0.1984) (0.0826)#
Weighted change DC import share –0.7224*** –0.2678**
(0.2688) (0.1137)#
Weighted change LDC import share –0.2433 –0.1348
(0.2017) (0.0927)
Change index of industrial production 0.0041*** –0.0002 –0.0002 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0052***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Change R&D intensity 0.0251 0.0538 0.0633 0.0430** 0.0523** 0.0544**
(0.0830) (0.0792) (0.0788) (0.0213) (0.0235) (0.0239)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0579*** –0.0480*** –0.0462** –0.0755*** –0.0738*** –0.0728***
(0.0181) (0.0185) (0.0190) (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0172)
Change ln(alternate wage) 0.0584 0.0652 0.0634 –0.0288 –0.0503 –0.0498
(0.0709) (0.0736) (0.0735) (0.0376) (0.0356) (0.0355)






Constant –0.0768** –0.0892*** –0.0861*** –0.1238*** –0.1261*** –0.1245***
(0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0331) (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0294)
Observations 525 525 525 748 748 748
Number of industries 75 75 75 75 75 75
R2 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.23 0.26 0.26
NOTE: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%; # = significantly different from ex-
port coefficient (in absolute value) at 5% level.
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the employment-reducing role of increasing import share.  The effect
on employment of changes in domestic demand is statistically equiva-
lent to the effect on employment of changes in exports.  Over this early
part of the period, increases in DC import share are associated with de-
clining employment, at a magnitude similar to the effect of declining
exports.  A 10 percent increase in DC imports, or a 10 percent decrease
in sales due to exports, is associated with a 7 percent decline in em-
ployment.  The effect of changes in LDC import share is imprecisely
estimated.
Relative to changes in domestic demand and import share, employ-
ment change due to sales of exports emerges with strength in the
1985–1994 period.  Again the estimated export elasticity is different, in
absolute value, from both the domestic demand and import share elas-
ticities.  It is over this later period that a weaker import share–employ-
ment change relationship emerges.  A rise in DC import share is associ-
ated with a decline in employment, and the LDC import share effect is
estimated with more precision, but it is still outside the standard bounds
of statistical significance. 
It is interesting to note that, although the difference is not statisti-
cally significant, the estimated coefficient on DC import share is
greater than the estimated coefficient on LDC import share when the
analysis controls for time-invariant industry effects.  The discussion
above noted how the measurement issues may differ between the two
sources of imports.  That argument can be expanded to consider the
nature of import competition induced by developing and developed
countries.  Within a three-digit industry, DC imports may well be
goods that compete more closely with domestic supply (and domestic
employment), while LDC imports are less directly competitive with
domestic supply because they are different goods.  For example, with-
in the footwear industry, an increase in the import share of shoes pro-
duced in China (an increase in LDC imports), holding constant the
share of domestic supply originating in Italy (DC import), may repre-
sent a broadening of the variety of goods domestically available.  In
other words, an increase in the imports of plastic shoes (perhaps water
sandals) from China does not displace domestic production, because
plastic shoes are not produced in the United States.  An increase in im-
ports of high-end Italian dress shoes, holding constant the domestic
share of supply originating in China, is associated with employment
Imports, Exports, and Jobs 113
decline because high-end Italian dress shoes compete more directly
with American shoes.
LONG-PERIOD CHANGES IN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT
The changes in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are annual, that is, year-on-year.
Although the model sketched out in Chapter 5 provides no explicit
room for timing, it is useful to consider the difference between changes
over the long period (from 1979–1994) and changes over the short run
(annual).  Import competition that persists over a few years, or is
steadily increasing, seems more likely to affect employment change
than a short-run change.  To consider a long-period change, however,
we must estimate across industries, not within, because there is only
one long-period change observation per industry.  Table 6.3 reports a
number of cross-section estimates, with the long-period change report-
ed in column 1 and annual (but cross-section) changes in columns 2–4.
The estimation is Weighted Least Squares (WLS), with 1979–1994
changes in sales, the composition of demand, and industry employ-
ment.6
A first observation is that, over the long period, the responsiveness
of employment to changes in the three components of sales is indeed
the same, as assumed in the empirical model.  It is over a long period
that we can reasonably expect this assumption to be valid, and the data
are consistent with the assumption.  With these equal estimated elastic-
ities, a 10 percent increase in sales due to domestic demand or exports
is associated with approximately an 8 percent increase in employment,
and a 10 percent increase in imports is associated with a 8 percent de-
cline in employment.  For the “average” manufacturing industry, expe-
riencing the sample mean long-period changes in domestic demand,
exports, and imports, these estimates predict an increase in employ-
ment of 11.5 percent.  The mean long-period change in employment
observed in the data is -15 percent.  It is clear that the pattern of em-
ployment change across industries cannot be explained by changes in
trade flows (or the demand composition analysis more generally).
Although the industry fixed-effects estimates are preferred from a











Table 6.3  Changes in Industry Employment, Sales, Domestic Demand, Exports and Import Share, Cross-
Section Estimates, Long-Period and Annual, 1979–1994
Long-period
Annual
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in ln(sales) 0.4178***
(0.0363)
Weighted change domestic demand 0.8869*** 0.4058*** 0.4224***
(0.1202) (0.0363)# (0.0317)#
Weighted change exports 0.8092 0.6983*** 0.7348***
(0.4859) (0.1292) (0.1332)
Weighted change import share –0.8376*** –0.5233*** –0.5016***
(0.1704) (0.0699) (0.0644)
Change index of industrial production 0.0024 0.0035** 0.0033**
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Change R&D intensity 0.0702*** 0.0963*** 0.0994***
(0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0178)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0052 –0.0057 –0.0068
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0036)
Change ln(alternate wage) –0.0038 –0.0169 –0.0183
(0.0513) (0.0583) (0.0596)
Change ln(imported intermediate inputs –0.8907
(0.5781)
Constant –0.2701*** –0.0365*** –0.0517*** –0.0496***





Observations 75 1198 1198 1194
R2 0.59 0.33 0.34 0.36
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%; # = significantly different from
export coefficient (in absolute value) at 5% level.
116 Link between Changes in Industry Employment and Trade Flows
flows may be associated with changes in industry employment, a multi-
variate analysis across industries reveals a few different points as well
as the robustness of the findings.  For the annual changes, Table 6.3 re-
ports estimates from WLS regressions using pooled cross-section time-
series annual data on changes in sales, the composition of demand, and
industry employment.  Year effects are included.  Note here that, with
the inclusion of year effects, the important variation is across industries
in these cross-section regressions.
Rising sales, domestic demand, and exports are all strongly asso-
ciated with rising employment across industries as well as within.  Us-
ing the column 2 estimate for changes in sales, a 10 percent increase in
sales is associated with a 4.2 percent increase in employment, all else
the same.  Again, given the size of the domestic market for most U.S.
manufacturing industries, it is not surprising that the estimated coeffi-
cient on (weighted) changes in domestic demand in columns 3–4
closely approximates the estimated coefficient on changes in sales re-
ported in column 2.  With this point estimate, the average annual
(weighted) change in domestic demand, +4.4 percent, yields a predict-
ed change in industry employment of +1.8 percent.  The mean ob-
served annual change in employment for this period was approximate-
ly –1 percent.
Foreign demand is equally important, as seen in results across the
columns for exports.  From the estimate in column 2, a 10 percent in-
crease in sales due to exports is associated with a 6.9 percent increase
in employment.  The mean weighted annual change in exports was 0.79
percent; with this estimated elasticity, the change in exports would pro-
duce a 0.53 percent increase in employment, slightly less than half the
observed mean annual change in employment.  The point estimates for
(weighted) changes in exports are larger than the point estimates for
changes in domestic demand, and  the differences are statistically sig-
nificant at standard levels. 
As with the fixed-effects estimates, the estimated responsiveness of
employment to changes in import share is somewhat smaller than the
export response.  A 1-percentage-point increase in import share is asso-
ciated with an approximately 0.5 percent decline in employment.  The
difference between the magnitude of the import share coefficient and
the estimated coefficient on exports is statistically significant.  The
mean weighted annual change in import share was about +1 percent,
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yielding a 0.5 percent annual decline in employment.  Again, the ob-
served mean annual change in employment was –1 percent.
What share of industry employment change is accounted for by
changes in trade flows and domestic demand?  For a representative in-
dustry experiencing sample mean (weighted) annual changes in domes-
tic demand, exports, and import share, these three estimated employ-
ment elasticities yield a predicted change in employment of +1.97
percent.  The mean annual change in industry employment observed in
the data over the 1979–1994 percent was –1.03 percent.  Thus, al-
though trade flows and domestic demand are (significantly) associated
with employment changes as predicted, they cannot, alone, explain the
cross-industry variation in employment change.  Trade has an effect,
but the effect is small and it cannot explain the overall pattern of em-
ployment change in manufacturing.
Column 4 considers the question of outsourcing in an abbreviated
fashion.  Does the use of imported intermediate goods reduce the de-
mand for labor and employment?  The measure of outsourcing is the
annualized difference in imputed imports of intermediate goods be-
tween 1979 and 1990.7 Controlling for overall import share, industries
with greater imports of intermediate goods had smaller employment
growth, although the effect is measured imprecisely.
As in the industry fixed-effects estimates, more capital intensive in-
dustries had smaller employment growth, and employment growth is
negatively correlated with wage growth as predicted.  Technological
change is positively related to employment change across industries.
Overall, the fit of the model to the data is modest; about one-third of the
variation in industry employment growth is explained by the included
explanatory variables.  It is clear that the sales and trade variables alone
have limited explanatory power.
INCREASING IMPORT COMPETITION—MEASURED AS
CHANGES IN IMPORT PRICE
As noted in previous chapters, changes in import prices are seen by
a number of scholars to be “cleaner” measures of changes in foreign
competition than are changes in trade flows.  In principle, changes in
118 Link between Changes in Industry Employment and Trade Flows
import prices can be the mechanism through which changes in the trad-
ing environment affect the domestic labor market.  Certainly for a small
country, changes in import prices may be considered to be exogenous
to changes in production and employment.  For a large country like the
United States, however, changes in import prices may well be related to
factors that influence changes in production (and employment and de-
mand).  The analysis here will proceed first with observed import price
changes and then, to illustrate some of the questions of endogeneity,
turn to instrumental variables estimation. 
The first set of estimates for prices are reported in Table 6.4.  The
time period is somewhat shorter for the price estimates because the im-
port price series is available for a large set of industries only from
1982–1983.  There are some industries with data from 1980, in the in-
terests of using the largest possible sample, columns 1 and 2 of Table
6.4 report estimates for 1980–1992, while columns 3 and 4 use 1983–
1992 estimates.  The samples also vary between balanced (where every
industry is represented for the same number of time periods) and unbal-
anced.  Similar to Grossman (1987) and Mann (1988), industry relative
domestic price enters separately from industry relative import price.
Both price terms enter the specification contemporaneously and with a
one-year lag.
Across the columns, the estimated relative import price elasticity
for changes in total industry employment is in the range of 0.14 to 0.34.
With this range, a 10 percent decrease  in import price is associated
with a 1.4 to 3.4 percent decline in employment.  The mean annual
change in import price was very small, –0.07 percent, with a large vari-
ation.  The employment change associated with this mean annual
change in import price using the middle of the estimated elasticity
range, would be –0.017 percent, when the observed mean annual
change in employment was –1 percent.  A one standard deviation
change in import price, 6.6 percent, would be associated with a 1.6 per-
cent decline in employment.
With the dollar peaking in 1985, however, the full period analysis
masks very different import price behavior.  Import prices fell around
14 percent over 1980–1985.  The estimates reported in column 3 indi-
cate a 14 percent decline in import price would be associated with a
predicted 3.4 percent decline in employment.  Employment fell 8.5 per-
cent over the period.  In one industry, import prices fell by 45.4 percent,
which would lead to a 11.1 percent reduction in employment. 
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As expected, increases in industry relative domestic price are nega-
tively related to employment.  Employment change is pro-cyclical, as
captured as the positive coefficient on the index of industrial produc-
tion.  Changes in R&D intensity are negatively related to employment
change.  Rising capital intensity of production is associated with falling
employment.
The complex question of endogenous import prices is examined in
Table 6.5. To take a more straightforward approach to the question, I
altered the specification of price slightly.  Rather than separately in-
cluding domestic price and import price, the “price” variable is relative
import price, that is, import price relative to domestic price (calculated
as import price divided by industry producer price index).  The first
three columns of Table 6.5 report the estimated relative import price
elasticities for the three samples used in Table 6.4, and the estimates are
very similar. 
The data requirements for the instrumental variables (IV) estima-
tion are considerable, and they reduce the sample size appreciably.8
For the subset of industries with available data, the fixed effects esti-
mate of the import price elasticity is 0.233 (see column 5).  The IV es-
timate reported in column 6 is lower, at 0.053, and it is not statistically
significant.  Revenga finds the IV estimate to be larger in magnitude
than the (in her case) OLS estimate.  The discussion in Chapter 5 noted
that the sign of the bias is ambiguous in theory.  Revenga’s analysis
used a different sample of industries over a different time period, and it
should not be expected that the estimated bias found here would be the
same as she found.
Bringing together the range of time periods and estimation tech-
niques, we get a range of  estimates for the elasticity of industry em-
ployment to changes in import price: 0.05 (IV, fixed effect) to 0.35
(fixed effects, without instruments; Revenga).  From the IV estimate re-
ported here, one can conclude that, with small average changes in im-
port price and small elasticities, falling import prices alone can account
for only a small decline in employment.  This  IV estimate can reason-
ably be considered as a lower bound.  The noninstrumented estimates
and Revenga’s IV estimates provide more room for the effect of chang-
ing import prices on domestic employment. 
Before we turn to an assessment of the empirical model, we should
note a limitation.  As I stated previously, the analysis is partial equilib-











Table 6.4  Changes in Industry Employment, Domestic Prices, and Import Prices: 
Within-Industry Estimates
(2) (3) (4)
(1) 1980–92 1983–92 1983–92
balanced balanced col. 2 sample
Change ln(domestic price) –0.2720 –0.3420 –0.4430 –0.3541
(0.1095) (0.1271) (0.1978) (0.1830)
Change ln(import price) 0.1478 0.2283 0.2450 0.3468
(0.0413) (0.0719) (0.0855) (0.9847)
Change index of industrial production 0.0063*** 0.0063** 0.0067*** 0.0056***
(0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0014)
Change R&D intensity –0.0129 –0.7986*** –0.0082 –0.5740
(0.0107) (0.2809) (0.0170) (0.3321)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0927*** –0.1040*** –0.0951** –0.0595
(0.0313) (0.0386) (0.0441) (0.0557)
Change ln(alternative wage) –0.0305 –0.0786 –0.0438 –0.0941
(0.0407) (0.1261) (0.0846) (0.1265)
Constant –0.1503*** –0.1789*** –0.1516** –0.0978
(0.0518) (0.0628) (0.0744) (0.0917)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes






Observations 717 286 470 220
Number of industries 68 22 47 22
R2 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.28
NOTE: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications include one lag in the domestic price and import











Table 6.5  Changes in Industry Employment and Relative Import Prices: Within-Industry Estimates
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) 1980–92 1983–92 1983–92 1983–92, 1983–92
balanced balanced col. 2 sample IV sample IV estimates
Change ln relative import price 0.1674 0.2553 0.2766 0.3590 0.2334** 0.0530
(0.0469) (0.0651) (0.0762) (0.0858) (0.0979) (0.0959)
Change index of industrial 0.0064*** 0.0061** 0.0067*** 0.0054*** 0.0081*** 0.0065***
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Change R&D intensity –0.0133 –0.7861*** –0.0094 –0.5398 –0.0027 –0.0036
(0.0135) (0.2844) (0.0195) (0.3178) (0.0209) (0.0102)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0931*** –0.1054*** –0.0952 –0.0593 –0.0913 –0.0934***
(0.0355) (0.0403) (0.0497) (0.0566) (0.0525) (0.0041)
Change ln(alternative wage) –0.0340 –0.0758 –0.0428 –0.0834 –0.0274 0.0651**
(0.0385) (0.1307) (0.0807) (0.1279) (0.0543) (0.0224)
Constant –0.1489** –0.1777*** –0.1505 –0.0970 –0.1444 –0.1557
(0.0583) (0.0655) (0.0837) (0.0930) (0.0878) (0.0041)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 710 286 470 220 290 290
Number of industries 68 22 47 22 29 29
R2 0.33 0.46 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.35
NOTE: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications include one lag in the relative import price.  IV denotes instrumen-
tal variables.  ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at 1% level.
1980–92
production
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industry.  This approach does not allow for spillover effects between in-
dustries.  For example, the model does not have a mechanism for al-
lowing an increase in the import share of cars to affect employment in
industries manufacturing equipment for automobile assembly lines.
Without these interaction effects, the economy-wide employment gains
and losses from industry-specific increases in exports or import shares
will likely be underestimated.  The degree to which employment
changes are underestimated is likely to differ across industries because
the linkages to upstream and downstream industries differ.  These
spillovers are properly the subject of another analysis.  They are impor-
tant, however, when considering trade or employment policies that pro-
tect individual industries.
ASSESSING WHAT THE MODEL SAYS ABOUT THE
“COSTS” OF TRADE FOR AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT
A number of questions remain.  Industry employment fell, despite
growth in exports and domestic demand.  The import share elasticity
and rise in import share cannot account for much of the substantial de-
cline in employment.  An even weaker assessment applies to the import
price estimations.  For the trade flows estimations, the statistical fit of
the models can be described as, “is the glass half empty or half full?”
That is, the estimates account for about 40 percent of the industry vari-
ation in employment, which is modestly respectable, but that leaves
about 60 percent of the variation in employment change unexplained.
It is natural to suspect technological change as a suspect whose pres-
ence is not well captured by the empirical proxies.  Advancing labor-
saving technological change could account for employment declines in
the face of growing demand.
In the context of these estimates, how can we assess the extent to
which “trade” has been responsible for changes in employment?  Fol-
lowing the interesting approach in Grossman (1987), we can use the pa-
rameter estimates reported in Table 6.1 with a counterfactual path of
exports and imports.  The counterfactual path assumes that trade flows
remain unchanged from their 1979 levels.  The counterfactual simula-
tions that follow take the trade flows model at face value; all the condi-
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tions and qualifications required to accept the model have been stated
in the discussions above.9 The model reported in column 2 of Table 6.1
was simulated using historical data for all of the independent variables,
except for, alternately, changes in exports and imports.  Thus, the simu-
lations generated paths for changes in employment over the period
1979–1994 that correspond to the counterfactual assumption of either
no import change, no export change, or no change in either imports or
exports.
The simulated changes in employment are reported in Table 6.6 for
the average manufacturing industry and for a selected set of “visible”
industries.  Here, “visible” is defined by employment size or a tradition
of import competition or export history.  For the average manufacturing
industry, employment fell by 13.4 percent over the 1980–1994 period.
Averaged across industries, the full historical model predicted an em-
ployment decline of 17.9 percent.  If import share had been frozen at its
1979 level, average industry employment would have declined by 8.8
percent.  For an average industry, this 4.6 percent difference, due to the
increase in imports, represents 11,693 jobs.  On the other hand, if ex-
ports had been frozen at their 1979 level, employment would have fall-
en by 19 percent, 5.6 percent more than observed.  Thus, the growth in
exports “saved” an average of 14,235 jobs in manufacturing.  Together,
if both imports and exports had been frozen at 1979 levels, employment
would have declined by 16.4 percent, or 3 percent more than observed
(7,626 jobs).
The domestic employment outcomes of increasing foreign compe-
tition have not been uniform across industries.  In a handful of indus-
tries, there would have been less employment in 1994 than was actual-
ly observed, had trade been neutral from 1979 to 1994.  In most
industries, however, there would have been more employment with
neutral imports and less employment with neutral exports.  In footwear,
for example, holding imports at their 1979 levels would have “saved”
27,695 jobs because employment would have fallen by 18.6 percent
less than observed.  While employment losses were very large in that
industry, 34,232 additional jobs would have been lost with constant
1979 exports.  The counterfactual changes in apparel are also notable.
Observed employment loss would have been an employment gain if
imports had been held at the 1979 level.  Where observed employment
fell by 39.7 percent, it would have risen by 25.3 percent with constant
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imports, a difference of 711,647 jobs.  With constant imports and ex-
ports, employment would have increased by 18.5 percent, a difference
of 636,708 jobs.  For electrical machinery, the largest industry in 1979
by employment, neutral trade would have increased employment by
39.2 percent, rather than its observed decrease of 10.2 percent, a differ-
ence of 619,712 jobs.
In many industries, holding exports at their 1979 levels would have
resulted in larger employment losses, sizably so in high-wage indus-
tries.  Employment would have fallen by an additional 63,839 in blast
furnaces, by an additional 195,288 in aircraft and parts, by an addition-
al 206,696 in motor vehicles, and by an additional 26,044 in iron and
steel foundries.
Holding imports at 1979 levels would have resulted in smaller em-
ployment losses in a number of industries: (small) leather products,
9,936 jobs would have been “saved”; tires and inner tubes, 26,030 jobs;
and construction and material moving machines, 113,270 jobs.  In
some small employment industries, employment would have increased
instead of decreased: watches and clocks, 28,556 jobs (employment
would have increased by 33.4 percent, instead of falling by 69.7 per-
cent); toys and sporting goods, 30,965 jobs (growth of 20.8 percent in-
stead of a decline of 4.7 percent); and scientific and controlling instru-
ments, 22,210 (growth of 20.6 percent instead of the smaller +3.3
percent).
SUMMARY
The empirical analysis reported in this chapter produced five main
findings.
• Employment declines with a rise in imports and it grows with a
rise in exports.
• Changes in trade (including domestic demand and the demand
composition analysis) cannot account for the declining trend in
overall manufacturing employment.  With the strong growth in
exports and domestic demand over the period, the model pre-



































Footwear 0.082 –0.950 –0.987 –0.764 –1.180 0.846
Leather products 0.140 –0.779 –0.730 –0.584 –0.921 0.664
Watches, clocks 0.156 –1.193 –1.157 0.334 –0.305 0.276
Apparel 0.174 –0.397 –0.383 0.253 0.104 0.185
Blast furnaces 0.321 –0.869 –0.845 –0.937 –0.981 0.963
Toys & sporting goods 0.339 –0.047 –0.074 0.208 –0.058 0.048
Aircraft & parts 0.393 –0.207 –0.141 –0.239 –0.537 0.524
Furniture & fixtures 0.412 0.013 0.018 –0.074 –0.136 0.117
Tires & inner tubes 0.494 –0.479 –0.461 –0.275 –0.403 0.380
Motor vehicles 0.540 –0.085 –0.068 –0.153 –0.294 0.268
Construction & material moving
machines
0.584 –0.593 –0.579 –0.297 –0.409 0.386
Newspaper 0.595 0.065 0.067 –0.079 –0.080 0.080
Iron & Steel foundries 0.611 –0.654 –0.632 –0.737 –0.763 0.757
Fabricated structural metals 0.631 –0.233 –0.223 –0.130 –0.147 0.145
Sawmills, planing mills 0.638 –0.019 –0.009 –0.027 –0.071 0.069
Scientific & controlling 0.679 0.033 –0.241 0.206 –0.041 0.018
Printing, publishing 0.721 0.294 0.299 0.152 0.124 0.125





Industrial & misc. chem. 0.743 –0.149 –0.185 –0.256 –0.373 0.363
Office & acct. machines 0.762 –0.085 0.005 –0.020 –0.233 0.147
Other primary metal 0.782 –0.322 –0.390 –0.166 –0.293 0.291
Primary aluminum industries 0.783 –0.405 –0.358 –0.301 –0.407 0.384
Electronic computing eqp. 0.803 0.236 0.300 0.265 –0.186 0.110
Metalworking machinery 0.816 –0.203 –0.189 –0.170 –0.300 –0.273
Cycles & misc. transport 0.832 –0.071 –0.202 –0.324 –0.596 0.607
Metal forgings 0.833 –0.241 –0.238 –0.321 –0.339 0.335
Meat products 0.857 0.232 0.203 0.090 0.045 0.042
Electrical machinery 0.863 –0.102 –0.073 –0.143 –0.433 0.392
Leather tanning & finish 0.887 –0.296 –0.425 –0.510 –0.709 0.683
Means for all manufacturing
industries in the sample:
–0.134 –0.179 –0.088 –0.192 –0.164
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most importantly, technological change, must account for some
part of the decline where demand composition changes cannot.
• Focusing on the average manufacturing industry misses striking
differences across industries.  For some industries, an important
share of employment change can be explained by changes in the
composition of demand.  This point is seen most clearly in the
simulations for a handful of traditionally import-competing in-
dustries, where freezing imports at their 1979 levels would have
“saved” many jobs.  The implied burden of worker adjustment to
these changes is sizeable.
• Domestic employment appears less sensitive to changes in im-
ports than to changes in exports or domestic demand.  The word
“appears” is critical here because this result appears more
strongly in some specifications than in others, and it is colored a
bit by the measurement issues noted above.
Allowing that the export association may be overstated, the greater
responsiveness of employment to changes in exports over changes in
import share is an interesting, if subtle, finding.  In this data set, exports
actually do represent goods produced by U.S. workers.  Thus, a fall in
exports is a reduction in demand that can be expected to result in a fall
in employment.  Imports, on the other hand, are not as closely tied to
jobs for U.S. workers.  Imports are goods made by foreign workers, and
they may not be goods that exactly duplicate goods made by U.S.
workers.  For imports to displace goods made in the United States,
there must be some substitutability between foreign and domestic
goods.  Certainly within the level of aggregation of this data set (three-
digit CIC), it seems possible that imports could represent different
goods (in fact different four-digit industries) than the goods produced
domestically, with little substitution.  For example, imports of expen-
sive watches may not result in lower employment for U.S. watch work-
ers if those watches are not substitutable for the more moderately
priced watches made in the United States.  Consider import share in
this case: as U.S. incomes rise, demand for expensive watches may
rise, and with expensive watches made almost exclusively outside the
United States, the import share of watches will rise while demand for
U.S. watches remains virtually unchanged.  In this case, buyers (or
owners) of expensive watches usually own more than one watch.  The
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decision to buy an expensive (imported) watch will not mean a substi-
tution away from a lower price watch, rather an addition to the con-
sumption bundle.  So, while we can be certain that exports are pro-
duced by U.S. workers, we cannot be certain that an industry import
directly substitutes for a domestic good.
The difference between the export and import association emerges
in the annual change regression but not in the long-period regression.
One interpretation is that production responds with a greater lag to
changes in imports than exports.  This estimated difference in timing
may be a result of not having inventories directly in the model.  Let ex-
port growth represent a direct increase in demand, then contemporane-
ous changes in exports will be associated with contemporaneous
changes in production and employment.  Perhaps an increase in im-
ports is associated with a contemporaneous rise in inventories, with do-
mestic production adjusting over time if the rise in import share per-
sists. 
Manufacturing sector employment has been in decline since 1979.
Up to 1994, the simulations suggest that employment decline would
have been even greater, 16.4 percent instead of 13.4 percent, if both im-
ports and exports had been frozen at 1979 levels.  If exports do repre-
sent jobs more closely than imports represent the absence of a job, then
the relationship between rising exports and rising employment could
well be stronger than the relationship between rising imports and
falling employment.  Venturing into the dangerous terrain of speculat-
ing how many jobs are associated with trade, this result suggests that
rising exports from manufacturing were associated with more job gains
than the job losses that can be associated with rising import share.
The conclusion is clear, if a bit nuanced.  Imports are associated
with employment declines, and manufacturing employment is ad-
vanced with increases in exports.  Given the growth in exports, there is
a strong message in the empirical analysis: with growing exports over
time, employment increases associated with rising exports will domi-
nate employment declines associated with export drops.  Therefore,
while policymakers need be mindful of short-term volatility in export
markets due to foreign country recessions and financial crises, efforts to
enhance the long-run growth in exports will be beneficial to employ-
ment.
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Notes
1. This specification also includes time fixed effects to capture omitted-variable bias
arising from excluded time-varying variables.  The estimation uses balanced panel
samples (where every industry is represented for the same number of time peri-
ods).
2. A small number of observations were excluded, where the log change in industry
employment exceeded 0.75 in absolute value.  These observations represent 1.9
percent of otherwise-eligible industry-year observations for the 1979–1994 period.
Upon inspection, these data points appear to have measurement problems when
checked against an alternative employment source.
3. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary within-panel heteroscedasticity and first-
order within-panel autocorrelation, where the coefficient of first-order process is
common to all panels.  A Hausman test shows the fixed industry effects to be an ap-
propriate assumption, that the industry-specific effects in the sample are fixed and
estimable.
4. From Chapter 5 we know that the estimated coefficient on changes in sales (or
weighted changes in domestic demand, exports, or import share), B, is not directly
an estimate of the total employment change to changes in product demand. Using
the point estimate of the coefficient on change in sales as an estimate of B yields an
estimated elasticity of total employment change to changes in product demand, h
of 0.384 to 0.416, depending on whether the own-price elasticity of demand is
elastic or inelastic.  A 10 percent increase in sales is associated with an approxi-
mately 4 percent increase in employment.
5. The estimated year effects are of some interest.  Employment growth was stronger
in 1979–1980 (relative to 1982, the excluded year), dropped in 1983, grew in each
of the years 1984–1987, grew more strongly from 1988–1990, slowed in 1991, fell
in 1992, and grew a bit in 1993–1994.
6. Standard errors are corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the clustering of
observations by industry.
7. The data are described in Feenstra and Hanson (1997).  I am grateful to Gordon
Hanson for providing the imported intermediate goods data.
8. The fit of the first-stage regression is quite good (R2 = 0.447), and the signs of the
estimated coefficients are as predicted and statistically significant.  As the industry
exchange rate increases (more national currency units per U.S. dollar), the import
price index increases, and as foreign production costs increase, so do import prices.
The first-stage estimates are reported in Appendix B.
9. For example, if imports are kept unchanged, with domestic demand and exports
evolving as they did, we assume that shipments adjusted accordingly.
7
Job Displacement and 
Foreign Competition
Employment expands in industries with growing exports, and it de-
clines with a rise in import share.  These results are consistent with a re-
allocation of labor away from industries losing comparative advantage
and toward industries gaining comparative advantage.  Discussions of
comparative advantage aside, one aspect of the policy debate can be
stated simply.  Are increasing imports associated with involuntary job
loss?  Can rising exports forestall job loss?  Chapter 4 discussed the de-
scriptive evidence linking job loss to changes in industry foreign com-
petition.  A number of other factors, some related to foreign competi-
tion and others not, are also likely related to industry job loss, as
discussed in the empirical model of Chapter 5.  In this chapter, I report
estimates of job loss associated with increasing foreign competition,
controlling for those other factors.
It is important to turn the focus to displacement.  Public percep-
tions of the cost of free trade rest heavily on the perception that trade
costs some people their jobs.  Turning the focus to permanent job loss
does, however, make the empirical analysis a bit more complicated be-
cause it is more difficult to find systematic patterns in the data on job
loss than it is with the data on industry employment.  The difficulty is
both theoretical and empirical.  From theory, changes in product de-
mand (domestic or foreign) can be fairly directly tied to changes in la-
bor demand and employment.  Less clear is the notion that changes in
product demand should influence how firms change their employment
levels.  When the desired level of employment changes for a firm fol-
lowing some change in product demand (or technology), displace-
ments (permanent layoffs) are just one mechanism firms can use to
change employment.  Other ways include “natural” attrition (quits, re-
tirements, or deaths) or changing hiring and rehiring, as noted in Chap-
ter 5.  Chapter 6 concluded that firms do change the level of employ-
ment in response to changes in the composition of demand, and this
chapter looks at just one of the ways firms make those changes.  This
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chapter analyzes the data to see how changes in the composition of
product demand are associated with one of the ways firms adjust em-
ployment.
I considered this question, in a similar analysis, in Kletzer (2000).
Before turning to the econometric estimates, it is useful to repeat a few
observations about the evidence on industry risk of job loss and
changes in import share from that analysis.  There are a handful of in-
dustries (footwear, leather products, apparel, and steel) where positive
(negative) changes in import share are associated with a high (low) dis-
placement rates so that casual observation suggests a relationship be-
tween increasing import share and a high risk of job loss (or a simple
regression line drawn through the data has positive slope).1 At the
same time, across industries and time, there is ample evidence of con-
siderable job loss in the absence of changes in foreign competition.  We
saw this variation across industries in Table 4.6 of Chapter 4, where I
noted that there is a set of industries facing sustained import competi-
tion, those with both high levels of import share and positive changes in
import share, where the rate of job loss is high.  At the same time, the
bulk of the industry observations reveal a considerable amount of vari-
ation in job displacement across industries.  Thus, at the outset, it ap-
pears that trade itself can explain only a small share of the variation in
job displacement.
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF DEMAND 
AND THE RISK OF JOB LOSS
Within industries 
In a manner parallel to the discussion in the previous chapter, with-
in-industry estimates are first reported in Table 7.1. Given the likely
heterogeneity across industries in the use of layoffs, hiring, discharges,
and quits to change employment levels, it is desirable to estimate the
relationships in an industry fixed-effects framework.  In this frame-
work, the estimation focuses on changes over time in job loss and trade
within an industry.  That is, when a given industry faces increasing for-
eign competition, what happens to job loss?
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Table 7.1  Changes in Industry Employment, Sales, Domestic Demand,
Exports, and Imports: Within-Industry Estimates (1979–1994)
(1) (2) (3)
Change in ln(sales) –0.1041***
(0.0187)
Weighted change domestic –0.0993*** –0.0980***
(0.0228) (0.0227)
Weighted change exports –0.2208*** –0.2201***
(0.0821) (0.0824)
Weighted change import share 0.0786
(0.0591)
Weighted change DC import 0.0992
(0.1214)
Weighted change LDC import 0.0680
(0.1350)
Change index of industrial –0.0044*** –0.0034*** –0.0035***
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Change R&D intensity 0.0315 0.0203 0.0225
(0.0841) (0.0957) (0.0963)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0164 –0.0172 –0.0171
(0.0088) (0.0117) (0.0118)
Change ln(alternative wage) –0.0496 –0.0472 –0.0471
(0.0487) (0.0464) (0.0466)
Constant –0.0069 0.0146 0.0147
(0.0180) (0.0197) (0.0199)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 816 816 816
Number of industries 51 51 51
R2 0.73 0.74 0.74
NOTE: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.  ** = significant at 5% level;
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As in Chapter 6, the main explanatory variables of interest in Table
7.1 are changes in sales, domestic demand, import share, and exports.
The table reports coefficient estimates from regressions using the in-
dustry displacement rate as the dependent variable (see Equation 15 in
Chapter 5). The various explanatory variables are listed in the first col-
umn of the table. In the main body of the table, each number represents
the change in the industry displacement rate associated with a one-unit
change in an explanatory variable. Each column of the table represents
a separate and distinct regression specification. Specifications differ ei-
ther by their explanatory variables or by the time period of the estima-
tion.  The time period is 1979–1994, and the specifications are similar
to those reported in the previous chapter in their proxies for technolog-
ical change, alternative wages, manufacturing capacity, and capital in-
tensity.  All reported specifications include controls for year, to capture
unobservable time-varying factors.2
Rising sales, domestic demand, and exports are all associated with
lower rates of job loss.  A 10 percent increase in sales (column 1) is as-
sociated with a 1.0-percentage-point reduction in the rate of job loss.
With a mean job loss rate of 0.049 across industries for the 1979–1994
period, a 1-percentage-point reduction is a 22 percent decline (or slight-
ly less than one-third of a standard deviation).  Moving to the separate
components of sales in column 2, the estimated coefficient on domestic
demand is close in size to the estimated effect of changes in sales, at
–0.09.  Again, this similarity in magnitude is not surprising given the
dominant size of the U.S. market for most industries.  If –0.09 is used
as a typical estimate for the elasticity of job loss to changes in domestic
demand, the average annual (weighted) change in domestic demand of
+4.4 percent yields a small change in the rate of job loss (0.39 percent-
age point).
The most striking result is the large responsiveness of job loss rates
to changes in sales due to exports.  A 10 percent rise in sales due to ex-
ports is associated with a 2.2 percent decline in the industry displace-
ment rate.  A 10 percent rise in domestic demand is associated with a
0.9 percent decline in the industry job loss rate.  The export association
is slightly more than twice the domestic demand association.  As dis-
cussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the estimated export association may be
somewhat overstated due to the associated rise in shipments along with
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the rise in exports.  Yet, it is precisely the rise in shipments that is of in-
terest because, when domestic demand remains constant, the increase
in foreign demand will be met by an increase in shipments.
The sensitivity of job loss to changes in exports has been over-
looked but may not be surprising.  The rise in exports can be interpret-
ed as a shift in labor demand, leading to an increase in the desired level
of employment.  At a given level of hiring (accessions) and nondis-
placement separations, employment will rise with a fall in permanent
job loss. 
Most notably, rising import share is associated with a higher dis-
placement rate, but the coefficient is small and the estimate is impre-
cise.  At standard levels of statistical significance, it cannot be rejected
that the “true” effect of changes in import share on the job loss rate is
zero.  Estimates reported in column 3 of Table 7.1 show that differenti-
ating imports by country of origin makes no difference in understand-
ing changes in the rate of job loss.  For increases in both developed and
developing country import share, the coefficient estimates are very im-
precise.
Changes in R&D intensity and TFP are negatively correlated with
job loss rates, although the coefficient estimates are imprecise.  Lower
job loss rates are associated with more capital intensive industries.  The
sensitivity of displacement rates to the business cycle, captured in part
by changes in domestic demand, is also revealed by the estimated coef-
ficient on the change in the index of manufacturing industrial produc-
tion, with the negative coefficient showing the countercyclical nature of
displacement.3
Briefly, the level of job displacement (i.e., the number of displaced
workers) is an alternative approach to measuring job loss.4 With job
loss levels sensitive to industry employment levels, a within-industry,
fixed-effects specification is the most appropriate.  The results are rela-
tively unchanged, with the exception that the responsiveness of the lev-
el of job loss to changes in domestic demand is similar in magnitude to
its responsiveness to changes in exports.  A 1 percent increase in either
sales, domestic demand, or exports (holding other factors constant)
lowers the level of job loss by approximately 2 percent.  Imprecisely
estimated, a 1 percent increase in imports increases the level of job loss
by 1.4 percent.
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Across industry
Although the within-industry approach is preferred, it is also useful
to briefly discuss one set of cross-industry estimates.  The more de-
scriptive evidence discussed in Chapter 4, in particular Table 4.6, re-
vealed that industries with the highest import share have, on average,
the highest rates of job loss.  Below the top quartile of industries with
respect to import share, job loss rates are more uniform.  In addition,
high rates of job loss were found for industries with high import share
and large increases in import share.  This evidence suggests that there
may be a stronger association across industries between changes in im-
port share and the risk of job loss than was found within industries. 
Cross-industry estimates are reported in Table 7.2. For changes in
sales and domestic demand, the estimated coefficients are very similar
to those reported in Table 7.1 (see columns 1 and 2).  There are two no-
table differences between the two tables.  The first difference is the an-
ticipated one for changes in import share.  The cross-industry associa-
tion between rising import share and the risk of job loss is considerably
stronger than the estimated within-industry association.  A 10 percent
increase in import share is associated with a 1.4–1.6 percentage point
increase in the rate of job loss, across industries.  The contrast between
the within-industry and cross-industry estimates suggests that specific
industries with high import share account for the rising import share–
job loss relationship, and once those industry effects are accounted 
for, the correlation between rising import share and job loss is much
weaker. 
The second difference between the within-industry and cross-in-
dustry estimates is the estimated correlation between changes in sales
due to exports and the job loss rate.  First, the cross-industry estimates
are considerably smaller than the within-industry estimates, and the co-
efficients are estimated imprecisely.  With year effects, there is not suf-
ficient variation in changes in exports to pick up a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between changes in sales due to exports and job loss,
although the estimated coefficient is negative as expected (Table 7.2).
In results not reported, without year effects, the estimated elasticity of
displacement with respect to changes in exports is negative and statisti-
cally significant.  A 10 percent rise in exports is associated with a 2-per-
centage-point decline in the displacement rate. 
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The influence of outsourcing can only be investigated in the cross
section.  Augmenting the specification with the annualized change in
imported intermediate inputs between 1979 and 1990 reveals that the
correlation between growth in imported inputs and the risk of job loss
is positive but not statistically significant (column 3 of Table 7.2).
Consistent with the different import share estimates between the
within- and cross-industry frameworks, there is a slight difference with
respect to the separate measures of changes in import share by country
of origin.  Column 4 of Table 7.2 shows rising imports from both de-
veloping and developed countries are associated with higher rates of
job loss; only the LDC elasticity is statistically significant.  This result
again suggests that certain industries, those with large increases in LDC
import share, had associated high job loss rates, while the within-indus-
try relationship is considerably weaker.
The overall fit of the displacement model to the cross-industry vari-
ation in displacement rates is modest, and, as expected, not as good as
in the case with the employment change data.  At best, only 13 percent
of the job loss rate variation is explained by the model.
Measuring the dependent variable as the natural log of displace-
ment produces very similar results, which are not reported here.  This al-
ternative way of specifying the dependent variable yields similar results
to those discussed above.  In results not reported, the point estimates im-
ply that a 1 percent increase in industry sales reduces the level of job loss
by 1.5 percent, a 1 percent increase in domestic demand reduces job loss
by 1.6 percent, a 1 percent increase in exports reduce job loss by 2.1 per-
cent (the estimated export coefficient is not statistically significant), and
a 1 percent decrease in import share reduces job loss by 0.6 percent (the
import share point estimate is not statistically significant).
Within industry: changes in relative import price
Estimates with time-invariant industry controls are reported in
Table 7.3. In the basic sample (column 1), the estimated import price
elasticity is negative as expected but small and estimated imprecisely.
When year effects are omitted (results not reported), the within-indus-
try estimated elasticity equals –0.10.  This estimate implies that a 10
percent increase in relative import price is associated with a 1-percent-
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Table 7.2  Industry Displacement Rates, Changes in Sales, Domestic Demand, Exports, and Import Share,
Cross-Section Estimates (1979–1994)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in ln(sales) –0.1122***
(0.0253)
Weighted change domestic demand –0.1066*** –0.1069*** –0.1061***
(0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0291)
Weighted change exports –0.0692 –0.1021 –0.0734
(0.0762) (0.0828) (0.0757)
Weighted change import share 0.1613*** 0.1374***
(0.0410) (0.0415)
Weighted change DC import share 0.1079
(0.1166)
Weighted change LDC import share 0.2760***
(0.0914)
Change index of industrial production –0.0036*** –0.0029** –0.0028 –0.0029**
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Change R&D intensity –0.0678 –0.0673 –0.0828 –0.0646
(0.0389) (0.0429) (0.0467) (0.0414)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) –0.0171*** –0.0159*** –0.0146*** –0.0159***
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Change ln(alternative wage) –0.0612 –0.0595 –0.0613 –0.0601
(0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0483) (0.0468)






Constant 0.0364*** 0.0456*** 0.0437*** 0.0455***
(0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0059)
Observations 963 963 961 963
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications include year dummy variables.  ** = significant at 5% level; ***
= significant at 1% level.
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Change ln(relative import –0.0461 –0.1021 –0.2562***
(0.0490) (0.0965) (0.1044)
Change index of industrial 0.0021*** 0.0021** 0.0023***
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Change R&D intensity 0.1100 0.0791 0.0859
(0.1075) (0.0924) (0.0704)
Ln(capital stock/shipments) 0.0271** 0.0559*** 0.0483***
(0.0125) (0.0192) (0.0037)
Change ln(alternative wage) –0.0984*** –0.1711** –0.1592***
(0.0327) (0.0709) (0.0211)
Constant 0.0743*** 0.1221*** 0.1192***
(0.0217) (0.0327) (0.0041)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 300 180 180
Number of industries 30 18 18
R2 0.70 0.71 0.70
NOTE: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Specifications include one lag
in the relative import price.  ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at 1% lev-
el.  IV denotes instrumental variables.
price)
production
This estimated magnitude is found, with the inclusion of year ef-
fects, in an early step of the IV approach.  Again, the data requirements
for the IV estimation are considerable.  For the subset of industries with
available data, the OLS estimate is reported in column 2, and it is small
(–0.10) and statistically insignificant.  The IV estimate (in column 3) is
considerably larger in magnitude at –0.255 and is statistically signifi-
cant.  The sign of the OLS bias, here positive, is consistent with results
Imports, Exports, and Jobs 141
from the employment estimation reported in the previous chapter.  The
bias is a result of correlation between the relative import price variable
and the error term in the displacement regression.  If there is an unob-
servable global price shock (perhaps an oil price shock) that increases
domestic displacement and increases relative import price (because
costs rise), then import price movements will be positively correlated
with increases in the rate of displacement rate, and this will impart a
positive bias to the OLS estimated coefficient.  The IV technique ad-
dresses this potential bias by treating relative import price as an en-
dogenous variable and predicting it from a set of conventional import
price predictors (instruments), such as trade-weighted exchange rates
and trade-weighted foreign relative factor costs.  With the IV estimate,
a 10 percent increase in import price reduces the rate of job loss by 2.5
percentage points. 
SUMMARY
Three main findings can be distilled from this chapter:
• Rising sales, domestic demand, and exports are all associated
with lower rates of job loss.  The most striking result is the large
responsiveness of the risk of job loss to changes in sales due to
exports.  The rise in sales due to exports can be associated with
an increase in the desired level of employment and, with this in-
crease, comes a fall in permanent job loss.
• Rising import share is associated with a higher displacement
rate, but the coefficient is small and estimated imprecisely.
Within industries, it cannot be rejected that the “true” associa-
tion between changes in import share and the risk of job loss is
zero.
• The cross-industry association between rising import share and
the risk of job loss is considerably stronger than the estimated
within-industry association.  The contrast between the within-in-
dustry and cross-industry estimates suggests that specific high
import share industries account for the rising import share–risk
of job loss relationship.  Once these industries are accounted for,
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the correlation between rising import share and the risk of job
loss is much weaker. 
Overall, the estimates are consistent with common perceptions of
the link between increasing foreign competition and job loss.  Across
industries, there is some weak evidence that the risk of job loss increas-
es as import share rises.  There is a weaker cross-industry relationship
between falling import prices and rising job loss.  This is consistent
with the discussion in Chapter 4 that noted that the industries with high
job loss, high import share, and increasing import share were not the
ones with the largest reductions in import prices.  At the same time, this
simple cross-industry specification explains little of the variation in job
loss rates.
Within industry, there is more evidence consistent with falling im-
port prices leading to job loss, and the correlation between rising im-
port share and job loss is positive, if weaker.  Together, the employment
change and job loss evidence show that, as relative import prices fall,
consumers substitute foreign-produced goods for domestic and domes-
tic demand falls, import share rises, and employment falls as output is
scaled back.  The employment reduction occurs, in part, through dis-
placement.
Notes
1. See Kletzer (2000), Figure 10.2.
2. Similar to the employment change analysis, observations where the log change in
industry employment exceeded 0.75 in absolute value were excluded.
3. The year effects work in the same way, and their estimated magnitudes are consis-
tent with the pattern of the business cycle over the time period.
4. To be precise, the natural logarithm of the number of displaced workers in an in-
dustry.  Haveman (1998) used this measure.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
Americans are of two minds about globalization.  They recognize
the benefits of lower prices and broader choices, while being fully cog-
nizant of the worker costs.  Opinion surveys note the ambivalence.  In a
survey conducted in 1999, 44 percent of respondents endorsed the idea
that, “Free trade is a bad idea, because it can lead to lower wages and
people losing their jobs” (Program on International Policy Attitudes
2000). Fifty-one percent of respondents endorsed the other option:
“Free trade is a good idea, because it can lead to lower prices and the
long-term growth of the economy.”  In the same survey, respondents
were presented with the following scenario: “The U.S. makes a trade
agreement that leads to a U.S. shoe factory closing.  The workers have
to find new jobs that pay on average $5,000 per year less, but American
consumers save $20 per pair of shoes.”  Based on this information, 63
percent of respondents said the United States would have made a mis-
take by entering into the agreement (Program on International Policy
Attitudes 2000). 
One of the endnotes of the twentieth century was the globalization
backlash.  Its voices are less a backlash and more an amplification of
old themes.  The most prominent is the claim that “trade costs jobs,”
and the resulting debate over the number of jobs affected by free trade.1
Although the level of employment in the U.S. economy is determined
far more by macroeconomic events and policy than by changes in trade
policy, it is important to the policy debate to understand more about the
link between U.S. jobs and job loss and increasing trade flows.  In this
spirit, one of the goals of this book was an examination of the claim
that increasing trade is associated with job loss in the United States.
The focus on job loss represents the most novel contribution of this
study.  Having spent the last 15 years studying the consequences of job
loss, I thought it natural to examine some of the underlying causes of
job displacement.  Job loss is considered by many Americans to be the
central domestic focus of free(r) trade, and many participants and ob-
servers of the U.S. political scene consider the domestic labor market
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consequences of “trade-related” job loss to be the key political econo-
my issue for the future of U.S. international trade policy. 
The research reported here has five main findings.
• Increasing imports are associated with employment reductions.
Increasing foreign competition, measured as a decline in relative
import price, is associated with a decline in employment.  The
sensitivity of employment and job loss to fluctuations in import
price and import share reported here confirms and extends the
earlier work of other researchers.  The relatively small magni-
tude of the average estimated associations between rising import
share and job loss (and employment reductions) is consistent
with the consensus of the “trade and wages” literature that trade
plays a smaller role than technological change in accounting for
rising wage inequality.
• Increasing exports (and domestic demand) enhance employ-
ment.  Within industries, the employment-enhancing effect of
expanding exports is significantly greater than the employment-
reducing effects of increasing imports.  Admittedly, this result is
stronger in some specifications than in others, and there are mea-
surement issues.
• With respect to job displacement, there is a set of industries fac-
ing sustained import competition, those with both high levels of
import share and increasing import share, where the rate of job
loss is high.  Beyond this subset of industries, the rising import
share–high rate of job loss relationship is considerably weaker.
This finding means that increasing imports play a small role in
aggregate economy job loss but a larger role in traditionally im-
port-competing industries.  Within a given industry, there is also
evidence that more competitively priced imports (falling relative
import prices) are associated with job loss.
• The steady focus on import competition and its potential role in
job loss has caused the export side to be overlooked.  As a mirror
image to export growth associated with employment growth, it
is also a counterforce against permanent job loss.  As sales in-
crease due to exports, the risk of job loss falls.  Restated slightly,
an open economy involves more exports along with more im-
ports, and increasing exports reduce job loss.
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• Although some jobs are lost when imports rise while others are
maintained or created when exports rise, the trend in manufac-
turing employment from the late 1970s to the early 1990s cannot
be completely explained by changes in trade flows or foreign
competition.  Technological change, changes in the composition
of consumer demand, corporate restructuring, and downsizing
have all played a role in declining manufacturing employment.
At the same time, while increasing imports have played a small
role in sectoral job loss, they have played a much larger role in
traditionally import-competing industries.  These industries in-
clude apparel, textiles, footwear, electrical machinery, some of
the metals industries, and motor vehicles.  In these industries,
the implied burden of worker adjustment is dramatic.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Import barriers are a traditional focus of trade policy analysis.  Im-
port protection is known to be costly to consumers.2 It is also contrary
to the multilateral reductions in trade barriers of the past three decades,
although allowable under certain conditions.  More importantly, this
study finds the risk of job loss to be not very responsive to changes in
import share within industries.  Reducing import share through import
restrictions will not reduce job loss by much, and consumers will bear
the high costs.
For policy, the inclusion of exports and the strength of the findings
in regard to exports, suggests a needed reorientation of thinking.  Im-
ports are half the story, not the whole story.  Fluctuations in employ-
ment and job loss are more sensitive to changes in sales due to exports
than to changes in the import share of domestic demand.  Employment
grows, and job loss is reduced, with increases in foreign demand.
Opening markets to U.S. goods is strongly supported by this study.
Export promotion is currently a major item for the U.S. Department of
Commerce, and this study supports continued emphasis.  The United
States has not concluded a multilateral trade agreement since the pas-
sage of NAFTA in 1993.  The bilateral agreements (with Jordan, Chile,
and Vietnam) are very small additions to open markets for U.S. ex-
porters and are generally seen as most important for their symbolic
values.
Richardson (1993) assessed the degree to which the United States’
own domestic microeconomic policy impeded exports.  He concluded
that as much as $40 billion in exports annually were discouraged
through a variety of export disincentives.  He highlighted inadequate
official support for export finance as a significant discouragement.  On
this point, strengthening the Export-Import Bank can be an important
step in export promotion. 
With the expected continued trend growth in exports, the vulnera-
bility of jobs to fluctuations in foreign demand will likely gain some
visibility in line with the known vulnerability of jobs to fluctuations in
domestic demand.  These short-run fluctuations can be addressed
through the current system of unemployment compensation (UC), the
primary source of income for workers unemployed due to cyclical fluc-
tuations.  Helping workers with income losses associated with export-
related unemployment may present additional claims on the UC sys-
tem.3
As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, protecting workers from
import competition resonates loudly with the American public.  This
study has revealed that considerable employment decline and some job
loss is associated with rising imports.  For many industries, skill-biased
technological change is a part of that association.  To the workers who
lose their jobs and their communities, the “trade versus technology”
question is irrelevant.  That question is very likely also irrelevant to the
public policies that help workers adjust to job loss.  This study under-
scores that the job losses are real and that there is some connection to
trade.
In related research, I have found that workers displaced from im-
port-competing industries face difficult adjustments following their job
loss.4 Import-competing job loss is associated with low re-employment
rates because the workers vulnerable to rising import job loss experi-
ence difficulty gaining re-employment, based on their individual char-
acteristics.  It is not import competition per se; it is who gets displaced
from (and is employed by) industries with rising import competition.
What limits the re-employment of import-competing displaced work-
ers?  The same characteristics that limit the re-employment of all
displaced workers—low educational attainment, advancing age, high
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tenure, minority status, and marital status.  Married women, even those
displaced from full-time jobs, are much less likely to be re-employed. 
Difficulties do not end with the transition to a new job.  Difficulties
continue in trying to recover earnings.  For re-employed import-com-
peting displaced workers, the average earnings loss is about 13 percent.
Two-thirds earn less on their new job than they did on their old job.
One-quarter reported earnings losses of 30 percent or more.  The same
average and distribution is found for manufacturing workers as a
whole.5
Trade barriers are seen by some as the way to “protect” workers
from import competition.  An alternative perspective is that workers
should be protected from undue losses associated with increasing trade.
This kind of protection is accomplished through domestic policy, rather
than trade policy, and it is the backdrop of the current programs of
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and North American Free Trade
Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA).
From this perspective, it is useful to assess the current state of do-
mestic adjustment assistance policy as we look to the future of interna-
tional trade and trade policy.  The federal role in assisting “trade-dis-
placed” workers began with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.  This Act
established the TAA program.  For eligible workers for whom it can be
documented that increasing imports have contributed importantly to
their job loss, additional assistance is available.  The size and form of
TAA has changed considerably in the four decades since the passage of
the Trade Expansion Act.  Under its current form, qualified workers
may gain an additional 52 weeks of income support (called Trade
Readjustment Allowances [TRA]) after they have exhausted their stan-
dard UI eligibility (26 weeks), provided they are enrolled in an ap-
proved training program.  The program also provides job search and re-
location assistance.  Income support payments are set at the prevailing
state UI benefit level.  Although income support payments under TAA
are an entitlement, the other benefits, including training, are limited by
the availability of funds.  The entire TAA program is funded out of gen-
eral revenues.
Federal efforts directed toward trade-displaced workers were en-
hanced with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act of 1993, legislation that created the NAFTA-TAA
program.  The NAFTA-TAA is similar to TAA in general form, al-
though it covers only workers who have lost jobs because of increased
imports from, or shifts of production to, Mexico or Canada.  Workers
can be certified under both programs but must choose one from which
to claim benefits.  Benefits provided under NAFTA-TAA are identical
to those provided under the TAA program.  Under TAA, NAFTA-TAA
provides benefits to secondary workers, defined as workers employed
by upstream producers and/or suppliers.  Similar to TAA, the federal
government pays all NAFTA-TAA expenses.  Over the last half of the
1990s, TAA and NAFTA-TAA service and benefit payments have been
less than $300 million annually.6
In 1999, the latest year for which information is available, 227,650
workers were certified eligible for TAA and/or NAFTA-TAA.7 Certifi-
cations include workers who lose jobs as well as those who are threat-
ened with job loss.  Interestingly, the number of 1999 certifications is
close to a DWS estimate of the number of workers displaced from
high-import industries in 1999 (295,000).8 A much smaller number of
workers received readjustment allowances (36,910), and only 32,120
received training.  The General Accounting Office report discussed rea-
sons for low training enrollment, including training waivers (allowed
under TAA but not under NAFTA-TAA), funding shortfalls, and a
strong labor market that allowed displaced workers to become re-em-
ployed more readily on their own. 
Evidence that TAA and NAFTA-TAA training programs are useful
is weak, at best (see Decker and Corson 1995; U.S. General Accounting
Office 2000).  Because workers typically enter training before getting a
new job, there is a weak link between training and the skill needs of po-
tential employers.  This raises the possibility that workers may train for
jobs that do not exist.  This is not to say that training has no value to
anyone.  Classroom training can be of real value to some dislocated
workers, but the share who benefit is quite small.  Most workers ac-
quire far more skill-enhancing knowledge on the job than in the class-
room (see Jacobson 1998).
To move forward again, proactively, on the path of increasing eco-
nomic integration, we must address the employment and earnings con-
cerns of workers, along with strengthening the current set of programs.
Jacobson (1998) articulated a set of clear primary policy goals, among
them reducing the time it takes displaced workers to find new perma-
nent jobs and offsetting the large and permanent earnings reductions as-
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sociated with the loss of firm- or industry-specific human capital.  The
first of these goals can be met by the existing social safety net of TAA
and NAFTA-TAA by providing job search assistance, assessing train-
ing needs and compatibilities, and providing training funds through
grants and/or loans.  Allowing part-time employment along with train-
ing participation would improve the support. 
The second of Jacobson’s goals, reducing long-term earnings loss-
es, is more difficult and will require new programs.  Time-limited earn-
ings (or wage) insurance has been proposed by a number of authors, in-
cluding Jacobson (1998), Burtless et al. (1998), and Kletzer and Litan
(2001).  Briefly, wage insurance is a program of financial assistance,
upon re-employment, for workers who lose jobs, for any reason,
through no fault of their own.  The goal of a wage insurance program is
to get workers back to work, while minimizing longer term earnings
losses.  A key aspect of the program, and difference between it and oth-
er adjustment assistance programs, is the employment incentive created
by making benefits conditional on re-employment.9
Kletzer and Litan (2001) proposed a program that would be open to
all workers who could provide documentation that they were “dis-
placed” according to criteria similar to the operational definition of dis-
placement used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its DWSs.  This
definition includes plant closing or relocation, elimination of position
or shift, and insufficient work.  Eligibility can be made contingent on a
minimum period of service on the old job, perhaps two years.  Workers
re-employed in a new job that pays less than the old job (where both old
and new job earnings can be documented through employer quarterly
earnings reports that are filed with the states) would have a substantial
portion of their lost earnings replaced, for up to two years following the
date of initial job loss.  For example, a displaced worker who once
earned $40,000 per year, re-employed in a new job paying $30,000 per
year would receive $5,000 per year, for a period from the time of re-
employment to two years after initial job loss.  Annual payments could
be capped, perhaps at $10,000. 
Kletzer and Litan provided cost estimates, based on DWS data, for
a number of program scenarios.  One of those scenarios, with a re-
placement rate of 50 percent of the earnings loss, a $10,000 annual pay-
ment cap, and eligibility limited to workers whose previous and new
jobs were full time, would have cost about $3 billion in 1997, when the
unemployment rate averaged 4.9 percent (the June 2001 unemploy-
ment rate was 4.5 percent).10 These projected costs are a tiny fraction
of the $500 billion in estimated benefits for the United States from freer
trade.11
Wage insurance addresses some of the criticisms leveled at TAA
and NAFTA-TAA.  First, the structure of the program, with benefits
available only upon re-employment, presents an incentive for workers
to find new jobs.  Second, workers’ job search efforts may be broader,
as entry-level jobs become more attractive to workers when the earn-
ings gap is reduced.  Third and relatedly, the program effectively subsi-
dizes retraining on the job, where it is likely to be far more useful than
in a training program where re-employment prospects are uncertain.
Fourth, the program directly addresses the critical problem of earnings
losses upon re-employment.
Free trade, open markets, and economic integration can facilitate
economic growth.  The benefits of free trade are considerable and wide-
spread.  But open engagement with the world does not help everyone.
This study provides confirmation of the concentrated costs of free
trade.  Manufacturing industries offer striking differences in their sensi-
tivities of employment change and job loss to changes in trade flows.
Rising imports are associated with job loss.  That the numbers may be
small, or that the association is limited to a particular set of industries
does not diminish the extent of the human costs.  Proponents of ex-
panded open trade and investment face an obligation to address the
concerns of workers, companies, and communities who can be hurt by
free trade.
Notes
1. NAFTA, starting with its negotiations in the early 1990s and continuing through
its current outcomes, has been a prime source for the heated jobs debate.  For an
early view, see Hufbauer and Schott (1993).  For a recent contribution, see Eco-
nomic Policy Institute (2001).
2. Hufbauer and Goodrich (2001) estimated the consumer costs per job saved in the
steel industry to be $360,000 annually and the estimated annual compensation per
worker as $72,000.
3. However, it is possible that more active involvement in foreign markets comes
with some risk.  Regaining foreign markets may be more difficult than regaining
domestic markets.  I leave this question for future research.
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4. See Kletzer (2001).
5. For more on the costs of job displacement, see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993), and Kletzer (1998a).
6. See U.S. General Accounting Office (2000).  This report is the source for the in-
formation that follows on workers certified.
7. The number includes workers certified under both programs.
8. See Kletzer (2001).
9. In the research literature, other proponents of wage insurance include Burtless et
al. (1998) and Jacobson (1998).
10. Some of the cost of a wage insurance programs could be offset if it were incorpo-
rated into the TAA and NAFTA-TAA programs.  One possibility would be to of-
fer wage insurance to workers if they became re-employed within 26 weeks, the
period before the extended income support from Trade Readjustment Allowances.
Once receiving wage insurance, re-employed workers would be ineligible for in-
come support and training allowances.
11. This estimated increase in U.S. economic welfare assumes global free trade, with
all post-Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed. See Brown, Dear-
dorff, and Stern (2002).

Appendix A
MEASURES OF TRADE VOLUMES AND IMPORT PRICES
Data on U.S. import and exports, by four-digit SIC category, are
available as part of the NBER Trade Database for the period 1958–
1994.  The import and export data file also reports the 1958–1994 value
of domestic shipments from the NBER Productivity Database.1
The SIC-based industry trade data must be aggregated up to three-
digit 1990 CIC codes in order to combine the trade information with
CPS-based information on employment and job displacement.
Import price indices data are available for many four-digit SIC man-
ufacturing industries starting in 1982–1983, with the SIC-based series
currently ending with 1992.  For a smaller set of industries, the price se-
ries provides reasonable information from 1980 forward.  For industries
where the three- or four-digit SIC import price information was missing,
two-digit SIC price information was used to fill in the time-series gaps.
The price measure is a fixed weight Laspeyres index with a 1985 base
period.2 Industry-specific Producer Price Indices, available from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, are used to obtain relative import prices.
MEASURING INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT AND 
JOB LOSS USING THE CPS
Industry employment 
Employment levels by industry were constructed from the March
Annual Demographic File supplements to the CPS for the period of
1975–1996.  These supplements contain information on labor market
status and activities for the preceding calendar year (thus, the 1975–
1996 files contain information for the period 1974–1995).3 A number
of important data construction issues arose in constructing the employ-
ment series.  In the analysis sample, all industries are defined using
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1990 CIC codes; concordances were employed to bring together the
1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 three-digit CIC codes used in the various
March supplements. 
Job loss
The DWSs provide information on displacement.  Available sur-
veys, administered biennially as supplements to the CPS, cover dis-
placements occurring over the period of 1979–1995.  In each survey,
adults (aged 20 years and older) were asked in the regular monthly CPS
if they had lost a job in the preceding five-year period due to “a plant
closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which he/she
was not recalled, or other similar reasons.”  If the answer was yes, a
series of questions followed concerning the old job and period of job-
lessness.
A common understanding of job displacement is that it occurs
without personal prejudice; terminations are related to the operating de-
cisions of the employer and are independent of individual job perfor-
mance.  In the DWSs, this definition can be implemented by drawing
the sample of displaced workers from individuals who respond that
their job loss was due to the reasons noted above.  Other causes of job
loss, such as quits or firings are not considered displacements.4 This
operational definition is not without ambiguity: the displacements are
“job” displacements, in the sense that an individual displaced from a
job and rehired into a different job with the same employer is consid-
ered displaced.
Some of the distinctions may be too narrow or arbitrary.  The dis-
tinction between quits and displacements is muddied by the ability of
employers to reduce employment by reducing or failing to raise wages.
Wage changes may induce some workers to quit (and not be in the sam-
ple) while others opt to stay with the firm (and they get displaced and
enter the sample).5 This distinction means that the displaced worker
sample will underestimate the amount of job change “caused” by trade.
In addition, if the workers who stay on with the firm until displacement
are those who face the worst labor market outcomes of all those at risk
of displacement, then the displaced sample will be potentially nonran-
dom and it will overstate the costs of job loss.  Without data on quits,
these issues cannot be addressed.
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The sample here is limited to workers (aged 20 to 64) displaced
from manufacturing industries.  Because the information is retrospec-
tively gathered, it has potential recall error.  Problems of recall are com-
pounded by the overlapping coverage of years of displacement by sur-
veys, with some years covered in two or three surveys.6 This recall bias
is thought to be significant.  As Topel (1990) and Farber (1993) show, it
is likely that the surveys seriously underestimate job loss that occurred
long before the survey date due to inaccuracies in recall as well as ques-
tion design.7 This makes it desirable to have non-overlapping recall pe-
riods (that is, each year of displacement drawn from only one survey)
that are relatively short.  The sample was restricted to displacements oc-
curring in the two-year period prior to each survey in order to incorpo-
rate these characteristics.  A larger and more extended sample was
drawn from the 1984 survey to extend the time-series coverage back to
1979.
Industry displacement rates were calculated by dividing the num-
ber of workers displaced from a three-digit CIC industry in a year by
the number of workers employed in that industry in that year.
Appendix Notes
1. The 1958–1994 file combines data from the earlier NBER Trade and Immigration
data file (described in Abowd 1991) with the NBER Trade Database (see Feenstra
1996).
2. These indices are described in more detail in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(1992).  They are based on a survey of actual transactions prices, and to the degree
possible, they reflect c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) prices.  When aggregation was
needed, the SIC indices were weighted by their relative shares in total imports us-
ing the NBER Trade Database.
3. The employment counts were derived from the sample of individuals employed in
private sector wage and salary jobs at the survey date, using information on indus-
try in the previous calendar year and the CPS supplemental weights.
4. Individuals may also respond that their job loss was due to the end of a seasonal
job or the failure of a self-employed business.  These individuals are not consid-
ered displaced.
5. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) showed that wages fall for displaced
workers before they are displaced.
6. The 1984 DWS covered the period 1979–1983; the 1986 survey, 1981–1985; the
1988 survey, 1983–1987; the 1990 survey, 1985–1989;  the 1992 survey, 1987–
1991; the 1994 survey, 1991–1993; and the 1996 survey, 1993–1995.
7. If more than one job was lost, information is gathered only for the job held longest.




























Electrical machinery 1255.2 –0.030 0.040 0.107 0.071 0.145 0.026
Apparel 1094.0 –0.175 0.054 0.132 0.103 0.023 –0.621
Machinery, exc. electric 1017.0 –0.113 0.053 0.085 0.052 0.139 –0.212
Furniture & fixtures 995.7 –0.010 0.023 0.046 0.048 0.014 –0.003
Motor vehicles 990.4 –0.115 0.064 0.173 0.086 0.091 –0.017
Printing, publishing 790.6 0.186 0.038 0.013 0.002 0.019 –0.068
Aircraft & parts 592.5 0.039 0.021 0.045 0.034 0.241 0.140
Blast furnaces 570.5 –0.634 0.084 0.119 0.074 0.033 –1.067
Misc. fabricated metal 532.2 –0.137 0.041 0.040 0.019 0.046 –0.358
Fabricated structural metals 516.3 –0.166 0.065 0.007 0.009 0.040 –0.742
Sawmills, planing mills 470.3 –0.089 0.047 0.135 0.003 0.063 –0.542
Yarn, thread 449.7 –0.291 0.052 0.045 0.040 0.072 –0.814
Industrial & misc. chemicals 426.4 –0.073 0.036 0.071 0.040 0.150 –0.128
Newspaper 420.1 0.069 0.039 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.812
Metalworking machinery 395.0 –0.178 0.038 0.108 0.061 0.095 –0.412
Office & acct. machines 385.5 0.260 0.009 0.079 0.083 0.183 –0.100
Construction & material moving
machines
382.8 –0.414 0.081 0.059 0.091 0.270 –0.478
Electronic computing eqp. 369.5 0.521 0.027 0.103 0.086 0.939 0.586





Misc. plastics products 340.1 0.015 N/A 0.032 0.013 0.051 –0.004
Metal forgings 300.7 –0.199 0.026 0.021 0.016 0.268 0.053
Misc. manuf. industries 273.6 –0.145 0.056 0.186 0.110 0.121 –0.740
Canned fruits 250.0 –0.104 0.043 0.038 0.023 0.031 –0.280
Cement, concrete, gypsum 248.7 –0.083 0.044 0.021 0.006 0.004 –0.335
Pulp, paper 245.8 –0.057 0.021 0.155 0.004 0.089 –0.129
Iron & Steel foundries 240.7 –0.532 0.085 0.017 0.024 0.011 –0.720
Beverage 237.9 –0.106 0.014 0.071 0.002 0.013 –0.315
Bakery 236.8 –0.091 0.025 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.150
Knitting mills 230.5 –0.139 0.023 0.061 0.097 0.016 –0.465
Ship & boat building 226.4 –0.193 0.077 0.019 0.018 0.028 –0.300
Paperboard 214.0 –0.084 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.007 –0.032
Plastics, synthetics 212.2 –0.210 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.145 –0.252
Misc. food 209.4 –0.067 0.035 0.049 0.006 0.160 –0.560
Glass & glass products 198.5 –0.240 0.050 0.055 0.038 0.056 –0.333
Drugs 192.5 0.066 0.021 0.052 0.012 0.077 0.175
Misc. fab. textile 189.2 –0.033 0.040 0.040 0.043 0.072 –0.729
Cutlery, handtools 183.9 –0.259 0.035 0.073 0.044 0.065 –0.336
Farm machinery & eqp. 182.3 –0.626 0.101 0.125 0.019 0.108 –0.547
Dairy products 179.8 –0.102 0.052 0.015 0.001 0.007 0.534
Household appliances 176.8 –0.274 0.058 0.071 0.050 0.081 –0.506
Misc. paper 174.4 0.109 N/A 0.014 0.009 0.027 –0.131
Petroleum refining 165.2 –0.156 0.030 0.075 0.026 0.016 0.764
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 157.9 –0.498 N/A 0.046 0.039 0.057 –0.149
Footwear 148.9 –0.406 0.110 0.348 0.219 0.018 0.078




























Engines & turbines 145.1 –0.323 0.043 0.083 0.113 0.197 –0.256
Grain mill 144.1 –0.143 0.039 0.005 0.003 0.111 –0.361
Misc. wood products 139.6 –0.117 0.041 0.066 0.014 0.033 –0.325
Soaps & cosmetics 139.5 0.056 0.043 0.009 0.011 0.028 –0.237
Photographic eqp. 134.2 –0.090 0.031 0.121 0.052 0.144 –0.350
Scientific & controlling instr. 128.5 0.515 N/A 0.074 0.042 0.220 0.116
Tires & inner tubes 127.1 –0.303 0.050 0.130 0.038 0.044 –0.272
Toys & sporting goods 121.1 –0.242 0.084 0.229 0.148 0.093 –0.476
Screw machine products 115.9 –0.187 0.027 0.089 0.018 0.030 –0.327
Radio, TV 114.7 –0.315 0.189 0.151 0.046 0.090 0.107
Sugar products 112.8 –0.135 0.046 0.139 –0.031 0.022 –0.158
Other primary metal 109.6 –0.204 0.085 0.189 0.022 0.242 –1.139
Guided missiles 101.5 0.557 0.049 0.009 0.018 0.063 –0.002
Logging 88.5 –0.047 0.069 0.010 –0.004 0.309 –0.652
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 83.4 –0.147 0.124 0.047 0.000 0.010 –1.592
Railroad locos. 74.3 –0.815 0.105 0.053 0.063 0.048 –0.260
Paints, varnishes 68.6 –0.079 0.040 0.002 0.006 0.025 –0.123
Primary aluminum industries 68.4 –0.296 0.079 0.048 0.045 0.044 –0.298
Misc. textile 66.4 –0.237 0.025 0.119 0.014 0.092 –0.230





Floor coverings 60.5 –0.106 0.060 0.047 0.022 0.035 –0.524
Tobacco 55.9 –0.079 N/A 0.007 –0.002 0.065 –0.066
Cycles & misc. transport 54.3 –0.065 0.085 0.291 –0.022 0.145 0.410
Structural clay products 52.1 –0.329 0.070 0.092 0.032 0.045 –0.537
Leather products 50.8 –0.444 0.101 0.269 0.195 0.040 –0.555
Pottery & related 49.2 –0.237 0.079 0.313 0.105 0.071 0.061
Optical & health supplies 45.1 –0.133 0.206 0.064 0.008 0.107 0.137
Misc. petroleum 32.6 –0.215 0.083 0.050 0.024 0.055 –0.183
Watches, clocks 27.7 –0.812 0.091 0.387 0.226 0.088 –0.841
Leather tanning & finish 19.9 –0.296 0.049 0.160 0.073 0.156 –0.192
Mean 254.2 –0.114 0.057 0.086 0.040 0.094 –0.253
NOTE: Changes are log–changes from 1979 to 1985.  Domestic demand and exports are deflated by the industry’s Producer Price In-
dex.  N/A = not available.  Import share is calculated as imports divided by domestic supply.  Displacement rate is calculated as the
number of workers displaced from an industry divided by the number of workers employed in that industry.  Export intensity is cal-
culated as exports divided by shipments.
SOURCE:  Data on imports, exports, and shipments are from the NBER Trade Database, 1958–1994.  Employment data are from

























Electrical machinery 1218.2 –0.072 0.038 0.178 0.135 0.129 1.146
Furniture & fixtures 985.8 0.023 0.024 0.095 0.038 0.013 1.478
Printing, publishing 952.0 0.108 0.037 0.015 0.006 0.014 1.038
Apparel 918.2 –0.222 0.052 0.236 0.146 0.012 1.965
Machinery, exc. electric 907.9 –0.000 0.037 0.137 0.050 0.121 0.757
Motor vehicles 883.1 0.029 0.038 0.259 0.016 0.088 0.800
Electronic computing eqp 622.3 –0.285 0.060 0.189 0.298 0.319 0.595
Aircraft & parts 616.2 –0.247 0.033 0.079 0.097 0.263 0.550
Office & acct. machines 500.2 –0.345 0.005 0.162 0.289 0.123 0.249
Misc. fabricated metal 464.2 0.002 0.027 0.059 0.026 0.035 0.952
Newspaper 450.1 –0.004 0.013 0.003 –0.003 0.001 0.307
Fabricated structural metals 437.2 –0.067 0.052 0.016 0.000 0.021 0.712
Sawmills, planing mills 430.4 0.070 0.031 0.138 0.005 0.036 0.949
Industrial & misc. chemicals 396.5 –0.076 0.028 0.111 0.021 0.147 0.477
Meat products 361.7 0.221 0.024 0.039 –0.006 0.032 0.944
Misc. plastics products 345.3 0.346 N/A 0.045 0.031 0.038 1.039
Yarn, thread 336.2 –0.159 0.036 0.086 0.022 0.036 0.871
Metalworking machinery 330.7 –0.026 0.032 0.169 0.068 0.084 0.900








Construction & material moving
machines
253.0 –0.179 0.044 0.150 0.087 0.264 0.287
Metal forgings 246.5 –0.043 0.027 0.037 0.005 0.408 –0.801
Misc. manuf. industries 236.7 0.145 0.048 0.296 0.080 0.064 0.773
Pulp, paper 232.2 –0.057 0.024 0.159 0.010 0.072 0.772
Cement, concrete, gypsum 228.9 –0.056 0.030 0.027 –0.014 0.003 0.732
Canned fruits 225.4 0.086 0.026 0.061 –0.007 0.023 1.022
Bakery 216.3 –0.020 0.030 0.010 0.004 0.002 1.911
Scientific & controlling instr. 215.0 –0.161 0.016 0.117 0.112 0.199 0.593
Beverage 213.9 –0.192 0.026 0.074 –0.006 0.009 1.369
Drugs 205.6 0.246 0.022 0.063 0.030 0.081 0.889
Knitting mills 200.5 –0.003 0.016 0.158 0.061 0.011 1.907
Paperboard 196.8 0.088 0.027 0.007 0.006 0.007 1.519
Misc. food 195.9 0.099 0.043 0.055 0.011 0.083 0.445
Misc. paper 194.4 0.223 N/A 0.024 0.001 0.021 1.125
Ship & boat building 186.6 –0.165 0.074 0.037 0.003 0.022 1.165
Misc. fab. textile 183.0 0.171 0.033 0.083 0.065 0.028 0.891
Guided missiles 177.2 –0.500 0.093 0.027 0.030 0.032 0.075
Plastics, synthetics 172.0 –0.063 0.028 0.048 0.056 0.116 0.859
Dairy products 162.3 –0.092 0.041 0.016 0.001 0.011 0.493
Glass & glass products 156.1 –0.026 0.047 0.093 0.036 0.045 0.994
Soaps & cosmetics 147.5 0.039 0.029 0.021 0.019 0.022 1.459
Cutlery, handtools 142.0 –0.101 0.025 0.117 0.059 0.054 1.048
Iron & Steel foundries 141.4 –0.122 0.025 0.040 0.006 0.009 0.990
Petroleum refining 141.4 –0.261 0.023 0.101 –0.016 0.042 0.053
Household appliances 134.4 –0.090 0.035 0.121 0.047 0.051 1.108

























Misc. wood products 124.2 0.098 0.033 0.080 0.022 0.022 1.050
Other rubber products 123.6 –0.036 0.050 0.074 0.169 0.042 1.124
Photographic eqp. 122.7 –0.329 0.028 0.172 0.088 0.111 0.378
Engines & turbines 105.1 –0.156 0.036 0.196 –0.007 0.200 0.798
Footwear 99.2 –0.544 0.081 0.567 0.140 0.024 1.297
Sugar products 98.6 0.012 0.031 0.108 –0.031 0.019 1.531
Farm machinery & eqp. 97.5 0.064 0.042 0.144 0.014 0.119 0.705
Screw machine products 96.1 –0.004 0.031 0.106 0.049 0.023 1.457
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 95.9 0.052 0.052 0.085 0.027 0.060 0.616
Toys & sporting goods 95.1 0.194 0.058 0.377 0.130 0.065 1.495
Tires & inner tubes 93.9 –0.177 0.034 0.167 0.058 0.036 1.316
Other primary metal 89.4 –0.119 0.071 0.211 –0.020 0.085 1.092
Logging 84.4 –0.028 0.052 0.006 0.014 0.140 0.679
Radio, TV 83.7 –0.297 0.086 0.197 0.101 0.063 1.205
Ordnance 77.6 –0.370 0.069 0.043 0.109 0.104 0.385
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 72.0 0.021 0.089 0.047 –0.013 0.003 1.699
Paints, varnishes 63.4 –0.101 0.047 0.008 0.008 0.021 1.179
Floor coverings 54.4 0.161 0.040 0.069 0.002 0.020 1.244
Misc. textile 52.4 0.006 0.050 0.133 0.000 0.079 1.017








Cycles & misc. transport 50.9 –0.006 0.094 0.268 –0.041 0.186 0.565
Primary aluminum industries 50.9 –0.110 0.061 0.093 0.064 0.043 0.962
Optical & health supplies 39.5 2.038 0.080 0.072 0.043 0.082 1.232
Pottery & related 38.8 0.043 0.074 0.418 0.027 0.094 0.693
Structural clay products 37.5 –0.128 0.080 0.124 0.055 0.032 0.204
Railroad locos. 32.9 0.062 0.111 0.115 0.026 0.145 0.271
Leather products 32.6 –0.336 0.176 0.464 0.196 0.034 1.328
Misc. petroleum 26.3 0.034 0.038 0.074 –0.002 0.046 –0.005
Leather tanning & finish 14.8 –0.188 0.094 0.233 0.045 0.143 0.752
Watches, clocks 12.3 –0.381 N/A 0.613 0.187 0.083 0.793
Mean 227.6 –0.012 0.046 0.126 0.045 –0.073 0.898
NOTE: Changes are log–changes from 1985 to 1994.  Domestic demand and exports are deflated by the industry’s Producer Price In-
dex.  N/A = not available.  Import share is calculated as imports divided by domestic supply.  Displacement rate is calculated as the
number of workers displaced from an industry divided by the number of workers employed in that industry.  Export intensity is cal-
culated as exports divided by shipments.
SOURCE:  Data on imports, exports, and shipments are from the NBER Trade Database, 1958–1994.  Employment data are from








1975–94 1994 Rank 1990 Rank 1985 Rank 1980 Rank 1975 Rank
Watches, clocks 0.405 0.800 1 0.571 2 0.613 1 0.436 1 0.265 2
Footwear, ex. rubber & plastic 0.377 0.707 2 0.641 1 0.567 2 0.313 4 0.252 3
Leather products, ex. footwear 0.320 0.660 3 0.505 3 0.464 3 0.283 5 0.165 6
Pottery & related products 0.316 0.445 7 0.421 5 0.418 4 0.329 2 0.247 4
Toys & sporting goods 0.265 0.507 4 0.472 4 0.377 5 0.236 7 0.134 9
Cycles & misc. transport. equip. 0.264 0.227 19 0.234 13 0.268 7 0.328 3 0.278 1
Misc. manuf. industries 0.209 0.376 9 0.336 7 0.296 6 0.190 9 0.121 12
Motor vehicles 0.191 0.275 13 0.291 11 0.259 8 0.220 8 0.161 7
Electronic computing equipment 0.188 0.487 5 0.377 6 0.189 15 0.101 25 0.110 14
Leather tanning & finishing 0.172 0.277 12 0.303 10 0.233 10 0.128 17 0.089 19
Apparel & accessories 0.167 0.382 8 0.328 9 0.236 9 0.135 13 0.086 20
Radio, TV, & communication 0.158 0.298 11 0.217 14 0.197 12 0.143 12 0.121 11
Office & accounting machines 0.157 0.451 6 0.335 8 0.162 20 0.074 32 0.075 22
Other primary metal industries 0.156 0.191 22 0.176 22 0.211 11 0.244 6 0.106 16
Pulp, paper & paperboard mills 0.153 0.168 29 0.175 23 0.159 21 0.153 11 0.145 8
Electrical machinery, equip. 0.133 0.313 10 0.264 12 0.178 16 0.120 20 0.074 24
Blast furnaces, steelworks 0.130 0.190 23 0.154 29 0.193 14 0.125 18 0.117 13
Photographic equipment 0.129 0.260 14 0.214 16 0.172 17 0.116 22 0.075 23





Sawmills, planning mills 0.121 0.144 36 0.111 37 0.138 25 0.116 21 0.098 18
Tires & inner tubes 0.120 0.225 20 0.209 17 0.167 19 0.135 14 0.074 25
Sugar & confectionary products 0.120 0.078 50 0.093 44 0.108 34 0.159 10 0.169 5
Farm machinery & equipment 0.118 0.158 31 0.164 25 0.144 24 0.123 19 0.109 15
Metalworking machinery 0.114 0.236 17 0.196 19 0.169 18 0.113 23 0.066 27
Engines & turbines 0.114 0.189 24 0.162 26 0.196 13 0.134 15 0.062 30
Knitting mills 0.101 0.219 21 0.189 20 0.158 22 0.069 36 0.053 36
Machinery, ex. electrical 0.100 0.187 25 0.172 24 0.137 26 0.091 27 0.063 28
Construction & material moving
machines
0.098 0.237 16 0.201 18 0.150 23 0.061 40 0.054 34
Scientific & controlling instrmnts 0.098 0.228 18 0.188 21 0.117 31 0.080 30 0.059 31
Other rubber products 0.096 0.243 15 0.217 15 0.074 47 0.096 26 0.054 33
Structural clay products 0.095 0.179 26 0.157 27 0.124 28 0.103 24 0.040 44
Household appliances 0.092 0.168 30 0.150 30 0.121 29 0.072 33 0.062 29
Cutlery, handtools 0.091 0.176 27 0.157 28 0.117 30 0.082 28 0.053 37
Screw machine products 0.088 0.156 33 0.137 32 0.106 35 0.081 29 0.076 21
Petroleum refining 0.083 0.085 48 0.093 43 0.101 36 0.068 38 0.102 17
Industrial & misc. chemicals 0.081 0.132 40 0.110 39 0.111 33 0.076 31 0.056 32
Glass & glass products 0.071 0.129 41 0.105 41 0.093 38 0.057 41 0.040 43
Primary aluminum industries 0.070 0.157 32 0.100 42 0.093 39 0.041 53 0.039 45
Aircraft & parts 0.069 0.176 28 0.147 31 0.079 44 0.070 34 0.043 41
Beverage industries 0.065 0.068 54 0.070 51 0.074 46 0.069 35 0.054 35
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.064 0.112 43 0.112 36 0.085 41 0.050 43 0.042 42
Optical & health supplies 0.064 0.115 42 0.108 40 0.072 48 0.062 39 0.048 38
Railroad locomotives 0.064 0.141 37 0.127 34 0.115 32 0.048 46 0.014 59
Yarn, thread, & fabric mills 0.063 0.108 44 0.093 45 0.086 40 0.048 47 0.037 47








1975–94 1994 Rank 1990 Rank 1985 Rank 1980 Rank 1975 Rank
Furniture & fixtures 0.061 0.133 39 0.111 38 0.095 37 0.047 48 0.032 51
Misc. fabricated textile products 0.060 0.148 35 0.120 35 0.083 42 0.046 49 0.029 54
Misc. petroleum & coal products 0.059 0.072 52 0.074 49 0.074 45 0.050 44 0.068 26
Drugs 0.051 0.093 47 0.075 48 0.063 50 0.050 45 0.038 46
Ordnance 0.050 0.153 34 0.076 47 0.043 57 0.039 55 0.037 48
Floor coverings 0.047 0.070 53 0.061 54 0.069 49 0.054 42 0.030 52
Misc. fabricated metal products 0.044 0.085 49 0.070 52 0.059 52 0.039 54 0.035 49
Misc. food preparations 0.044 0.066 55 0.054 57 0.055 53 0.043 51 0.044 39
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 0.043 0.035 62 0.053 58 0.047 55 0.041 52 0.030 53
Plastics, synthetics, & resins 0.040 0.104 45 0.072 50 0.048 54 0.023 59 0.021 57
Canned and preserved fruits 0.040 0.054 57 0.060 55 0.061 51 0.035 56 0.025 55
Meat products 0.039 0.034 63 0.039 60 0.039 59 0.043 50 0.033 50
Misc. plastics products 0.038 0.076 51 0.066 53 0.045 56 0.031 57 0.021 56
Metal forgings 0.028 0.042 59 0.055 56 0.037 60 0.028 58 0.019 58
Iron & steel foundries 0.025 0.046 58 0.045 59 0.040 58 0.020 60 0.014 61
Ship & boat building & repair 0.022 0.040 60 0.021 65 0.037 61 0.016 61 0.010 64
Guided missiles, space vehicles 0.020 0.057 56 0.031 61 0.027 62 0.014 63 0.011 63
Logging 0.015 0.020 66 0.023 64 0.006 73 0.008 70 0.014 60
Misc. paper & pulp products 0.014 0.025 64 0.018 67 0.024 64 0.014 65 0.007 67





Dairy products 0.014 0.017 68 0.016 68 0.016 67 0.015 62 0.010 65
Soaps & cosmetics 0.013 0.039 61 0.026 62 0.021 65 0.009 69 0.005 70
Printing, publishing 0.013 0.021 65 0.018 66 0.015 68 0.013 66 0.012 62
Fabricated structural metal 0.009 0.016 69 0.015 69 0.016 66 0.009 68 0.007 69
Grain mill products 0.009 0.018 67 0.013 70 0.008 71 0.005 72 0.005 71
Tobacco manufactures 0.009 0.008 74 0.004 74 0.005 74 0.011 67 0.007 68
Bakery products 0.007 0.014 71 0.011 71 0.010 69 0.006 71 0.004 72
Paints, varnishes 0.005 0.016 70 0.010 72 0.008 70 0.003 74 0.001 75
Paperboard containers & boxes 0.005 0.013 72 0.009 73 0.007 72 0.004 73 0.002 73
Newspaper publishing & printing 0.002 0.000 75 0.002 75 0.003 75 0.002 75 0.002 74
Mean (column) 0.096 0.171 0.148 0.126
Std. deviation 0.086 0.164 0.136 0.122




Table A4  Changes in Import Prices, by Industry
Import price change
1980–85 1985–92 1980–92 1975–94
Watches, clocks –0.366 0.222 –0.143 0.405
Footwear, ex. rubber & plastic –0.182 0.084 –0.097 0.377
Leather products, ex. footwear –0.182 0.084 –0.097 0.320
Pottery & related products –0.214 0.585 0.370 0.316
Toys & sporting goods –0.209 0.225 0.016 0.265
Cycles & misc. transport. equip. 0.037 0.199 0.237 0.264
Misc. manuf. industries –0.087 0.265 0.178 0.209
Motor vehicles 0.025 0.178 0.203 0.191
Electronic computing equipment –0.276 –0.074 –0.350 0.188
Leather tanning & finishing –0.134 –0.022 –0.156 0.172
Apparel & accessories –0.059 0.079 0.020 0.167
Radio, TV, & communication N/A 0.002 N/A 0.158
Office & accounting machines –0.276 –0.074 –0.350 0.157
Other primary metal industries –0.255 0.038 –0.218 0.156
Pulp, paper & paperboard mills –0.105 –0.073 –0.178 0.153
Electrical machinery, equip. N/A 0.002 N/A 0.133
Blast furnaces, steelworks –0.208 0.146 –0.062 0.130
Photographic equipment –0.274 0.119 –0.155 0.129
Misc. textile mill products 0.050 0.244 0.294 0.128
Sawmills, planning mills –0.204 0.074 –0.129 0.121
Tires & inner tubes –0.049 –0.001 –0.050 0.120
Sugar & confectionary products –0.455 –0.198 –0.653 0.120
Farm machinery & equipment –0.249 0.249 –0.000 0.118
Metalworking machinery –0.250 0.318 0.068 0.114
Engines & turbines –0.249 0.200 –0.050 0.114
Knitting mills –0.013 0.306 0.292 0.101
Machinery, ex. electrical –0.249 0.262 0.012 0.100
Construction & material moving
machines
–0.241 0.369 0.128 0.098
Scientific & controlling instrmnts –0.290 0.232 –0.057 0.098
Other rubber products –0.209 0.149 –0.061 0.096
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Table A4  (continued)
Import price change
1980–85 1985–92 1980–92 1975–94
Household appliances N/A 0.242 N/A 0.092
Cutlery, handtools N/A –0.109 N/A 0.091
Screw machine products –0.288 0.130 –0.158 0.088
Industrial & misc. chemicals –0.083 0.002 –0.081 0.081
Glass & glass products –0.125 0.396 0.270 0.071
Primary aluminum industries –0.255 0.038 –0.218 0.070
Aircraft & parts 0.037 0.199 0.237 0.069
Beverage industries –0.031 0.247 0.216 0.065
Misc. nonmetallic mineral –0.125 0.396 0.270 0.064
Optical & health supplies –0.290 0.232 –0.057 0.064
Railroad locomotives 0.037 0.208 0.246 0.064
Yarn, thread, & fabric mills –0.013 0.290 0.276 0.063
Furniture & fixtures –0.233 0.140 –0.093 0.061
Misc. fabricated textile products –0.059 0.079 0.020 0.060
Drugs –0.083 –0.392 –0.475 0.051
Ordnance N/A 0.255 N/A 0.050
Floor coverings –0.013 0.290 0.276 0.047
Misc. fabricated metal products N/A 0.255 N/A 0.044
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes –0.204 0.143 –0.061 0.043
Plastics, synthetics, & resins –0.083 –0.060 –0.143 0.040
Canned and preserved fruits –0.080 –0.077 –0.157 0.040
Meat products –0.347 0.033 –0.315 0.039
Misc. plastics products N/A 0.300 N/A 0.038
Metal forgings N/A 0.315 N/A 0.028
Iron & steel foundries –0.255 0.026 –0.229 0.025
Ship & boat building & repair 0.037 0.199 0.237 0.022
Guided missiles, space vehicles 0.037 0.237 0.020
Logging –0.204 –0.136 –0.340 0.015
Misc. paper & pulp products –0.105 –0.073 –0.178 0.014
Cement, concrete, gypsum –0.125 0.396 0.270 0.014
Dairy products –0.212 0.339 0.127 0.014
Soaps & cosmetics –0.083 0.062 –0.021 0.013





Table A4  (continued)
Import price change
1980–85 1985–92 1980–92 1975–94
Paints, varnishes –0.083 –0.008 –0.090 0.005
Paperboard containers & boxes –0.105 –0.054 –0.159 0.005
Mean (column) –0.148 0.140 –0.013
Std. deviation 0.118 0.173 0.223
NOTE: Changes are log changes.  Where 1980 import price is unavailable, 1981 import
price was used as a substitute (making the change “1981–85”).  N/A = not available.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the Bureau of Labor Statistics International Price








Table A5  Industry Shares of Shipments and Exports, 1980, 1987, and 1994
Industry share (1980) Industry share (1987) Industry share (1994)
Shipments Rank Exports Rank Shipments Rank Exports Rank Shipments Rank Exports Rank
Meat products 0.033 8 0.012 23 0.032 9 0.017 14 0.032 8 0.016 15
Dairy products 0.018 18 0.002 60 0.019 18 0.002 56 0.016 21 0.002 59
Canned and preserved fruits 0.017 20 0.006 37 0.016 23 0.005 32 0.016 20 0.006 35
Grain mill products 0.013 28 0.017 15 0.015 25 0.012 20 0.015 24 0.009 25
Bakery products 0.010 36 0.000 74 0.009 35 0.000 73 0.008 39 0.001 70
Sugar & confectionary products 0.008 42 0.004 46 0.008 43 0.003 52 0.007 41 0.004 43
Beverage industries 0.021 13 0.003 55 0.020 15 0.003 50 0.019 14 0.004 45
Misc. food preparations 0.020 15 0.030 9 0.019 17 0.022 12 0.017 17 0.016 16
Tobacco manufactures 0.010 35 0.007 34 0.008 42 0.012 21 0.006 46 0.013 20
Knitting mills 0.006 49 0.001 63 0.006 51 0.001 67 0.006 47 0.003 53
Floor coverings 0.003 63 0.002 58 0.004 60 0.001 63 0.004 60 0.002 62
Yarn, thread, & fabric mills 0.012 31 0.009 30 0.011 32 0.005 36 0.010 31 0.005 40
Misc. textile mill products 0.003 68 0.003 53 0.003 66 0.003 49 0.003 64 0.003 49
Apparel & accessories 0.022 12 0.006 36 0.020 14 0.005 37 0.017 19 0.011 23
Misc. fabricated textile products 0.005 53 0.003 51 0.007 46 0.003 54 0.007 43 0.003 52
Pulp, paper & paperboard mills 0.019 17 0.023 12 0.020 16 0.024 11 0.018 15 0.018 13
Misc. paper & pulp products 0.014 25 0.004 44 0.015 24 0.004 38 0.015 23 0.006 37
Paperboard containers & boxes 0.011 33 0.001 66 0.011 33 0.001 62 0.011 29 0.002 57
Newspaper publishing & printing 0.014 26 0.000 75 0.013 28 0.000 74 0.009 36 0.000 75
Printing, publishing 0.032 9 0.007 33 0.040 4 0.008 29 0.036 6 0.009 24
Plastics, synthetics & resins 0.015 21 0.028 10 0.017 20 0.028 9 0.017 18 0.026 9
Drugs 0.015 22 0.012 24 0.016 22 0.017 15 0.018 16 0.018 14
Soaps & cosmetics 0.014 24 0.004 43 0.014 27 0.004 42 0.014 26 0.008 29
Paints, varnishes 0.005 55 0.001 61 0.005 52 0.002 60 0.005 53 0.002 56
172
A
ppendix AIndustrial & misc. chemicals 0.036 5 0.063 6 0.033 7 0.068 5 0.029 10 0.049 6
Petroleum refining 0.060 2 0.014 20 0.053 2 0.020 13 0.046 4 0.014 18
Misc. petroleum & coal products 0.005 58 0.004 50 0.005 53 0.003 53 0.005 54 0.001 65
Tires & inner tubes 0.004 59 0.003 52 0.004 58 0.003 51 0.004 58 0.004 48
Other rubber products 0.005 54 0.003 54 0.005 54 0.003 48 0.005 51 0.004 46
Misc. plastics products 0.017 19 0.010 27 0.026 10 0.013 18 0.032 7 0.015 17
Leather tanning & finishing 0.001 73 0.002 59 0.001 74 0.002 57 0.001 73 0.002 61
Footwear, ex. rubber & plastic 0.003 64 0.001 70 0.002 67 0.001 66 0.001 70 0.001 66
Leather products, ex. footwear 0.002 71 0.001 71 0.001 72 0.000 69 0.001 74 0.001 68
Logging 0.005 57 0.010 28 0.005 56 0.009 28 0.003 61 0.007 32
Sawmills, planning mills 0.015 23 0.011 25 0.017 19 0.010 23 0.014 25 0.009 26
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 0.003 65 0.001 73 0.003 65 0.000 75 0.003 65 0.000 74
Misc. wood products 0.004 62 0.001 62 0.004 59 0.001 61 0.004 56 0.002 63
Furniture & fixtures 0.013 29 0.002 57 0.015 26 0.002 55 0.013 27 0.005 42
Glass & glass products 0.007 45 0.005 39 0.007 45 0.004 43 0.006 45 0.005 41
Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.011 32 0.001 72 0.012 29 0.000 72 0.010 33 0.000 72
Structural clay products 0.001 72 0.001 68 0.001 70 0.001 68 0.001 71 0.000 73
Pottery & related products 0.001 74 0.001 67 0.001 73 0.001 64 0.001 72 0.001 67
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.007 48 0.005 41 0.006 50 0.004 39 0.005 52 0.004 47
Blast furnaces, steelworks 0.035 6 0.017 16 0.022 12 0.005 33 0.022 12 0.008 30
Iron & steel foundries 0.007 44 0.001 65 0.004 57 0.000 71 0.004 57 0.001 69
Primary aluminum industries 0.011 34 0.010 26 0.008 40 0.005 34 0.007 42 0.006 38
Other primary metal industries 0.014 27 0.033 8 0.012 30 0.016 16 0.011 28 0.019 11
Table A5  (continued)
Industry share (1980) Industry share (1987) Industry share (1994)





0.006 50 0.005 38 0.006 49 0.004 41 0.005 50 0.005 39
Engines & turbines 0.009 40 0.022 13 0.006 47 0.015 17 0.006 48 0.019 12
Farm machinery & equipment 0.010 37 0.013 22 0.005 55 0.007 30 0.006 49 0.008 28
Construction & material moving
machines
0.020 14 0.069 4 0.010 34 0.030 8 0.010 32 0.027 8
Metalworking machinery 0.013 30 0.015 17 0.008 38 0.011 22 0.008 37 0.012 22
Office & accounting machines 0.002 70 0.004 47 0.001 69 0.003 47 0.001 69 0.002 55
Electronic computing equipment 0.005 52 0.048 7 0.025 11 0.091 3 0.053 3 0.070 4
Machinery, ex. electrical 0.040 4 0.065 5 0.035 5 0.056 6 0.037 5 0.058 5
Household appliances 0.008 43 0.007 32 0.007 44 0.005 31 0.007 40 0.007 33
Radio, TV, & communication 0.026 10 0.024 11 0.033 6 0.030 7 0.030 9 0.046 7
Electrical machinery, equip. 0.041 3 0.069 3 0.048 3 0.089 4 0.073 2 0.114 1
Motor vehicles 0.068 1 0.074 2 0.085 1 0.097 2 0.093 1 0.108 2
Aircraft & parts 0.033 7 0.089 1 0.032 8 0.106 1 0.023 11 0.083 3
Ship & boat building & repair 0.007 47 0.004 49 0.006 48 0.002 58 0.004 55 0.003 51
Railroad locomotives 0.005 56 0.003 56 0.001 71 0.002 59 0.002 66 0.001 64
Guided missiles, space vehicles 0.007 46 0.005 40 0.011 31 0.004 40 0.006 44 0.002 54
Cycles & misc. transport. equip. 0.003 66 0.004 42 0.003 64 0.005 35 0.003 62 0.007 34
Scientific & controlling instrmnts 0.009 39 0.021 14 0.009 37 0.025 10 0.009 34 0.021 10
Optical & health supplies 0.006 51 0.006 35 0.008 39 0.010 26 0.010 30 0.013 19
Photographic equipment 0.009 41 0.015 18 0.008 41 0.012 19 0.008 38 0.008 27
Watches, clocks 0.001 75 0.001 69 0.001 75 0.000 70 0.000 75 0.000 71
Toys & sporting goods 0.004 60 0.004 45 0.004 61 0.004 45 0.004 59 0.006 36
Misc. manuf industries 0.010 38 0.014 21 0.009 36 0.010 25 0.009 35 0.008 31
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from the NBER Trade Database.
Cutlery, handtools
Fabricated structural metal 0.019 16 0.010 29 0.017 21 0.004 44 0.015 22 0.004 44
Screw machine products 0.004 61 0.001 64 0.003 62 0.001 65 0.003 63 0.002 58
Metal forgings 0.003 67 0.007 31 0.002 68 0.009 27 0.001 68 0.002 60
Ordnance 0.003 69 0.004 48 0.003 63 0.003 46 0.002 67 0.003 50
Misc. fabricated metal products 0.024 11 0.014 19 0.021 13 0.010 24 0.020 13 0.012 21
Fabricated structural etal






Table A6  Industry Export Intensity (Exports/Shipments), 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1994
Export intensity
Mean
1975–94 1994 Rank 1990 Rank 1985 Rank 1980 Rank 1975 Rank
Electronic computing equipment 0.615 0.167 22 0.271 7 0.319 2 0.811 1 1.842 1
Metal forgings 0.345 0.173 21 0.352 2 0.408 1 0.251 3 0.279 4
Aircraft & parts 0.304 0.449 1 0.379 1 0.263 4 0.246 4 0.282 3
Construction & material moving
machines
0.303 0.344 3 0.302 4 0.264 3 0.319 2 0.343 2
Engines & turbines 0.244 0.394 2 0.264 8 0.200 5 0.229 5 0.213 6
Scientific & controlling instrmnts 0.233 0.295 4 0.273 6 0.199 6 0.213 7 0.226 5
Logging 0.210 0.266 5 0.278 5 0.140 11 0.199 8 0.205 8
Office & accounting machines 0.192 0.249 8 0.232 10 0.123 13 0.190 9 0.207 7
Cycles & misc. transport. equip. 0.183 0.265 6 0.189 12 0.186 7 0.149 15 0.140 14
Leather tanning & finishing 0.176 0.246 9 0.343 3 0.143 10 0.126 19 0.085 27
Electrical machinery, equip. 0.163 0.197 15 0.215 11 0.129 12 0.154 12 0.141 12
Industrial & misc. chemicals 0.160 0.208 13 0.174 16 0.147 8 0.162 11 0.133 15
Machinery, exc. electrical 0.155 0.199 14 0.178 13 0.121 14 0.150 14 0.158 10
Other primary metal industries 0.146 0.215 12 0.178 14 0.085 21 0.226 6 0.076 31
Ordnance 0.146 0.227 11 0.153 18 0.104 18 0.142 16 0.191 9
Plastics, synthetics & resins 0.144 0.191 18 0.178 15 0.116 16 0.173 10 0.098 24
Farm machinery & equipment 0.143 0.175 20 0.167 17 0.119 15 0.125 20 0.140 13
Photographic equipment 0.136 0.133 29 0.146 19 0.111 17 0.153 13 0.147 11





Metalworking machinery 0.117 0.176 19 0.140 21 0.084 22 0.106 24 0.116 19
Optical & health supplies 0.117 0.162 23 0.145 20 0.082 25 0.106 25 0.117 18
Misc. food preparations 0.113 0.114 35 0.093 35 0.083 24 0.140 17 0.113 20
Watches, clocks 0.110 0.237 10 0.107 28 0.083 23 0.083 31 0.086 26
Railroad locomotives 0.108 0.096 41 0.098 34 0.145 9 0.054 45 0.108 22
Motor vehicles 0.106 0.146 27 0.123 25 0.088 20 0.100 26 0.119 17
Toys & sporting goods 0.106 0.195 16 0.139 22 0.065 29 0.095 27 0.075 32
Misc. textile mill products 0.104 0.151 25 0.137 23 0.079 27 0.114 23 0.080 29
Pulp, paper & paperboard mills 0.103 0.126 31 0.122 26 0.072 28 0.115 22 0.122 16
Radio, TV, & communication 0.102 0.193 17 0.120 27 0.063 32 0.083 30 0.104 23
Misc. manuf. industries 0.099 0.111 36 0.106 29 0.064 30 0.132 18 0.086 25
Pottery & related products 0.098 0.146 26 0.125 24 0.094 19 0.075 34 0.044 48
Drugs 0.091 0.126 32 0.105 32 0.081 26 0.076 33 0.082 28
Grain mill products 0.085 0.080 44 0.070 43 0.059 34 0.121 21 0.109 21
Household appliances 0.084 0.117 33 0.101 33 0.051 36 0.087 28 0.076 30
Cutlery, handtools 0.081 0.135 28 0.105 31 0.054 35 0.078 32 0.068 33
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.069 0.100 39 0.084 37 0.060 33 0.064 39 0.054 37
Primary aluminum industries 0.064 0.102 37 0.106 30 0.043 39 0.085 29 0.041 49
Tires & inner tubes 0.064 0.116 34 0.092 36 0.036 43 0.073 35 0.052 42
Glass & glass products 0.062 0.096 40 0.083 39 0.045 38 0.061 42 0.046 47
Other rubber products 0.062 0.101 38 0.084 38 0.042 41 0.060 43 0.048 46
Sawmills, planning mills 0.058 0.075 47 0.068 45 0.036 44 0.069 37 0.053 39
Leather products, ex. footwear 0.055 0.152 24 0.069 44 0.034 47 0.043 54 0.020 62
Yarn, thread, & fabric mills 0.053 0.067 50 0.061 47 0.036 45 0.068 38 0.063 34
Misc. fabricated metal products 0.051 0.076 46 0.057 49 0.035 46 0.054 47 0.049 44




Table A6  (continued)
Export intensity
Mean
1975–94 1994 Rank 1990 Rank 1985 Rank 1980 Rank 1975 Rank
Misc. plastics products 0.049 0.059 52 0.050 51 0.038 42 0.053 48 0.058 35
Misc. petroleum & coal products 0.048 0.038 65 0.040 59 0.046 37 0.072 36 0.053 38
Guided missiles, space vehicles 0.048 0.048 58 0.041 57 0.032 49 0.060 44 0.040 50
Footwear, ex. rubber & plastic 0.047 0.127 30 0.082 40 0.024 52 0.022 63 0.009 70
Misc. fabricated textile products 0.045 0.048 59 0.035 63 0.028 51 0.063 40 0.056 36
Screw machine products 0.044 0.087 42 0.072 42 0.023 53 0.030 58 0.051 43
Meat products 0.044 0.065 51 0.058 48 0.032 48 0.035 56 0.029 55
Structural clay products 0.042 0.039 64 0.040 58 0.032 50 0.053 49 0.049 45
Floor coverings 0.041 0.056 54 0.051 50 0.020 62 0.054 46 0.034 52
Blast furnaces, steelworks 0.037 0.045 61 0.048 53 0.020 61 0.045 53 0.052 40
Sugar & confectionary products 0.037 0.074 48 0.062 46 0.019 63 0.045 52 0.024 59
Fabricated structural metal 0.035 0.036 66 0.026 67 0.021 60 0.046 51 0.052 41
Soaps & cosmetics 0.034 0.072 49 0.044 54 0.022 55 0.029 59 0.022 61
Canned and preserved fruits 0.034 0.050 57 0.039 61 0.023 54 0.032 57 0.028 56
Petroleum refining 0.033 0.039 63 0.048 52 0.042 40 0.021 64 0.015 64
Misc. wood products 0.032 0.045 62 0.039 60 0.022 57 0.035 55 0.024 58
Paints, varnishes 0.032 0.057 53 0.041 56 0.021 59 0.027 61 0.024 60
Apparel & accessories 0.030 0.082 43 0.042 55 0.012 66 0.025 62 0.013 66





Furniture & fixtures 0.022 0.048 60 0.031 65 0.013 65 0.017 68 0.012 67
Knitting mills 0.022 0.052 55 0.032 64 0.011 67 0.020 65 0.014 65
Printing, publishing 0.022 0.033 67 0.028 66 0.014 64 0.019 66 0.020 63
Iron & steel foundries 0.019 0.022 70 0.023 68 0.009 69 0.014 69 0.032 53
Beverage industries 0.015 0.029 68 0.019 69 0.009 70 0.013 70 0.008 71
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 0.012 0.012 73 0.015 71 0.003 73 0.017 67 0.010 68
Paperboard containers & boxes 0.011 0.025 69 0.017 70 0.007 71 0.008 72 0.007 72
Dairy products 0.011 0.017 71 0.009 72 0.011 68 0.008 71 0.010 69
Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.004 0.005 74 0.005 74 0.003 72 0.005 73 0.004 73
Bakery products 0.004 0.012 72 0.007 73 0.002 74 0.002 74 0.001 74
Newspaper publishing & printing 0.001 0.001 75 0.001 75 0.001 75 0.000 75 0.000 75
Mean (across industries) 0.096 0.125 0.112 0.074
Std. deviation 0.095 0.090 0.090 0.071
NOTE: Across-industry mean and standard deviation uses industry shares of total value of shipments as weights.





















Footwear, ex. rubber & plastic 0.082 0.313 0.022 0.642 0.046 0.707 0.127
Logging 0.086 0.008 0.199 0.007 0.153 0.020 0.266
Leather products, ex. footwear 0.140 0.283 0.043 0.506 0.040 0.660 0.152
Watches, clocks 0.156 0.436 0.083 0.593 0.070 0.800 0.237
Apparel & accessories 0.174 0.135 0.025 0.285 0.019 0.382 0.082
Tobacco manufactures 0.233 0.011 0.061 0.006 0.123 0.008 0.252
Grain mill products 0.233 0.005 0.121 0.009 0.065 0.018 0.080
Knitting mills 0.253 0.069 0.020 0.151 0.011 0.219 0.052
Pottery & related products 0.312 0.329 0.075 0.444 0.094 0.445 0.146
Blast furnaces, steelworks 0.321 0.125 0.045 0.166 0.020 0.190 0.045
Toys & sporting goods 0.339 0.236 0.095 0.434 0.085 0.507 0.195
Wood bldgs. & mobile homes 0.346 0.041 0.017 0.059 0.002 0.035 0.012
Beverage industries 0.364 0.069 0.013 0.073 0.012 0.068 0.029
Aircraft & parts 0.393 0.070 0.246 0.088 0.270 0.176 0.449
Paints, varnishes 0.400 0.003 0.027 0.016 0.024 0.016 0.057
Furniture & fixtures 0.412 0.047 0.017 0.108 0.013 0.133 0.048
Misc. manuf. industries 0.415 0.190 0.132 0.305 0.090 0.376 0.111
Petroleum refining 0.442 0.068 0.021 0.097 0.032 0.085 0.039









Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.465 0.014 0.005 0.026 0.002 0.012 0.005
Plastics, synthetics & resins 0.466 0.023 0.173 0.048 0.135 0.104 0.191
Tires & inner tubes 0.494 0.135 0.073 0.195 0.053 0.225 0.116
Screw machine products 0.500 0.081 0.030 0.124 0.026 0.156 0.087
Motor vehicles 0.540 0.220 0.100 0.294 0.094 0.275 0.146
Misc. wood products 0.579 0.068 0.035 0.084 0.025 0.101 0.045
Construction & material moving
machines
0.584 0.061 0.319 0.201 0.241 0.237 0.344
Bakery products 0.586 0.006 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.014 0.012
Misc. fabricated textile products 0.592 0.046 0.063 0.096 0.032 0.148 0.048
Newspaper publishing & printing 0.595 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001
Sugar & confectionary products 0.595 0.159 0.045 0.080 0.028 0.078 0.074
Ship & boat building & repair 0.601 0.016 0.049 0.043 0.025 0.040 0.076
Radio, TV, & communication 0.607 0.143 0.083 0.207 0.074 0.298 0.193
Ordnance 0.610 0.039 0.142 0.052 0.085 0.153 0.227
Iron & steel foundries 0.611 0.020 0.014 0.044 0.008 0.046 0.022
Fabricated structural metal 0.631 0.009 0.046 0.013 0.019 0.016 0.036
Sawmills, planning mills 0.638 0.116 0.069 0.123 0.049 0.144 0.075
Misc. food preparations 0.644 0.043 0.140 0.054 0.094 0.066 0.114
Other rubber products 0.654 0.096 0.060 0.088 0.051 0.243 0.101
Scientific & controlling instruments 0.679 0.080 0.213 0.152 0.218 0.228 0.295
Misc. petroleum & coal products 0.711 0.050 0.072 0.076 0.042 0.072 0.038
Engines & turbines 0.711 0.134 0.229 0.241 0.205 0.189 0.394
Soaps & cosmetics 0.714 0.009 0.029 0.022 0.024 0.039 0.072
Printing, publishing 0.721 0.013 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.021 0.033
Yarn, thread & fabric mills 0.722 0.048 0.068 0.095 0.037 0.108 0.067



















Household appliances 0.736 0.072 0.087 0.142 0.064 0.168 0.117
Industrial & misc. chemicals 0.743 0.076 0.162 0.116 0.168 0.132 0.208
Misc. paper & pulp products 0.748 0.014 0.029 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.050
Cutlery, handtools 0.749 0.082 0.078 0.147 0.063 0.176 0.135
Drugs 0.752 0.050 0.076 0.073 0.083 0.093 0.126
Guided missiles, space vehicles 0.761 0.014 0.060 0.015 0.032 0.057 0.048
Office & accounting machines 0.762 0.074 0.190 0.257 0.191 0.451 0.249
Other primary metal industries 0.782 0.244 0.226 0.177 0.108 0.191 0.215
Primary aluminum industries 0.783 0.041 0.085 0.111 0.053 0.157 0.102
Railroad locomotives 0.783 0.048 0.054 0.216 0.135 0.141 0.096
Pulp, paper, & paperboard mills 0.794 0.153 0.115 0.163 0.099 0.168 0.126
Floor coverings 0.795 0.054 0.054 0.070 0.022 0.070 0.056
Electronic computing equipment 0.803 0.101 0.811 0.284 0.297 0.487 0.167
Photographic equipment 0.804 0.116 0.153 0.203 0.123 0.260 0.133
Canned and preserved fruits 0.806 0.035 0.032 0.055 0.027 0.054 0.050
Optical & health supplies 0.807 0.062 0.106 0.087 0.097 0.115 0.162
Dairy products 0.815 0.015 0.008 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.017
Metalworking machinery 0.816 0.113 0.106 0.198 0.108 0.236 0.176









Cycles & misc. transport. equip. 0.832 0.328 0.149 0.241 0.141 0.227 0.265
Metal forgings 0.833 0.028 0.251 0.044 0.418 0.042 0.173
Meat products 0.857 0.043 0.035 0.042 0.043 0.034 0.065
Misc. fabricated metal products 0.863 0.039 0.054 0.066 0.041 0.085 0.076
Electrical machinery, equip. 0.863 0.120 0.154 0.206 0.153 0.313 0.197
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.869 0.050 0.064 0.108 0.064 0.112 0.100
Misc. plastics products 0.875 0.031 0.053 0.053 0.042 0.076 0.059
Farm machinery & equipment 0.881 0.123 0.125 0.170 0.118 0.158 0.175
Machinery, ex. electrical 0.885 0.091 0.150 0.169 0.132 0.187 0.199
Misc. textile mill products 0.887 0.131 0.114 0.122 0.088 0.133 0.151
Leather tanning & finishing 0.887 0.128 0.126 0.242 0.178 0.277 0.246
Mean (unweighted) 0.613 0.089 0.096 0.139 0.080 0.171 0.124
Std. deviation (unweighted) 0.222 0.088 0.108 0.132 0.077 0.164 0.093
NOTE: Import share is calculated as imports divided by domestic supply; export intensity is calculated as exports divided by shipments.
Trade overlap is defined in the text.





















Electrical machinery 0.062 –0.030 61 0.015 0.071 16 0.026 61 0.217 63
Apparel 0.054 –0.175 30 0.070 0.103 8 –0.621 11 0.060 50
Machinery, ex. electric 0.050 –0.113 43 0.043 0.052 19 –0.212 44 0.027 44
Furniture & fixtures 0.049 –0.010 62 0.004 0.048 22 –0.003 59 0.138 59
Motor vehicles 0.049 –0.115 42 0.043 0.086 12 –0.017 57 0.161 60
Printing, publishing 0.039 0.186 70 0.199 0.002 66 –0.068 54 0.288 67
Aircraft & parts 0.029 0.039 65 0.029 0.034 33 0.140 68 0.259 65
Blast furnaces 0.028 –0.634 3 0.107 0.074 14 –1.067 3 –0.553 3
Misc. fabricated metal 0.026 –0.137 38 0.027 0.019 42 –0.358 24 –0.071 26
Fabricated structural metals 0.026 –0.166 32 0.032 0.009 54 –0.742 6 –0.162 16
Sawmills, planing mills 0.023 –0.089 50 0.016 0.003 62 –0.542 15 –0.241 11
Yarn, thread 0.022 –0.291 16 0.045 0.040 28 –0.814 5 –0.139 19
Industrial & misc. chem. 0.021 –0.073 55 0.012 0.040 29 –0.128 51 –0.102 23
Newspaper 0.021 0.069 68 0.037 0.002 67 0.812 75 0.197 61
Metalworking machinery 0.020 –0.178 29 0.026 0.061 18 –0.412 22 –0.183 13
Office & acct machines 0.019 0.260 72 0.141 0.083 13 –0.100 53 0.293 68
Construction machines 0.019 –0.414 8 0.052 0.091 10 –0.478 19 –0.334 8
Electronic computing eqp. 0.018 0.521 74 0.311 0.086 11 0.586 73 0.676 74





Meat products 0.018 0.010 63 0.005 –0.008 72 –0.235 41 –0.239 12
Misc. plastics products 0.017 0.015 64 0.006 0.013 50 –0.004 58 0.243 64
Metal forgings 0.015 –0.199 26 0.022 0.016 47 0.053 62 –0.048 30
Misc. manuf industries 0.014 –0.145 35 0.015 0.110 6 –0.740 7 0.028 45
Canned fruits 0.012 –0.104 46 0.010 0.023 39 –0.280 34 0.067 52
Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.012 –0.083 52 0.008 0.006 58 –0.335 27 –0.155 18
Pulp, paper 0.012 –0.057 58 0.005 0.004 60 –0.129 50 0.047 47
Iron & steel foundries 0.012 –0.532 5 0.040 0.024 38 –0.720 9 –0.543 4
Beverage 0.012 –0.106 44 0.010 0.002 65 –0.315 31 0.079 54
Bakery 0.012 –0.091 48 0.008 0.005 59 0.150 69 0.055 48
Knitting mills 0.011 –0.139 37 0.012 0.097 9 –0.465 21 –0.057 29
Ship & boat building 0.011 –0.193 27 0.016 0.018 45 –0.300 32 –0.037 34
Paperboard 0.011 –0.084 51 0.007 0.003 61 –0.032 56 0.038 46
Plastics, synthetics 0.011 –0.210 24 0.016 0.024 37 –0.252 39 –0.026 36
Misc. food 0.010 –0.067 56 0.005 0.006 57 –0.560 12 –0.118 21
Glass & glass products 0.010 –0.240 20 0.017 0.038 31 –0.333 28 –0.026 35
Drugs 0.010 0.066 67 0.016 0.012 51 0.175 70 0.301 69
Misc. fab. textile 0.009 –0.033 60 0.002 0.043 26 –0.729 8 0.197 62
Cutlery, handtools 0.009 –0.259 18 0.017 0.044 25 –0.336 26 –0.066 27
Farm machinery & eqp. 0.009 –0.626 4 0.034 0.019 43 –0.547 14 –0.589 2
Dairy products 0.009 –0.102 47 0.007 0.001 68 0.534 72 –0.013 37
Household appliances 0.009 –0.274 17 0.017 0.050 21 –0.506 18 0.011 41
Misc. paper 0.009 0.109 69 0.025 0.009 53 –0.131 49 0.084 55
Petroleum refining 0.008 –0.156 33 0.009 0.026 35 0.764 74 –0.129 20
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.008 –0.498 6 0.025 0.039 30 –0.149 48 –0.102 22





















Other rubber products 0.007 –0.169 31 0.009 –0.012 73 –0.233 42 –0.012 38
Engines & turbines 0.007 –0.323 11 0.016 0.113 5 –0.256 38 –0.042 32
Grain mill 0.007 –0.143 36 0.008 0.003 63 –0.361 23 –0.011 39
Misc. wood products 0.007 –0.117 41 0.006 0.014 49 –0.325 30 –0.041 33
Soaps & cosmetics 0.007 0.056 66 0.010 0.011 52 –0.237 40 0.125 58
Photographic eqp. 0.007 –0.090 49 0.005 0.052 20 –0.350 25 0.096 56
Scientific & controlling 0.006 0.515 73 0.107 0.042 27 0.116 66 0.283 66
Tires & inner tubes 0.006 –0.303 13 0.013 0.038 32 –0.272 35 –0.180 14
Toys & sporting goods 0.006 –0.242 19 0.010 0.148 4 –0.476 20 0.064 51
Screw machine products 0.006 –0.187 28 0.008 0.018 46 –0.327 29 –0.171 15
Radio, TV 0.006 –0.315 12 0.012 0.046 23 0.107 65 0.445 73
Sugar products 0.006 –0.135 39 0.006 –0.031 75 –0.158 47 –0.047 31
Other primary metal 0.005 –0.204 25 0.008 0.022 40 –1.139 2 –0.248 10
Guided missiles 0.005 0.557 75 0.093 0.018 44 –0.002 60 0.767 75
Logging 0.004 –0.047 59 0.002 –0.004 71 –0.652 10 –0.101 24
Wood bldgs. & mobile 0.004 –0.147 34 0.005 0.000 69 –1.592 1 –0.356 7
Railroad locos 0.004 –0.815 1 0.017 0.063 17 –0.260 37 –1.396 1
Paints, varnishes 0.003 –0.079 53 0.002 0.006 56 –0.123 52 0.074 53
Primary aluminum industries 0.003 –0.296 15 0.007 0.045 24 –0.298 33 –0.304 9





Misc. textile 0.003 –0.237 22 0.006 0.014 48 –0.230 43 –0.157 17
Ordnance 0.003 0.197 71 0.017 0.003 64 –0.260 36 0.364 71
Floor coverings 0.003 –0.106 45 0.002 0.022 41 –0.524 17 0.026 43
Tobacco 0.003 –0.079 54 0.002 –0.002 70 –0.066 55 0.364 70
Cycles & misc. transport 0.003 –0.065 57 0.001 –0.022 74 0.410 71 0.006 40
Structural clay products 0.003 –0.329 10 0.006 0.032 34 –0.537 16 –0.088 25
Leather products 0.003 –0.444 7 0.007 0.195 3 –0.555 13 –0.063 28
Pottery & related 0.002 –0.237 21 0.004 0.105 7 0.061 63 0.022 42
Optical & health supplies 0.002 –0.133 40 0.002 0.008 55 0.137 67 0.403 72
Misc. petroleum 0.002 –0.215 23 0.003 0.024 36 –0.183 46 0.097 57
Watches, clocks 0.001 –0.812 2 0.006 0.226 1 –0.841 4 –0.415 5
Leather tanning & finish 0.001 –0.296 14 0.002 0.073 15 –0.192 45 –0.359 6
NOTE: Changes are log changes.  Share of total mfg. employment losses/gains: if industry i employment change is negative, measure equals
industry i employment change/total mfg. employment losses; if if industry i employment change is positive, measure equals industry i em-























Electrical machinery 0.066 –0.072 31 0.054 0.135 8 1.146 55 0.456 66
Furniture & fixtures 0.053 0.023 52 0.028 0.038 30 1.478 68 0.254 47
Printing, publishing 0.051 0.108 66 0.132 0.006 52 1.038 46 0.304 54
Apparel 0.050 –0.222 13 0.118 0.146 6 1.965 75 0.223 41
Machinery, ex. electric 0.049 –0.000 46 0.000 0.050 25 0.757 27 0.302 53
Motor vehicles 0.048 0.029 54 0.032 0.016 43 0.800 32 0.323 58
Electronic computing eqp. 0.034 –0.285 9 0.099 0.298 1 0.595 19 0.475 67
Aircraft & parts 0.033 –0.247 11 0.087 0.097 13 0.550 16 –0.026 6
Radio, TV 0.031 –0.297 8 0.094 0.101 12 1.205 58 0.014 8
Office & acct. machines 0.027 –0.345 5 0.094 0.289 2 0.249 6 –0.331 2
Misc. fabricated metal 0.025 0.002 48 0.001 0.026 37 0.952 40 0.180 32
Newspaper 0.024 –0.004 44 0.001 –0.003 64 0.307 9 0.128 23
Fabricated structural metals 0.024 –0.067 32 0.018 0.000 62 0.712 24 0.172 28
Sawmills, planing mills 0.023 0.070 61 0.038 0.005 53 0.949 39 0.494 68
Industrial & misc. chem. 0.021 –0.076 30 0.019 0.021 41 0.477 13 0.126 22
Meat products 0.020 0.221 72 0.109 –0.006 66 0.944 38 0.184 33
Misc. plastics products 0.019 0.346 75 0.173 0.031 32 1.039 47 0.556 72
Yarn, thread 0.018 –0.159 20 0.032 0.022 39 0.871 34 0.164 26





Blast furnaces 0.016 –0.235 12 0.041 –0.003 65 1.084 50 0.187 34
Construction & material
moving machines
0.014 –0.179 16 0.027 0.087 15 0.287 8 0.061 11
Metal forgings 0.013 –0.043 36 0.007 0.005 54 –0.801 1 0.161 25
Misc. manuf. industries 0.013 0.145 67 0.045 0.080 16 0.773 29 0.410 64
Pulp, paper 0.013 –0.057 34 0.008 0.010 48 0.772 28 0.207 38
Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.012 –0.056 35 0.008 –0.014 71 0.732 25 0.121 18
Canned fruits 0.012 0.086 62 0.024 –0.007 69 1.022 45 0.236 44
Bakery 0.012 –0.020 41 0.003 0.004 55 1.911 74 0.189 35
Scientific & controlling 0.012 –0.161 19 0.039 0.112 10 0.593 18 0.244 46
Beverage 0.012 –0.192 14 0.024 –0.006 67 1.369 65 0.171 27
Drugs 0.011 0.246 74 0.070 0.030 34 0.889 35 0.754 74
Knitting mills 0.011 –0.003 45 0.000 0.061 20 1.907 73 0.353 61
Paperboard 0.011 0.088 63 0.022 0.006 51 1.519 70 0.301 52
Misc. food 0.011 0.099 65 0.025 0.011 46 0.445 12 0.121 19
Misc. paper 0.011 0.223 73 0.059 0.001 60 1.125 54 0.262 48
Ship & boat building 0.010 –0.165 18 0.018 0.003 56 1.165 56 –0.026 5
Misc. fab. textile 0.010 0.171 69 0.041 0.065 18 0.891 36 0.383 62
Guided missiles 0.010 –0.500 2 0.045 0.030 33 0.075 4 –0.316 4
Plastics, synthetics 0.009 –0.063 33 0.007 0.056 23 0.859 33 0.317 56
Dairy products 0.009 –0.092 28 0.009 0.001 59 0.493 14 0.111 16
Glass & glass products 0.008 –0.026 39 0.003 0.036 31 0.994 43 0.199 36
Soaps & cosmetics 0.008 0.039 56 0.007 0.019 42 1.459 67 0.264 49
Cutlery, handtools 0.008 –0.101 27 0.009 0.059 21 1.048 48 0.199 37
Iron & steel foundries 0.008 –0.122 23 0.011 0.006 50 0.990 42 0.121 21























Household appliances 0.007 –0.090 29 0.007 0.047 27 1.108 52 0.173 30
Grain mill 0.007 0.028 53 0.004 0.011 47 0.495 15 0.297 51
Misc. wood products 0.007 0.098 64 0.016 0.022 40 1.050 49 0.520 71
Other rubber products 0.007 –0.036 37 0.003 0.169 5 1.124 53 0.394 63
Photographic eqp 0.007 –0.329 7 0.022 0.088 14 0.378 10 0.174 31
Engines & turbines 0.006 –0.156 21 0.010 –0.007 68 0.798 31 –0.010 7
Footwear 0.005 –0.544 1 0.027 0.140 7 1.297 61 0.028 9
Sugar products 0.005 0.012 50 0.001 –0.031 74 1.531 71 0.081 12
Farm machinery & eqp. 0.005 0.064 60 0.008 0.014 45 0.705 23 0.353 60
Screw machine products 0.005 –0.004 43 0.000 0.049 26 1.457 66 0.139 24
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.005 0.052 58 0.013 0.027 36 0.616 20 0.121 20
Toys & sporting goods 0.005 0.194 71 0.025 0.130 9 1.495 69 0.512 69
Tires & inner tubes 0.005 –0.177 17 0.010 0.058 22 1.316 63 0.035 10
Other primary metal 0.005 –0.119 24 0.006 –0.020 73 1.092 51 0.172 29
Logging 0.005 –0.028 38 0.001 0.014 44 0.679 21 0.514 70
Ordnance 0.004 –0.370 4 0.015 0.109 11 0.385 11 –0.325 3
Wood bldgs. & mobile 0.004 0.021 51 0.002 –0.013 70 1.699 72 0.325 59
Paints, varnishes 0.003 –0.101 26 0.004 0.008 49 1.179 57 0.240 45





Misc. textile 0.003 0.006 49 0.000 0.000 61 1.017 44 0.308 55
Tobacco 0.003 0.001 47 0.000 0.002 57 1.306 62 0.231 43
Cycles & misc. transport 0.003 –0.006 42 0.000 –0.041 75 0.565 17 0.275 50
Primary aluminum industries 0.003 –0.110 25 0.003 0.064 19 0.962 41 0.091 14
Optical & health supplies 0.002 0.189 70 0.065 0.043 29 1.232 59 0.610 73
Pottery & related 0.002 0.043 57 0.002 0.027 35 0.693 22 0.317 57
Structural clay products 0.002 –0.128 22 0.003 0.055 24 0.204 5 0.105 15
Railroad locos 0.002 0.062 59 0.003 0.026 38 0.271 7 0.813 75
Leather products 0.002 –0.336 6 0.006 0.196 3 1.328 64 0.208 39
Misc. petroleum 0.001 0.034 55 0.001 –0.002 63 –0.005 2 0.089 13
Leather tanning & finish 0.001 –0.188 15 0.002 0.045 28 0.752 26 0.450 65
Watches, clocks 0.001 –0.381 3 0.003 0.187 4 0.793 30 0.215 40
NOTE: Changes are log changes.  Share of total mfg. employment losses/gains: if industry i employment change is negative, measure equals
industry i employment change/total mfg. employment losses; if if industry i employment change is positive, measure equals industry i em-

























Electrical machinery 0.062 –0.102 822901 0.070 0.042 0.155 0.206 N/A 1.172
Apparel 0.054 –0.397 748325 0.064 0.052 0.194 0.250 0.020 1.343
Machinery, exc. electrical 0.050 –0.114 633346 0.054 0.044 0.113 0.102 0.012 0.544
Furniture & fixtures 0.049 0.013 374982 0.032 0.024 0.070 0.087 –0.093 1.476
Motor vehicles 0.049 –0.085 675574 0.057 0.051 0.217 0.101 0.203 0.783
Printing, publishing 0.039 0.294 580815 0.049 0.038 0.014 0.008 N/A 0.969
Aircraft & parts 0.029 –0.207 282846 0.024 0.029 0.080 0.132 0.237 0.690
Blast furnaces 0.028 –0.869 333094 0.028 0.061 0.143 0.071 –0.062 0.017
Misc. fabricated metal 0.026 –0.135 234805 0.020 0.032 0.050 0.045 N/A 0.594
Fabricated structural metals 0.026 –0.233 386332 0.033 0.056 0.011 0.009 N/A –0.029
Sawmills, planing mills 0.023 –0.019 261766 0.022 0.039 0.124 0.008 –0.129 0.407
Yarn, thread 0.022 –0.450 237402 0.020 0.042 0.068 0.062 0.276 0.057
Industrial & misc. chem. 0.021 –0.149 188667 0.016 0.031 0.089 0.062 –0.081 0.349
Newspaper 0.021 0.065 163512 0.014 0.025 0.002 –0.001 N/A 1.119
Metalworking machinery 0.020 –0.203 177442 0.015 0.036 0.130 0.129 0.068 0.488
Office & acct. machines 0.019 –0.085 31820 0.003 0.008 0.181 0.372 –0.350 0.149
Construction & material
moving machines 0.019 –0.593 251471 0.021 0.057 0.113 0.177 0.128 –0.191
Electronic computing eqp. 0.018 0.236 394949 0.034 0.046 0.214 0.384 –0.350 1.180











Misc. plastics products 0.017 0.361 293087 0.025 0.047 0.043 0.044 N/A 1.035
Metal forgings 0.015 –0.241 82316 0.007 0.027 0.032 0.021 N/A –0.748
Misc. manuf industries 0.014 0.129 219224 0.019 0.054 0.234 0.190 0.178 0.033
Canned fruits 0.012 –0.018 115909 0.010 0.033 0.043 0.016 –0.157 0.742
Cement, concrete, gypsum 0.012 –0.139 122308 0.010 0.035 0.015 –0.008 0.270 0.397
Pulp, paper 0.012 –0.114 73250 0.006 0.023 0.154 0.014 –0.178 0.644
Iron & steel foundries 0.012 –0.654 123928 0.011 0.051 0.028 0.030 –0.229 0.270
Beverage 0.012 –0.299 69384 0.006 0.022 0.066 –0.003 0.216 1.054
Bakery 0.012 –0.111 93518 0.008 0.027 0.008 0.009 N/A 2.060
Knitting mills 0.011 –0.142 63980 0.005 0.020 0.114 0.159 0.292 1.441
Ship & boat building 0.011 –0.358 227173 0.019 0.075 0.025 0.021 0.237 0.865
Paperboard 0.011 0.004 74640 0.006 0.024 0.006 0.009 –0.159 1.487
Plastics, synthetics 0.011 –0.273 69623 0.006 0.027 0.044 0.081 –0.143 0.608
Misc. food 0.010 0.032 131110 0.011 0.040 0.047 0.017 N/A –0.115
Glass & glass products 0.010 –0.266 125742 0.011 0.048 0.075 0.074 0.270 0.661
Drugs 0.010 0.312 68042 0.006 0.022 0.057 0.041 –0.475 1.064
Misc. fab. textile 0.009 0.138 96492 0.008 0.037 0.068 0.109 0.020 0.162
Cutlery, handtools 0.009 –0.359 47530 0.004 0.029 0.103 0.103 N/A 0.712
Farm machinery & eqp. 0.009 –0.562 110815 0.009 0.066 0.127 0.033 –0.000 0.158
Dairy products 0.009 –0.194 115101 0.010 0.044 0.015 0.002 0.127 1.027
Household appliances 0.009 –0.364 93327 0.008 0.047 0.105 0.097 N/A 0.603
Misc. paper 0.009 0.331 82257 0.007 0.028 0.016 0.010 –0.178 0.994
Petroleum refining 0.008 –0.417 41568 0.004 0.026 0.089 0.010 N/A 0.817
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 0.008 –0.446 61299 0.005 0.049 0.071 0.066 0.270 0.467
Footwear 0.007 –0.950 144385 0.012 0.091 0.436 0.359 –0.097 1.375

























Engines & turbines 0.007 –0.479 59276 0.005 0.039 0.130 0.106 –0.050 0.541
Grain mill 0.007 –0.115 60978 0.005 0.033 0.009 0.013 N/A 0.134
Misc. wood products 0.007 –0.019 63757 0.005 0.036 0.069 0.035 N/A 0.726
Soaps & cosmetics 0.007 0.094 72412 0.006 0.035 0.015 0.030 –0.021 1.223
Photographic eqp 0.007 –0.419 40442 0.003 0.030 0.147 0.140 –0.155 0.028
Scientific & controlling 0.006 0.354 111831 0.010 0.024 0.111 0.154 –0.057 0.709
Tires & inner tubes 0.006 –0.479 60039 0.005 0.044 0.140 0.096 –0.050 1.044
Toys & sporting goods 0.006 –0.047 115307 0.010 0.068 0.301 0.278 0.016 1.019
Screw machine products 0.006 –0.192 22430 0.002 0.029 0.100 0.067 –0.158 1.130
Radio, TV 0.006 –0.380 279570 0.024 0.126 0.179 0.147 N/A 1.312
Sugar products 0.006 –0.122 45218 0.004 0.039 0.118 –0.062 –0.653 1.373
Other primary metal 0.005 –0.322 95218 0.008 0.076 0.168 0.002 –0.218 –0.047
Guided missiles 0.005 0.057 177594 0.015 0.080 0.023 0.048 0.237 0.073
Logging 0.004 –0.075 74568 0.006 0.060 0.013 0.010 –0.340 0.027
Wood bldgs. & mobile 0.004 –0.126 90571 0.008 0.099 0.043 –0.012 –0.061 0.107
Railroad locos. 0.004 –0.753 41625 0.004 0.108 0.076 0.089 0.246 0.011
Paints, varnishes 0.003 –0.180 24381 0.002 0.044 0.006 0.014 –0.090 1.055
Primary aluminum industries 0.003 –0.405 62610 0.005 0.070 0.074 0.109 –0.218 0.664
Misc. textile 0.003 –0.231 22612 0.002 0.042 0.124 0.015 0.294 0.788











Floor coverings 0.003 0.055 33619 0.003 0.049 0.051 0.024 0.276 0.720
Cycles & misc. transport 0.003 –0.071 60810 0.005 0.094 0.271 –0.063 0.237 0.975
Structural clay products 0.003 –0.457 14464 0.001 0.084 0.106 0.088 0.270 –0.333
Leather products 0.003 –0.779 49057 0.004 0.142 0.361 0.391 –0.097 0.773
Pottery & related 0.002 –0.195 23462 0.002 0.072 0.347 0.133 0.370 0.754
Optical & health supplies 0.002 0.425 130452 0.011 0.126 0.072 0.051 –0.057 1.368
Misc. petroleum 0.002 –0.181 8048 0.001 0.074 0.064 0.022 N/A –0.188
Watches, clocks 0.001 –0.697 7025 0.001 0.091 0.458 0.413 –0.143 –0.048
Leather tanning & finish 0.001 –0.296 3530 0.000 0.074 0.190 0.117 –0.156 0.560
Mean (weighted) –0.153 309515 0.026 0.043 0.104 0.097 –0.0125*
Std. deviation (weighted) 0.272 255785 0.022 0.018 0.077 0.098 0.2226*
NOTE: * = unweighted mean and standard deviation; N/A denotes not available.







Industry exchange rate indices
Industry exchange rate indices are constructed as follows:
RERk,t = 
where RERk,t is the real exchange rate index for industry k in year t,
ERIi,t is the nominal exchange rate index for country i in year t, j is the
number of countries that account for at least 2 percent of imports for
industry k, SHIMPk,i is country i’s share of total imports into the United
States for industry k in 1984, and PPIUS,t is the U.S. producer price in-
dex for year t.
Nominal exchange rate indices are constructed in the following
manner:
ERIi,t = × 100 + 100
where ERi,t is the U.S.-country i bilateral nominal exchange rate (mea-
sured in national currency units per US$) and ERIi,1990 is set = 100.
Industry foreign cost indices
Industry foreign cost indices are constructed as follows:
RFCk,t = 

















PPIi,t is the producer price index for country i for year t, and the other
variables are defined as above.
Data definitions and sources
The bilateral nominal exchange rates (U.S.-country i) for all coun-
tries, except for Hong Kong, and Taiwan, were taken from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics  and cover the
period 1978–1994. The nominal exchange rate for each country in year
t is measured as an average of the monthly exchange rates (line rf in In-
ternational Financial Statistics). The bilateral nominal exchange rates
for Hong Kong and Taiwan were taken from the Penn World Tables and
cover the period 1978–1992 for Hong Kong and 1978–1990 for Tai-
wan.
The consumer price index was used whenever the producer price
index was unavailable.  For all countries except for Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, and China, the price indices were taken from the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and cover the period
1978–1994, with the exception of Costa Rica (1978–1993), Nicaragua
(1978–1992), Uruguay (1978–1993) and Romania (1978–1990).  
Countries omitted
Macao, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia were omitted from the
calculations because data for these countries was unavailable.  Macao
accounted for 4 percent of imports in SIC 239 and 2 percent of imports
in SIC 394; the Soviet Union accounted for 17 percent of imports of
SIC 287; Yugoslavia accounted for 3 percent of imports in SIC 259 and
2 percent of imports in SIC 348.
Data limitations
Source weights for the industry exchange rates were calculated
from information on industry imports by country of origin.  To mini-
mize the degree of industry aggregation required in the calculations,
only the subset of three-digit CIC industries that correspond to a single
three-digit SIC industry was used to calculate the instruments.  Thus,
the IV import price analysis must be limited to this subset of industries.
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First-stage estimates
First-stage estimates of the relationship between industry real im-
port price and the two instruments, a source-weighted exchange rate
and a source-weighted index of foreign production costs, are reported
in Table B1.  The fit of the first-stage regression is reasonable (R2 =
0.324), and the signs of the estimated coefficients are as predicted and
statistically significant.  As the industry exchange rate increases (more
national currency units per U.S. dollar), the import price index increas-
es and, as foreign production costs increase, so do import prices.
Table B1  First-Stage Import Price Regression
Model: 1
No. obs: 290
Trade-weighted exchange rate –0.3586**
(0.1273)
Relative foreign costs 0.0405
(0.2484)
Index of ind. production 0.0037*
(0.0014)










Exchange rate = 0: Pr > F 0.015
Relative foreign costs = 0: Pr > F 0.986
NOTE: Specification includes one lag in trade-weighted ex-
change rate and relative foreign costs.  * = significant at the 5%
level.  ** = significant at 1% level.
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